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ABSTRACT 
Eating Empire, Going Local centers the island of Pohnpei, Micronesia in a global story of 
colonial encounter and dietary change. It follows Pohnpeians and Pohnpei’s outer Islanders in 
their encounters with Spain, Germany, Japan, and the United States, negotiating, adapting to, and 
resisting empire through food and food production. In the process, Pohnpei extended food’s 
traditional role as locus of political influence and used it to navigate deceptively transformative 
interventions in ecology, consumption, the market, and the body. Food became Pohnpei’s middle 
ground, one that ultimately fostered a sharp rise in rates of non-communicable diseases like 
diabetes, heart disease, and hypertension. The chapters draw on global commodity histories that 
converge on the island, of coconuts, rice, imported foods, and breadfruit. These foods illuminate 
the local and global forces that have delivered public health impacts and new political 
entanglements to the island. Eating Empire uses food and the analytic lenses it enables – from 
ecology and race to domesticity and sovereignty – as a tool to reimagine Pohnpei’s historical 
inter-imperial and contemporary political relationships from the bottom up.
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PREFACE 
 
Casual chatter on Pohnpei often turns to the island’s escalating rates of non-
communicable disease, its numerous heavyset residents, the abrupt spike in both after the 
1970s, and to years past when things were different. Older Pohnpeians and outer 
Islanders have often reminisced with me over the lean figures they saw in their youth, and 
of a time when they themselves felt healthier, or lighter. Those familiar with my work in 
the archives ask whether I have seen photographs of earlier times, when their ancestors 
were fitter, and stronger. “How have you seen how our bodies used to be,” some ask, 
“and how thin we were?” Something has changed on Pohnpei. An indigenous food 
system that once promoted healthy bodies has been replaced with one that fosters a 
deadly growth in conditions like heart disease and hypertension, and by 2002 had left 
73.1% of Pohnpei’s adult population overweight or obese and 32.1% with diabetes.1  
The epidemic of non-communicable disease on Pohnpei is a matter of urgent 
community concern, as are NCD epidemics in indigenous communities across Oceania 
and North America. Those public health crises have also become a priority for national 
and international health organizations, and the Pacific Island Health Officers Association 
has even declared a “regional state of health emergency” across Micronesia and 
American Samoa.2 But the historical transformations of island food systems and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 These figures are based on a 2002 population-based cross-sectional survey of 1,638 Pohnpeian adults 
between 25 and 64 years of age. The 73.1% figure includes 30.5% adults classified as overweight and 
42.6% as obese. Women were more likely than men to be diagnosed with diabetes, at rates of 37.1% and 
26.4% respectively. 46.6% of the study population was diagnosed with hypercholesterolemia and 21.2% 
with high blood pressure, with a higher percentage of men (26.8%) than women (15.6%) having 
hypertension. Henry M. Ichiho, et al., “An Assessment of Non-Communicable Diseases, Diabetes, and 
Related Risk Factors in the Federated States of Micronesia, State of Pohnpei: A Systems Perspective.” 
Hawai’i Journal of Medicine & Public Health 75, no. 5, Supplement 1 (May 2013), 51. 
2 Pacific Islands Health Officers Association. “Board Resolution #48-01: ‘Declaring a Regional State of 
Health Emergency Due to the Epidemic of Non-Communicable Diseases in the United States-Affiliated 
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growth of other risk factors for NCDs are more globally rooted, more fundamental to 
lived experience, and more far-reaching than treatment of the body alone can fully 
address, whether through nutrition education or medical interventions. Island food 
systems are intricate and porous, weaving together global economic forces with local 
environmental change, racial frictions, gender formations, colonial power relations, and 
the idiosyncratic cultural meanings that become entangled with individual foodstuffs. 
Once transformed, the impacts of those food systems can be just as extensive, from health 
to sovereignty, culture to economic development, social relations to identity.  
In 2015, I visited the offices of Island Food Community to speak with the 
organization’s director, Rainer Jimmy, about the reordering of Pohnpei’s food system. 
Island Food’s founding vision, to foster a “productive, environmentally sound island” 
where locally grown foods provide “food security, sustainable development, economic 
benefits, self-reliance, improved health, cultural preservation, and human dignity” 
suggests the scale of that reordering.3 But Jimmy thought back to his own childhood, 
when “people would wake up and get ready to go to their land, find food, and plant 
food.” As the cash economy expanded in the 1960s and 1970s, people tended “not [to] 
stop [farming], but to ignore their land,” trading subsistence crops for fast-cooking 
imports. “Maybe,” Jimmy mused, “that was the reason there were not many NCDs. We 
would go up, spend the whole day cleaning, climbing, and then eating food. The land. We 
could live off the land.”4  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pacific Islands,’” 2010. Accessed 15 October, 2017, http://www.pihoa.org/fullsite/newsroom/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2012/06/NCD_Emergency_Declaration.pdf. 
3 Island Food Community of Pohnpei, “Articles of Incorporation” in The Building of a New Nation… The 
Federated States of Micronesia. Micronesian/Pacific Collection, College of Micronesia-FSM, 1. 
4 Rainer Jimmy. Interview by author. Kolonia, Pohnpei, 13 January 2015. 
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This evolving relationship between Pohnpei’s land and its people has powerfully 
shaped the lives of its residents, but it precedes them as well. Most recently, that 
evolution was framed by four periods of colonial rule: by Spain from 1886 to 1899, 
Germany until 1914, Japan until 1945, and the United States until 1978. Over a few 
generations, as foreign flags were raised and lowered, Pohnpei’s colonialities layered one 
on top of the other, becoming embedded into the fabric of the island with the colonial 
subjectivities that emerged alongside them. Together, those accumulated strata of 
colonial encounter formed the building blocks of modern Pohnpei. But with the 
accumulation of those encounters has come pain: pain to bodies, and to the food systems 
that sustain them. Brett Walker writes that all modern nations “require pain and 
acceptance of that pain from their subjects and citizenry,” and that citizens experience the 
policies and priorities of their nations physiologically, at times with lethal consequences.5 
Here I offer prehistories of the pain that Pohnpei’s colonial encounters have brought to its 
people, and of the public health crises that now preoccupy a postcolonial state. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Brett Walker. Toxic Archipelago: A History of Industrial Disease in Japan. (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2010), 9, 11. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Eating Empire, Going Local centers the island of Pohnpei in a global story of 
colonial encounter and dietary change. It follows Pohnpeians and Pohnpei’s outer 
Islanders, engaging food and food production as political spaces through which they 
negotiated and resisted empire, extended food’s traditional role as locus of political 
influence, and used it to navigate deceptively transformative interventions in ecology, 
consumption, the market, and the body. In the process food became Pohnpei’s middle 
ground, a middle ground that ultimately fostered its rise in rates of non-communicable 
disease. The chapters draw on global commodity histories that converge on the island, of 
coconuts, rice, imported foods, and breadfruit, in order to illuminate the local and global 
forces that delivered these new political entanglements and public health impacts. Eating 
Empire uses food and the analytic lenses it enables – from ecology and race to 
domesticity and sovereignty – as a tool to reimagine Pohnpei’s historical inter-imperial 
and contemporary political relationships from the bottom up. 
The story of dietary change on Pohnpei is the story of an indigenous food 
system’s transformation under a century of colonial rule. Epidemiologist Elise Dela Cruz-
Talbert defines a food system as all the ways food is “grown, processed, transported, 
eaten, and disposed of,” each of which may vary widely by region, locality, 
socioeconomic status, and ethnicity. Food systems are woven together by threads so 
diverse and interconnected that they exert pressures on us from all directions, seen and 
unseen, even as we retain agency to make choices within those systems. “Imagine,” Cruz-
Talbert writes, “that you go with the flow of what your family and friends are eating, dine 
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in your neighborhood, and gravitate towards the foods you see or hear about on 
television. How would you be eating?”6  
We might then ask how a Pohnpeian “going with the flow” would eat prior to 
colonization, how she would eat now, and what accounts for the extent of the change. In 
the early 19th century, just prior to Pohnpei’s first sustained contacts with whalers, 
beachcombers, and missionaries, most Pohnpeians ate a balanced diet of starchy staples 
like breadfruit and taro, seafood, fruits, sugarcane and, less commonly, ceremonial foods 
like dog. Absent natural disasters like drought or typhoon, families skillful and diligent 
enough to fish and farm found an abundance of healthy food, especially in the rahk 
season when breadfruit was most abundant. Today, those foods are still widely 
consumed. But the island’s commercial economy has also made staples like rice or flour 
and fatty, salty imports almost ubiquitous: from the groceries and restaurants of Kolonia 
on Pohnpei’s northern coast to the “local stores” of its rural municipalities and outer 
islands, from traditional feasts and office parties to school lunches and home meals.  
Imported foods have become woven into Pohnpei’s food system, which is itself 
firmly embedded within the dense webs of social and political obligation that shape life 
on the island. Emelihter Kihleng’s 2008 poem “Pressure” suggests the scale of that 
embeddedness: 
Mihna needs a case of ramen for the kapasmwar7  
Nohno Anako needs a 50 lb. bag of rice for the meal 
plus ehu kehs en malek8 
Soulik is in the hospital again (his liver) 
my cousin Reileen just had a baby 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Elise Leimomi Dela Cruz-Talbert. “How We Choose Our Food and How Our Food Chooses Us: Public 
Health” in The Value of Hawai’i 2: Ancestral Roots, Oceanic Visions. (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i 
Press, 2014), 153-154. 
7 A feast for bestowing new titles in the chiefly system 
8 One case of chicken 
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I need to bring hot dogs to the fundraiser 
the car windshield is leaking 
pay day isn't until Wednesday 
I'm on my own9 
 
Kihleng’s speaker struggles to bridge her participation in the cash economy with her duty 
to show generosity to family, in part by converting her limited savings into gifts of 
purchased food. Pressures known to precolonial Pohnpei, like caring for new mothers and 
sick relatives, are added to the strains of wage work, and both exacerbated by unequal 
access to money. While the speaker is free to purchase or eat whatever she chooses, 
violating her obligations may jeopardize the family ties that root her in Pohnpei society.  
 Scholars have typically offered two explanations for how imported foods like 
white rice and hot dogs have come to be such essential components of so many 
indigenous communities. On the one hand, “dietary colonialism” has framed an array of 
interpretations that foreground the influence of colonial or global economic power. In 
1975, for instance, the geographer T.G. McGee used dietary colonialism as a device to 
apply dependency theory to his reading of Pacific dietary change.10 “Food dependency” 
in Oceania, he argued, was a product of colonial cash cropping, the urbanization it 
produced, and the resulting spread of food imports from urban to rural areas, all of which 
culminated in Islanders being “forced away from the use of their own resources.”11 Three 
decades later, anthropologist Martha Ward likened Pohnpei’s “dietary colonialism” to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Emelihter Kihleng. My Urohs. (Honolulu: Kahuaomanoa Press, 2008), 42. 
10 As Richard White suggests, the central concern of dependency theory during the 1970s and 1980s was 
“the process by which peripheral regions are incorporated into the global capitalist system and the 
‘structural distortions’ – political, economic, and social – that result in these societies.” For White’s 
application of dependency theory to shifts in Choctaw, Pawnee, and Navajo food systems, see: Richard 
White. The Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change among the Choctaws, 
Pawnees, and Navajos. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), xvi.  
11 T.G. McGee. Food Dependency in the Pacific: A Preliminary Statement. Working Paper/Development 
Studies Centre, Australian National University. (Canberra: Australian National University, Research 
School of Pacific Studies, 1975), 4-6. 
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disease in the social body, attacking the United States for “’force-feeding’ its own 
dysfunctional values about consumption to island societies who neither asked for nor 
needed such interventions.” “Obesity,” Ward argued, “is not an individual choice or a 
character defect; it is the system-wide availability of foods that entice, seduce, and fill 
with empty calories; it is schools that feed children turkey tails and Spam.” According to 
Ward, that system facilitated the transformation of certain food imports into “social and 
biological necessities, something at the root of what it means to be Pohnpeian.”12 
 Historian Tamara Levi’s recent work on rationing and indigenous peoples in the 
19th century U.S. and South Australia finds fertile ground for this sort of top-down 
reading. Levi explores four communities where food rationing anchored coercive 
strategies to expand government access to indigenous lands. There, rations constrained 
behavior and enforced acculturation, while also helping governments avoid the sort of 
“straightforward exile or extermination” that might have violated “national ideologies 
encompassing humanitarian thought and Christian duty.”13 But on Pohnpei, deliberate 
colonial meddling in indigenous food systems can be difficult to locate. Rather than 
“force-feeding” food values to passive recipients, officials prioritized interventions in 
environments, societies, and economies they considered unrelated to food or diet, but 
which nonetheless helped transform Pohnpei’s food system over the course of a few 
generations. Ironically, some of the starkest transformations came at the behest of U.S. 
officials who also declaimed their support for the production and consumption of local 
foods, and defended their health benefits. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Martha Ward. Nest in the Wind: Adventures in Anthropology on a Tropical Island. (Long Grove, Illinois: 
Waveland Press, 2005), 165-166. 
13 Tamara Levi. Food Control and Resistance: Rations and Indigenous Peoples in the United States and 
South Australia. (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2016), 6-7. 
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 On the other hand, nutrition researchers and healthcare professionals working in 
indigenous communities have typically foregrounded individual behaviors and eating 
choices, which are presumed to be at least partly changeable through education and 
counseling. While Pohnpei’s first colonial healthcare systems were almost entirely 
concerned with infectious disease, its postwar governments have demonstrated a similar 
level of commitment to education-based nutrition programming. These interventions are 
not only within the reach of healthcare professionals, agriculturalists, and community 
advocates, whose influence rarely permits them to spearhead truly systemic reforms, they 
are also unlikely to upset capitalist commitments to consumer choice and free markets, or 
to subvert government authority by inducing radical social or economic change. In 1954, 
for instance, University of Hawai’i nutritionist Mary Murai carried out one of the 
Carolines’ first large-scale nutrition studies, aiming to facilitate “educational and 
developmental programs conducive to improved conditions.” But Murai’s willingness to 
attribute some responsibility for the incipient nutrition crisis she found on Majuro Atoll 
to U.S. policymaking, and her assertion that “good food consumption depends on both 
education and economics,” led officials to dismiss her work as “pessimistic” and decline 
to incorporate her recommendations as official policy.14 
 Charlotte Biltekoff has argued that dietary ideals in the postbellum U.S. convey 
two interlocking sets of social ideals: one that “communicates emerging cultural notions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Murai’s study, which I discuss briefly in chapter three, included a number of more specious conclusions 
as well. Using nutrition standards established by the National Research Council, Murai seemed to judge 
most of the people she met on Chuuk Lagoon’s Udot Island and Majuro as deficient in most of the 
categories measured. This ostensible undernourishment led her to prescribe increased consumption of a 
wider range of foods. Finding 97% of Majuro residents below NRC allowances for caloric intake, for 
instance, Murai recommended increased intake of fat and carbohydrates. Mary Murai. Nutrition Study in 
Micronesia (Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1954), 1, 90; Dorothy E. Richard, United States 
Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, vol. 3 (Washington: Office of the Chief 
of Naval Operations, 1957), 943-944. 
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of good citizenship and prepares people for new social and political realities,” and 
another that attempts to distinguish the character and identity of the American middle 
class and express its social concerns.15 On Pohnpei, as in the colonized islands to its east 
and west, food was invested with its own notions of good citizenship. German officials 
aimed to “educate” Islanders for capitalist labor by fostering plantation environments that 
regulated work and promoted import consumption. Japanese settlers and agriculturalists 
upheld rice as a metaphor for racial and national identity, using mutually reinforcing 
notions of “rice as our food” and “rice paddies as our land to shape social and agricultural 
policy.16 American officials and healthcare professionals advocated nutrition 
interventions they hoped would result in “the people themselves deciding” to purchase 
healthier foods and then “of their own volition, requesting that these products be made 
available.”17 Pohnpeian sovereignty advocates warned that “our appetites are standing in 
the way of progress” toward political autonomy, championing the consumption of deeply 
rooted local foods like breadfruit over imports like rice.18 
 Each of these ideal Pohnpeian food citizenships was particular to time and place, 
influenced by colonizers’ national identities, prevailing global approaches to imperial 
rule, technologies of food production and distribution, environmental change, and the 
island’s own evolving strategies of adaptation and resistance to foreign control. But while 
the discourses that defined Pohnpei’s ideal colonial subject and capitalist consumer 
converged markedly after the Second World War, administrative commitments to both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Charlotte Biltekoff. Eating Right in America: The Cultural Politics of Food and Health. (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2013), 7. 
16 Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney. Rice as Self: Japanese Identities through Time. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1993), 4. 
17 High Commissioner to Distad Ponape, “Addition of Enriched Rice and Flour to Micronesian Diet,” May 
14, 1958, Robert Gibson Papers, Pacific Collection, University of Hawai’i, Box 7, Folder 93, 1-2 
18 Ann Nakano. “Food Stands in Way of Self-Gov’t.” The National Union. January 30, 1981, 7. 
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corresponded to such a degree as to make the island’s 20th century governance something 
of a shared inter-imperial project, albeit one thrown out of time. Yet these parallels are 
often obscured by the strict periodization of modern Pohnpeian history into colonial 
periods, and by the logistical challenges inherent to accessing archival documents in all 
the relevant languages. I therefore offer histories of core commodities that resurface 
throughout Pohnpei’s modern history, but which also highlight the particularities of each 
colonial ruler. I also rely on Japanese, German, and English-language archives and oral 
histories to better apprehend the island’s inter-imperial overlap, and its divergences.  
Chapter one is an environmental history of Pohnpei’s trade in copra, the dried 
flesh of the coconut. During the 1870s and 1880s, copra drew trading firms to the island, 
and became a primary focus of the colonial regime during the island’s German 
occupation. Here I draw our attention to the entanglement of human and nonhuman 
agents that facilitated the growth of Pohnpei’s copra trade, and argue that Pohnpeians and 
coconuts, commodified as copra, remade the land and one another as indigenous and 
foreign visions of the coconut collided. Chapter two is a history of race and rice under 
Japanese rule. In the Japanese home islands, rice acted as an enduring, bifurcated 
metaphor for the Japanese self, both enforcing the eater’s racial identity and marking the 
paddy land that produced it as Japanese. On Pohnpei, rice became a site in which one’s 
standing within the colonial order realized and contested, at least until the island’s racial 
regimes collapsed under the weight of the Pacific War.   
 Chapter three offers a history of domesticity and imported foods during the early 
American occupation. It traces the routes products like corned beef, canned salmon, 
canned milk, flour, tinned vegetables, and alcohol took through the households and 
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bodies of early Cold War Pohnpei. It argues that the U.S. Navy’s confident vision of 
postwar Kolonia as an import-dependent base town broke down in the wake of American 
unease with modernity’s impacts on Pacific Islander bodies and landscapes, and in light 
of Kolonia’s flowering into a multiethnic hub whose own use of imports granted it a 
measure of independence from outside leadership. Chapter four is a history of breadfruit, 
rice, and the sovereignty movement of the 1960s and 1970s. It focuses on a series of 
impacts to local economies, political systems, cultures, and health so far-reaching they 
might be called a rice revolution. But the risk to Pohnpei’s food sovereignty was always 
the era’s primary concern, as the rice revolution’s deep entanglements with imported 
goods and U.S. aid threatened to lure voters toward Washington at the very moment the 
territory’s independence movements reached their climax.  
 
 
Pohnpei 
 
Pohnpei is named for the stone altar on which it rests. The first voyaging party to 
reach it called forth a quantity of altar stones, placing them on a coralhead just visible 
above the ocean’s surface. That altar became the foundation for all of Pohnpei, whose 
earth, stones, and flora were subsequently assembled atop it through a mixture of human 
and divine labor. The island is high, volcanic, and lush, lying in the Caroline archipelago 
seven degrees north of the equator. Roughly circular and around 130 miles square, it is 
surrounded by a barrier reef that extends about two miles from the shoreline, enclosing a 
lagoon and a scattering of small islets. Outside its reef lie a number of low coral atolls, 
eight of which are inhabited and presently incorporated within the political boundaries of 
the Federated States of Micronesia’s Pohnpei State. Those atolls include And, eight miles 
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southwest of the main island; Pakin, 21 miles west; Ngatik, 88 miles southwest; Mokil, 
109 miles east; Pingelap, 188 miles southeast; Oroluk, 202 miles west-northwest; 
Nukuoro, 245 miles south; and Kapingamarangi, 465 miles north-northeast. Prior to 
colonial rule, the people of these atolls maintained varying degrees of contact with 
Pohnpei. Today, all have a permanent presence there. 
Most of Pohnpei’s residents live near the shoreline, where there are no natural 
beaches and few coastal plains, but where an extensive system of mangrove swamps 
guards against excessive erosion. The interior is rugged and more sparsely populated, 
with deep valleys and high mountain ridges like Nahnalaud and Ngihneni reaching more 
than 2,500 feet above sea level. Pohnpei’s interior is among the wettest places on earth, 
receiving between 295 and 400 inches of rainfall per year, and sending 65-70% of that 
rainfall downstream through a network of more than 40 streams and rivers. The coasts are 
drier, and the western leeward shore drier than the windward side, but the island as a 
whole still averages 190 inches of rainfall annually. The climate is tropical, somewhat 
drier and less humid in January and February, but averaging between 80 and 90 percent 
humidity and holding to a narrow temperature range around the average of 81 degrees 
throughout the year.19 
Pohnpei’s land and sea are rich with resources. The lands Pohnpeians classify as 
nanwel, those not under human management, are found mostly in the interior. Inhabited 
and ruled by enihn, the gods and spirits of traditional religion, nanwel regions 
traditionally represented the limits of human authority, though they still yielded valuable 
crops like bananas and wild yams. Nansapw land is “humanized,” sustaining households, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Mark Merlin, et al., Tuhke En Pohnpei: Plants of Pohnpei. (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1992), 1-4, 13-
14. 
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farms, and most social activity. Over the centuries, nansapw farms became strategically 
managed agroforests, which typically consist of an upper canopy of breadfruit and 
coconuts, a midlevel canopy of herbaceous and woody perennials, and a lower canopy of 
root crops like yams.20 The mixture of human and divine knowledge that brought these 
agroforests into being, and their enduring power to sustain human life, has led Pohnpei 
Chief of Agriculture Adelino Lorens to describe them as a “heavenly gift to Pohnpei… a 
natural gift,” one contemporary Pohnpeians should build upon but never undermine.21 
Fish and shellfish have also sustained Pohnpeians, although their island’s 
agricultural abundance requires less dependence on marine resources than on outer atolls. 
Precolonial techniques like line fishing, spearfishing, gathering shellfish, and cooperative 
multi-net fishing typically took place within the confines of the reef. Most fishing was 
done on an ad hoc basis, with the catch divided among the fishermen, their kin, and 
neighbors. Although I focus mainly on agriculture, the increasing entanglement of 
Pohnpei’s fisheries with its market economy during the 20th century mirrors a similar 
evolution in its farms. Technologies like monofilament gill nets, fiberglass boats 
equipped with outboard motors, and icemakers expanded access to marine resources 
outside the reef, drawing fish like tuna more deeply into Pohnpei’s maritime economy, 
and providing a cash incentive for fishing groups to limit their size and willingness to 
share their catch. Further, as land transportation displaced canoe travel and fishing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The nanwel/nansapw binary is not entirely rigid. Nansapw can be created from nanwel through diligent 
labor, and nanwel can return through neglect. Michael J. Balick, et al. Ethnobotany of Pohnpei: Plants, 
People, & Island Culture. (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009), 10; Akitoshi Shimizu. 
“Chiefdom and the Spatial Classification of the Life-World: Everyday Life, Subsistence and the Political 
System on Ponape,” in Islanders and Their Outside World. (Tokyo: Committee for Micronesian Research, 
St. Paul’s University, 1982), 169.  
21 Adelino Lorens. Interview by author. Kolonia, Pohnpei, 5 March 2015.  
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became a pathway into the cash economy, canoe and net feasts grew increasingly rare.22 
Pohnpei’s traditional political systems have offered mechanisms to manage this 
abundance for centuries. The nahnmwarki system, in effect since the early 17th century, 
divides the island into paramount chiefdoms called wehi, each of which is ruled by an 
“A” title line headed by a nahnmwarki and a “B” title line headed by a nahnken. Each 
wehi is composed of many kousapw (sections), which are ruled through parallel systems. 
These chiefs govern as embodiments of traditional custom (tiahk) rather than by 
coercion, preside over hierarchically organized communities traditionally ordered by 
status rather than economic class, and stand at the center of vibrant redistribution 
economies. A chief’s governing authority is rooted in the prestige (wahu) associated with 
his title, just as the wahu of plants, animals, fish, and certain places and times elevate 
their standing within the same system. Chiefs control titles ranked by their wahu value, 
and by granting these titles in recognition of work done in service of the community or 
leadership, they incorporate nearly every adult Pohnpeian within their domain.23   
Prior to the German land reforms of 1912, the nahnmwarki was the sole 
landowner in his wehi, granting his people indefinite use rights to their farmsteads and 
using his divine authority to bring fertility to the soil. The island’s redistribution economy 
revolves around the cycles of generosity and obligation generated by these initial gifts. 
The people offer the first fruits of their harvests to their chiefs, focusing particularly on 
crops like sakau (kava) or yams with a high prestige value. The chiefs then redistribute 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Larry Allan Goodwin. “Change Is Continuity: The Maritime and Subsistence Economics of Ponape, 
Micronesia.” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 1983), 21, 130-132. 
23 Titles in both the nahnmwarki and nahnken lines have corresponding women’s titles. A now disused “C” 
line of priestly titles maintained a parallel set of women’s titles as well. I discuss women’s participation in 
the nahnmwarki system at greater length in chapter 3. Shimizu, “Chiefdom and the Spatial Classification of 
the Life-World,” 155-157. 
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those offerings according to the status of the titleholders in their domain. These 
redistributions obligate the people to make additional tributes in the future. In the 
meantime, a range of other feasts can be held, to demonstrate respect, show thanksgiving, 
or make amends, and to commemorate an array of important life events.24  
This feasting complex is often characterized as a prestige economy. Frequently 
targeted by missionaries and colonial officials for fostering gluttony, waste, and 
inequality, prestige feasting in fact induces greater agricultural productivity, and even 
aids in disaster recovery. The prestige economy operates in tandem with Pohnpei’s 
subsistence and commercial economies. The former enables Pohnpeians to produce food 
for day-to-day use, which typically consists of crops, seafood, or meat that hold a low 
prestige value. The latter is rooted in the island’s foreign trade, and is animated by cash 
and the imports it brings into reach. The reshaping of Pohnpei’s subsistence and prestige 
economies is due largely to growing influence of its commercial economy, which since 
the early 19th century has been spurred along by the popularization of certain trade items, 
economic development, and the formulation of a new form of class-based prestige 
centered on access to cash rather than traditional status.25 
The scale of these changes to Pohnpei’s indigenous food system is hardly unique 
in Oceania. In the Marshalls, nearly every resident of Kwajalein Atoll’s thickly populated 
Ebeye islet lacks direct access to farmland and relies heavily on imported foods. On 
Oahu, development and commercial agriculture have displaced fishponds, breadfruit 
trees, and taro patches, and more than 90% of food is imported. New Zealand sends large 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Shimizu, “Chiefdom and the Spatial Classification of the Life-World,” 155-157; David Hanlon. Upon a 
Stone Altar: A History of the Island of Pohnpei to 1890. (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1988), 40. 
25 William R. Bascom. “Ponapean Prestige Economy.” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 4, no. 2 
(1948), 211. 
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quantities of fatty mutton flaps to Papua New Guinea, where they are seen as central to a 
“modernist good life,” illustrations of wealthy nations “dumping” undesirable food into 
the developing world, and emblematic of the stubbornly unequal relationships fostered by 
globalization.26 Even on nearby Nukuoro Atoll, whose population numbers in the 
hundreds, wartime bomb craters and sea level rise have resulted in saltwater intrusion 
through much of the central taro patch, severely damaging a critical staple that once stood 
at the core of the atoll’s food system.27 
Arguably, some of these communities now maintain food systems far more 
troubled than Pohnpei, which lacks the population density of Ebeye, the settler colonial 
legacy of Oahu, the poverty of Papua New Guinea, or the agricultural limitations of 
Nukuoro. But it is precisely Pohnpei’s agricultural abundance, political autonomy, 
fidelity to its nahnmwarki system, and small settler population that so clearly lays bare 
the full range of empire’s influence on indigenous food systems. Pohnpei can still sustain 
the majority of its people with local foods, and is hypothetically capable of substituting 
most of its imported staples with traditional foods like breadfruit or taro. Yet the island’s 
intermittent rice shortages can nonetheless inspire real panic, and even the occasional 
physical confrontation when grocery supplies run low. These panics alone suggest a more 
complex story, one tied to economics, tradition, prestige, desire, and a multilayered 
legacy of colonial encounter, and one that Pohnpei is uniquely positioned to reveal.28 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Deborah Gewertz and Frederick Errington. Cheap Meat: Flap Food Nations in the Pacific Islands. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 7. 
27 Ray Ezekias. Interview by author. Kolonia, Pohnpei, 15 January 2015. See: Phil Giles. “Nukuoro Atoll 
Taro Patch Report.” United States Department of Agriculture Natural Resources Conservation Service, 
Pohnpei Field Office, 2001. Micronesian Seminar archives, Chuuk. 
28 Jim Hiyane, owner of Kolonia’s Palm Terrace grocery, has called these periodic rice shortages “crises,” 
and speculated dramatically that “chaos and mob rule” would result from a more serious, longer-term 
scarcity of rice. Several years ago, a short tongue-in-cheek video circulated among Pohnpeian Facebook 
users that gave some playful substance to Hiyane’s hypothesis. Entitled “Sohte Rais” (no rice) and shot in 
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Breadfruit and tobacco: prehistories of empire 
 
While I limit my focus to four commodities I find especially illustrative of 
Pohnpei’s evolving food system under colonial rule, many other foods reveal a great deal 
about its history as well. Turtles, sakau, and yams harbor deep histories of Pohnpei’s 
feasting complex, its political economy, and its ongoing ties to its high and low island 
neighbors. Breadfruit offers a story of sweeping change to subsistence and prestige 
economies, nearly a thousand years before colonization. The swift transition pigs made 
from trade item to fixture of prestige feasting reveals the island’s remarkable capacity to 
adapt to new products and technologies. Tobacco’s role as Pohnpei’s first de facto 
currency and its deleterious effects on public health foreshadow some of the commercial 
economy’s more recent impacts. This section includes brief versions of a few of those 
stories, and a much-abbreviated overview of the four periods Pohnpeians use to chronicle 
their history.  
The first of these periods is Mwein Kawa, the period of building, which began 
with Pohnpei’s first settlement around 2,000 to 2,500 years ago.29 Oral histories describe 
an initial voyage guided by an octopus, which located a vast submerged reef marked by a 
small coralhead. Successive voyagers used magic and their canoes to deliver earth, 
stones, mangroves, and crops to that coralhead, building it into an island. According to 
Luelen Bernart, a mission-educated Pohnpeian who recorded his variant of the island’s 
oral history in the 1930s and 1940s, in those years the people and the land underwent a 
sustained, mutual improvement. As Pohnpei rose from the sea, the people found food to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the style of a trailer for a post-apocalyptic disaster film, the clip featured foreboding music and dramatic 
monochrome shots of empty rice bags and bowls scattered through an apparently abandoned Pohnpeian 
household. James Hiyane. Interview by author. Kolonia, Pohnpei, 14 March 2015. 
29 Paul Rainbird. The Archaeology of Micronesia. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 181. 
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eat and bark cloth to wear, battled and exterminated a cruel race of mutant cannibals who 
were born among them, and learned to cook with fire. Matrilineal clans became the 
“basic distinguishing unit of social organization,” each bearing histories that marked the 
deep ties between the people and the land. More than an evolution in Pohnpei’s food 
system, the Mwein Kawa saw Pohnpeians enlightened as moral beings, accumulating the 
deep knowledge needed to thrive in the environment they made.30  
Even so, Pohnpei’s decentralization continued to produce disorder. But during 
Mwein Saudeleur, the island was politically unified for the first time. Pohnpei’s second 
period began sometime between the 10th and 12th centuries, when two brothers named 
Olosihpa and Olosohpa set sail with a voyaging party from the west. Establishing a 
settlement on Pohnpei’s eastern shore after a prolonged search, they began to build a 
capital at Nan Madol. Over the centuries, that capital became a vast complex: 92 artificial 
islets spread across 200 acres, assembled from immense basalt crystals by a mixture of 
human and divine effort. Ohlosohpa became Pohnpei’s first island-wide leader, its 
Saudeleur, and launched a dynasty that coerced tribute and labor from all of Pohnpei for 
the next five centuries.  
Ohlosohpa’s successors became ensconced at Nan Madol, along with lines of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Each of the island’s six earliest voyages brought usable resources and technologies that radically 
reshaped the island’s environment and created its early food system. The first wave planted fruit seeds and 
taro, the second brought soil, the third carried the knowledge to build suitable shelters, the fourth brought 
ivory nut, the fifth fire, and the sixth yam seedlings and banana plants. Paul Rainbird has written that early 
settlers throughout the region aimed “to alter the very nature of the landscape, by manipulating the 
vegetation so as to cause erosion and thereby lay the foundations for the subsistence systems, in a 
landscape transported as much by mind as by seacraft.” Luelen Bernart. The Book of Luelen. (Canberra: 
Australian National University Press, 1977), 7-11; Rainbird, Archaeology of Micronesia, 95; Hanlon, Upon 
a Stone Altar, 7. On Luelen, see: David Hanlon, “The Path Back to Pohnsakar: Luelen Bernart, His Book, 
and the Practice of History on Pohnpei.” ISLA: Journal of Micronesian Studies 1, no. 1 (1992): 13-36; Dirk 
Ballendorf, “Luelen Bernart: His Times, His Book, and His Inspiration.” Micronesian Journal of the 
Humanities and Social Sciences 4, no. 1 (2005): 17-24; Jacqueline Hazen. “Voyages of Ethnographic 
Knowledge: Circulation, Intertextuality, and Genre in The Book of Luelen.” (M.A. thesis, George 
Washington University, 2012). 
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titleholders and priests. The former were assigned discrete forms of service to the 
Saudeleur, while the latter presided over religious ceremonies that ritually affirmed his 
dominion. Those ceremonies integrated an existing worship of the land centered in 
Salapwuk and Wene with a new ocean-centered worship of Nahn Samwohl, the alien, 
predatory moray eel. The combined practice was called Nahnisohnsapw, “the honored 
one of the land.” It helped cement the Saudeleur’s control over Pohnpei’s agricultural and 
marine resources, and over the island’s political, economic, and cultural life. The turtle 
was the culminating tribute of Nahnisohnsapw’s central ceremony, its ability to thrive on 
land and sea signifying the union of both. But the turtle also evoked the land’s maternal 
nurturing. Its ritual sacrifice therefore symbolized the submission of Pohnpei’s three wehi 
(turtle states) to the death-dealing power of the Saudeleur, whose rule forcibly interrupted 
the bond between the land and its people.31 
Already exacting, Saudeleur demands for tribute and labor escalated over time. 
The Saudeleurs were said to be omniscient, and omnipotent. They claimed ownership 
over the products of all human labor for themselves and their court, at times feasting so 
richly that the people were left with little for themselves. Stories of the Saudeleur’s 
repressive rule pervade Pohnpei’s oral history. Luelen writes of a subordinate chief 
named Lepen Moar and of Pohnpei’s first farmer, a man named Lamuak. Lamuak 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 These three wehi were Sounahleng (presently Madolenihmw, U, and eastern Nett), Onohnleng (presently 
Kitti), and Pikeniap (Sokehs Island). Rufino Mauricio describes the last turtle ceremony performed at Nan 
Madol, sometime in the 1830s. Priests first transported a turtle caught and stored in a special pool to the 
shore of Temwen Island. There, “the turtle was bathed, anointed, and decorated with cords made from 
coconut fiber.” Following the purification, two priests positioned the turtle upright on a canoe between 
them and held it steady. The priest Dauk Madolenihmw “stood in front of the turtle and stared at its eyes. 
Every time the turtle blinked, Dauk would do the same.” The turtle was then taken to another place in 
Temwen, dropped four times on a large stone, transported to Idehd Islet in Nan Madol, killed, butchered, 
and redistributed. Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, 9-15; Rufino Mauricio. “Ideological Bases for Power and 
Leadership on Pohnpei, Micronesia: Perspectives from Archaeology and Oral History.” (University of 
Oregon, 1993), 151-158. 
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uprooted a certain banana sucker and brought it to the Lepen Moar’s domain, asking 
permission to build a farmstead there. The banana tree bore first, and Lamuak baked one 
of its stalks in a stone oven as a chiefly offering. But before the Lepen Moar could bring 
the bananas to Nan Madol, Lamuak tossed them into a flooded river that carried them 
straight to the Saudeleur’s residence. Furious, the Saudeleur ordered Lepen Moar on a 
quest abroad to fetch the feather of a rare bird, a mission likely to end in death. Lepen 
Moar reaffirmed his loyalty, but only after leading a group of people and animals on an 
epic voyage, finally securing the feather by virtue of their unusual skill and trickery.32 
Stories like these now stand as vivid warnings against centralized governance, 
repression, and chiefly greed. But anthropologist Glenn Petersen has speculated that the 
radical changes to the island under the Saudeleurs were not entirely of their making. 
Instead, he points to the diffusion between C.E. 1000 and 1500 of new hybrid varieties of 
breadfruit, a nutritious and abundant staple that demands relatively little labor to produce. 
Breadfruit, he suggests, may have “revolutionized” the region’s subsistence economies 
by sharply reducing labor demands, diverting workers into production of tribute offerings 
or construction projects, and fostering sweeping changes in other areas of society as 
well.33 Perhaps the abundant wealth that fueled the Saudeleur dynasty and the building of 
Nan Madol were also a consequence of breadfruit’s extraordinary, even sacred, ability to 
provide for human needs. At the very least, Mwein Saudeleur coincided with a critical 
reordering of Pohnpei’s food system, which saw breadfruit installed at the core of a food 
security framework that served the island well into the 20th century. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Luelen, Book of Luelen, 41-43. 
33 I discuss Petersen’s “breadfruit revolution” theory more extensively in chapter four. Glenn Petersen. 
Traditional Micronesian Societies: Adaptation, Integration, and Political Organization. (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 2009), 57. 
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Mwein Nahnmwarki, Pohnpei’s third period, followed an invasion from the east 
that toppled Saudeleur rule and avenged the long-suffering victims of the dynasty’s 
abuse. Around 1628, a demigod named Isohkelekel gathered 333 companions from his 
home island, probably Kosrae, and led them to And Atoll. From And, they sailed to 
Pohnpei. But before staging an invasion, they made peace with the land and its people, 
marrying Pohnpeian women, fathering children, and absorbing the island’s customs. 
Finally, Isohkelekel’s forces staged a military campaign that left the Saudeleur cornered, 
forcing him to transform into a small fish and beat a permanent retreat. Isohkelekel then 
took up residence at Nan Madol. There, he received divine instruction to form a new 
political order.34 
Revolving around feasts that incorporated both the people and their tributes, the 
new nahnmwarki system fostered a closeness between leaders and their subjects that had 
been absent under Saudeleur rule. But with the demigod Isohkelekel installed as 
Madolenihmw’s first nahnmwarki, that closeness was limited. Isohkelekel had already 
repurposed Saudeleur-era titles to manage the demands of the feast complex, and he now 
installed a nahnken to serve as intermediary between himself and his people, along with a 
line of associated titles. In time, Pohnpei’s other wehi replicated this governing 
framework, splintering power across multiple paramount chiefdoms and giving rise to the 
maxim Pohnpei sohte ehu, “Pohnpei is not one.” The first mehn waii (foreigners) to reach 
the island surfaced along its western coast in 1595, in the twilight of Saudeleur rule. But 
nearly all the island’s other foreign visitors have found autonomous wehi, separated by 
political boundaries and cultural practices but united by their ties to the land.35 	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35 Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, 21-25. 
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It was not until the first decades of the 19th century that mehn waii began to build 
a sustained presence on Pohnpei, starting with the beachcombers who collected 
tortoiseshell for sale to visiting schooners in exchange for metal tools, firearms, and 
tobacco. Those beachcombers served at the pleasure of the nahnmwarki, each of whom 
took charge of the foreign trade in his wehi. But demand for imports quickly outpaced 
their ability to regulate commerce, and Pohnpeians began pursuing alternative pathways 
into the new commercial economy like prostitution and theft. Ship traffic peaked in the 
1850s, when whalers regularly put in at the ports of Rohnkitti and Madolenihmw. By 
then, tobacco had become Pohnpei’s currency of choice, and the pigs initially meant to 
provision passing vessels were featuring as prestige offerings in feasts across the island.36 
Tobacco proved a pragmatic way to accumulate foreign goods discreetly, without 
risking confiscation by traditional leaders. But its pervasive reach probably fueled 
widespread addiction as well, which then generated further demand for trade. Tobacco 
also drew the condemnation of Pohnpei’s first Congregationalist missionaries, who 
crossed its reef in 1852 under the auspices of the American Board of Commissioners for 
Foreign Missions. Alarmed by children’s requests for chaw and their inability to avoid 
tobacco-based bartering, the missionaries set upon tobacco, alcohol, and prostitution as 
evidence of the deleterious effects of foreign contact, or at least foreign contact of the 
wrong sort. A devastating smallpox epidemic that struck two years later underlined those 
warnings, steeped in evangelical Manichaeism though they may have been. In fact, along 
with several additional outbreaks of influenza and measles, by the 1870s disease had 
reduced the island’s population by more than half.37 	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By the time the warship Manila arrived in 1886 to declare Spanish possession of 
Pohnpei, beginning the fourth period of the island’s history, a great many mehn waii had 
already staged encounters with Pohnpei and its people. Whalers and beachcombers had 
fueled an active foreign trade, some inadvertently spreading disease and others fathering 
children with Pohnpeian women. Protestant missionaries had planted churches and 
cultivated a small class of mission-educated Islanders, but failed to advance any truly 
radical reforms. The beginnings of a copra trade were taking root at Lenger Island in the 
northern lagoon, expanding the commercial economy’s reach. Spain introduced a 
Catholic counterbalance to Protestant power, and engaged in frequent unsuccessful 
military campaigns against Pohnpeian forces. 
Enduring transformations in Pohnpei’s food system under Spanish rule were, 
however, relatively minimal outside of the copra trade. With thirteen governors in 
thirteen years, Pohnpei’s Spanish rulers neither adopted a development strategy, actively 
promoted trade, integrated scientific research into their policymaking, or encouraged 
foreign settlement, all key factors in the food system’s reordering after 1899. The military 
doctor Cabeza Pereiro, for instance, was left so discouraged by his years on Pohnpei that 
he composed a lengthy attack on his nation’s chaotic, seemingly aimless quest for 
military domination there. Questioning the basis for Spain’s presence in the islands, 
Pereiro dismissed their potential for commercial development, agricultural cultivation, 
settlement, or serving as coaling stations or ports-of-call. “The single benefit we have 
received from the islands to date,” an exasperated Pereiro wrote, “is the sacrifice of men 
and money!”38 Those sacrifices were only cut short by Spain’s sale of the Carolines and 	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(Master’s Thesis, University of Hawai’i at Manoa, 1983), 20. 
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Northern Marianas to Germany. I therefore begin the story of Pohnpei’s modern food 
system with copra, the quintessential commercial crop of German rule and foundation of 
the island’s cash economy for nearly a century.  
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CHAPTER 1: IDEAL COCONUT COUNTRY: COMMODIFIED  
COCONUTS AND THE SCIENTIFIC PLANTATION 
 
The first voyagers who settled Pohnpei brought with them nearly all the crops 
their descendants needed to survive, but the coconut came of its own accord. The island’s 
oral histories speak of the world’s first coconut tree, which sprouted from the grave of a 
man in Eir, to the south. The palm multiplied there and floated to Pohnpei, passing 
through the reef on the island’s east side and coming to rest at Mesihsou in 
Madolenihmw.1 Pohnpeians came to value the coconut’s versatility, finding it useful for 
everything from providing sustenance and fiber to soothing conflicts between chiefs and 
their people.2 Yet they also recognized its agency, as they did the agency of rivers, 
mountains, and reefs. As David Hanlon suggests, Pohnpeians regard human beings, 
natural forces, and supernatural forces as equally important agents in the making of their 
island’s past.3 Pohnpei’s rapid transition from an island where families maintained only a 
small number of coconut plantings to one whose 20th century skyline was dominated by 
coconut palms should therefore draw our attention to the entanglement of human and 
nonhuman agents that facilitated the growth of the copra trade on Pohnpei at the end of 
the 19th century.4  
This chapter focuses on the modern proliferation of coconut trees on Pohnpei, its 
link to a powerful scientific agricultural discourse, and the coconut’s attendant effects on 
Pohnpeian relationships and ecology. Environmental change has not always been at the 
forefront in written accounts of Pohnpeian history, just as Pohnpei’s story has been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Luelen Bernart. The Book of Luelen (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1977), 127-128. 
2 Bernart, Book of Luelen, 153. 
3 David Hanlon. Upon a Stone Altar: A History of the Island of Pohnpei to 1890. (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i Press, 1988), xxi. 
4 Bill Raynor. Interview by author. Kolonia, Pohnpei, 19 November 2014. 
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largely absent in historical work on the Pacific copra trade. Still, it would be a mistake to 
dismiss the lessons Pohnpei’s coconuts have to offer, both for assessing copra’s impact 
on islands deemed marginal for production and in considering copra’s transformative 
power even in places where large plantations were mostly absent. On islands like 
Pohnpei, copra signified the possibility of reimagining the coconut as money, and for 
decades represented the easiest and most regular access most families had to a 
burgeoning cash economy. I therefore follow the coconut’s pathways across the Pacific 
and into Europe’s booming coconut oil refineries, tracing the roots of the ideologies that 
drew Pohnpei into the global capitalist networks the copra trade helped to draw. I argue 
that Pohnpeians and coconuts, commodified as copra, remade the land and one another as 
indigenous and mehn waii visions of the coconut collided.  
Historians who have examined Pohnpei’s 1899-1914 German occupation, under 
which copra’s influence on the island mushroomed, have most often taken the Sokehs 
Rebellion of 1910-1911 as their focal point.5 That rebellion was indeed pivotal for 
German rule on Pohnpei and for the evolution of Pohnpeian anti-colonial resistance, and 
its legacy on the island still endures. Yet, as Peter Sack suggests, the Sokehs Rebellion 
was neither representative of anti-colonial resistance in the German Pacific more broadly 
nor did it capture the full range of Pacific Islander responses to German colonial rule.6 
Pohnpeians themselves sometimes note that the most enduring effects of colonialism on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See, for instance: Thomas Morlang. Rebellion in der Südsee: Der Aufstand auf Ponape gegen die 
deutschen Kolonialherren 1910/11. (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag), 2010; Francis Hezel. Strangers in Their 
Own Land: A Century of Colonial Rule in the Caroline and Marshall Islands. (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i Press, 1995); Peter Sack. Phantom History, the Rule of Law and the Colonial State: The Case of 
German New Guinea. (Canberra: Australian National University, 2001); and Helmut Christmann, Peter 
Hempenstall, and Dirk Anthony Ballendorf. Die Karolinen-Inseln in deutscher Zeit: eine 
kolonialgeschichtliche Fallstudie. (Münster: Lit, 1991); Paul Ehrlich. ‘”The Clothes of Men”: Ponape 
Island and German Colonial Rule, 1899-1914’. (Ph.D. dissertation, SUNY Stony Brook, 1978);  
6 Sack, Phantom History, 87-88. 
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their island have come not from the “hard bullets” of violent warfare but from the “soft 
bullets” of the cash economy and the imported goods it delivered.7  
 Germany presided over Pohnpei from its colonial capital at Herbertshöhe on New 
Britain, but it governed the “Island Territory” of the Carolines and Northern Marianas 
separately from its Melanesian holdings, aiming to transform Micronesians into capitalist 
consumers rather than pressure them into plantation labor.8 Even so, the plantation 
remained a persistent fixture in German colonial visions of the island, despite the fact that 
all of region’s copra interests were privately held and Pohnpei’s wet, rocky soil made it a 
poor fit for large-scale monocropping. Plantations appealed to colonial officials 
throughout the German Empire as a totalizing way of life and a tool of colonial power, 
just as they appealed to the copra industry as a way to boost production and regulate 
quality. On Pohnpei, the colonial logic of the plantation intruded even where plantations 
themselves were few. 
Plantation copra was in such demand partly because of Europe’s emerging 
coconut margarine industry, which after the 1880s began to purchase kiln-dried, 
plantation-grown coconut flesh in large quantities. Industry boosters imagined a bright 
future for the product: as an inexpensive alternative to butter, a butter or lard substitute 
for Hindus and Muslims, a hygienic and shelf-stable product suitable for hospitals and 
army camps, a solution to the spiking costs of animal fats, or – more speciously – a 
miracle food whose cleanliness guaranteed freedom from typhoid and tuberculosis.9 
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Margarines like Palmin, Cocosa, Nucoline, and Vegetaline stressed the coconut’s purity 
in their advertising, often by contrasting vivid white coconut flesh against the black skin 
of an ape or a “Native,” or by framing industrial coconut production as a colonial 
civilizing process.10 Ultimately, however, Pohnpei produced little of this high-grade 
copra, falling instead into a supporting role: exporting trade copra and absorbing migrants 
from nearby coral atolls, thus enabling plantation copra to be produced elsewhere. 
 Yet the long-term impacts of copra on Pohnpei were dramatic nonetheless. In 
1939, as a man of 73, Pohnpeian oral historian Luelen Bernart reflected back on the 
changes the copra trade had brought to his island. After the 1912 German land reform, he 
said, Pohnpeians “became ambitious to earn money through the production of copra,” 
urgently desired to possess their land, and no longer shared food as often as they once 
had. Young couples shifted toward patrilocal residence, and married couples began to 
live independently. And, he might have added, the island boasted thousands of new 
residents from atolls like Pingelap, Mokil, and the Mortlocks, transforming Pohnpeian 
society and its relationship with neighboring islands.11 These “soft bullets” became the 
most enduring legacy of Germany’s brief time on Pohnpei. 
 
 
Land and labor 
 
Pohnpei’s gently sloping mountains, turquoise lagoon, and lush vegetation must 
have made it appear a potential Eden to foreign visitors in the 19th century, a garden ready 
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to be reclaimed from the wilderness. Mehn waii in this period rarely missed a chance to 
remark on the island’s beauty. Yet many saw in this beauty a fundamental disorder that 
demanded their intervention. When Frederick Moss visited from New Zealand in 1886, 
he declared that in spite of the fertility of its soil Pohnpei would require terrace farming 
to become truly productive. “Then it will be a lovely garden,” he wrote, “but not, I fear, 
till then.”12 Moss read the Pohnpeian landscape as a signifier of the advancement and 
industriousness of its inhabitants, and found both lacking. This easy conflation of the 
shape of the land and the advancement of its people proved remarkably resilient in 
imperial visions of the island. As Carolyn Merchant suggests, the intertwined binaries of 
humans as civilized/savage and the land as garden/wilderness reach back to the earliest 
period of European exploration in the New World.13 Those binaries were at the heart of 
Pohnpeian and mehn waii contestations over coconuts and how to cultivate them.   
 Throughout Pohnpei’s colonial history, mehn waii agricultural development 
schemes have been built on critiques of the island’s farms as little better than untended 
wilderness. German district officer Albert Hahl, for instance, saw in Pohnpeian 
cultivation “a random style of gardening,” and invested considerable personal effort in 
introducing commercially viable foreign crops to the island.14 Yet much of what 
foreigners like Hahl saw as chaos or natural landscape was strategically built. Pohnpeians 
distinguished between their island’s humanized nansapw land and its spirit-filed nanwel, 
but they also recognized numerous nansapw subcategories, from mwetwel (forest 
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13 Carolyn Merchant. Reinventing Eden: The Fate of Nature in Western Culture. (New York: Routledge, 
2003), 66. 
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clearing) and lepwul (swamps) to diphw (overgrown areas not yet reverted to “wild” 
forest), wasahn kousoan (house clearings), and mal (forest or grass savannah). But it was 
the indigenous agroforest, panwel, that most encompassed the accumulation of Pohnpei’s 
agricultural knowledge, and lay at the heart of its humanized landscape.15  
 Unrecognizable in terms of early 20th century European agriculture, Pohnpei’s 
agroforests provided a sustainable, intercropped land-use system capable of supplying 
much of a skilled farmer’s subsistence and prestige needs throughout the year.16 That 
agroforestry system was hard-won. Pohnpei’s earliest settlers probably practiced shifting 
cultivation, clearing fields, burning the cuttings, planting crops for two or three years, and 
then allowing the land to grow wild. An agroforestry framework likely emerged by the 
middle of the Saudeleur period, combining tree crops with a multi-layer canopy of other 
vegetation.17 Yet Pohnpei’s apparent fertility is deceptive, and its agroforestry land 
limited. While the island’s upland slopes offer fertile soil and good drainage, many are 
too steep, stony, or rainy for farming. Bottomlands are suitable for crops like swamp taro, 
but are wet and poorly drained. Most agroforestry therefore occurs in the lowlands, where 
soil is typically older and weathered, and where acidity limits possibilities for planting. 
There, coconuts and breadfruit dominate the agroforest’s upper canopy, while 
intercropping limits soil depletion, even from a large number of coconut trees.18 
At the outset of the 20th century, Pohnpeians and mehn waii understood 
agroforests and plantations to be places laden with meaning, where labor was intimately 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Mark Merlin, et al., Tuhke En Pohnpei: Plants of Pohnpei. (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1992), 30-32. 
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linked to the status of those who worked them. For Pohnpeians, the agroforest was a 
critical site for doadoahk, work, having taken on an expanded importance after the 
decline of traditional warfare in the last years of the 19th century. David Hanlon writes 
that doadoahk then constituted one of Pohnpei’s most fundamental activities. The 
proximate purpose of doadoahk en nansapw (subsistence work) and doadoahk en 
nanihmw (domestic work) was to sustain human life, but all doadoahk ultimately served 
the nahnmwarki. Direct service to the nahnmwarki was called doadoahk en wahu, works 
of honor. It materially linked commoners to their island’s traditional political system 
through the feasting complex, using chiefs as a medium.19 
While traditional leaders could order their people to perform certain forms of 
labor, voluntary contributions were most highly valued. Tautik, little work, was a short 
burst of voluntary service, typically participation in warfare. Taulap, great work, included 
“direct labor and all expressions of obedience, etiquette, and deference.” Most visible as 
nohpwei, the first fruits contributions that drove Pohnpei’s prestige economy, taulap 
reflected a patient, rigorous, lifelong dedication to the nahnmwarki. Traditional leaders 
answered nohpwei tributes with reciprocal redistributions, but also rewarded exceptional 
gifts with a traditional title, or with a title promotion. Skilled farmers therefore competed 
to make exceptional offerings of prestige crops like yams or sakau. A rare cultivar or a 
gift of unusual size or quality stood to boost the giver’s social standing, on an island 
where prestige was highly coveted.20 
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American missionaries and German colonial officials, by contrast, seemed to 
carry with them Lockean notions of private property, presuming, as Patrick Wolfe puts it, 
that “property in land resulted from the mixing of one’s labor with it to render it a more 
efficient provider of wealth than it would have been if left in its natural state.”21 Apart 
from the risk of joining property rights to a subjective standard for what qualified as 
labor, this framing became especially troublesome when confronted with orientalist 
visions of the boundless abundance of Pacific land. German district officer Viktor Berg, 
for instance, asserted that Pohnpei’s soil and climate were “so favorable for native 
produce, the natives have never learned to work hard for their living or even for a certain 
amount of luxury,” while Albert Hahl worried over the vast plantings left behind by those 
who had perished in the epidemics of the 19th century. “In a certain sense,” he wrote, the 
resulting abundance of food was detrimental to Pohnpeian industriousness, as “the mass 
of fruit makes structured work almost dispensable.”22 Yet, Hahl noted, the fantasy of a 
labor-free Pohnpei had reached at least as far as Nürnberg, where a family set out for the 
island in hopes of establishing a plantation, after reading that “the people here lived under 
breadfruit trees and had only to stretch out their hands to obtain the necessaries of life.”23 
These mehn waii assumptions made Pohnpei’s agroforests a potential target for 
foreign civilizing missions throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, and ultimately 
contributed to dispossession of vast tracts of nahnmwarki-owned land after the reforms of 
1912. Yet the agroforest remained the steadfast core of Pohnpei’s food system, mitigating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Patrick Wolfe. “Land, Labor, and Difference: Elementary Structures of Race.” The American Historical 
Review 106, no. 3 (2001): 869. 
22 For historical population estimates, see: Saul Riesenberg. The Native Polity of Ponape. Washington, DC: 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1968, 6. Hahl, Albert. “Mitteilungen über Sitten Und Rechtliche Verhältnisse 
Auf Ponape.” Ethnologisches Notizblatt 2, no. 2 (1901): 1–13, 21; Viktor Berg. “Über die Insel Ponape.” 
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23 Hahl, Governor in New Guinea, 74-75. 
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the need to rely on imported goods for essential resources except in times of extreme 
natural disaster. Still, as the copra trade reached Pohnpei in the 1870s, followed two 
decades later by a supportive German regime, mehn waii increasingly agitated for land, 
labor, and tax reforms that aimed to alter this balance in their favor.  
 
 
The copra plantation’s global origins 
 
 When the first regular copra exports began leaving Pohnpei in the 1870s via the 
trading station at Lenger Island, families produced the vast majority of the island’s copra 
at their convenience. According to Luelen, Pohnpeians propagated these coconuts by 
selecting a fresh nut, hanging it from a tree or placing it on a drying platform until it 
sprouted, and then planting it, probably within an existing agroforest. Coconut meat 
could then be smoked or sun-dried before being bagged and shipped. Pohnpei’s copra 
firms all encouraged production of this trade copra. But all aspired to plantation copra as 
well, from the three German firms who merged in 1887 to form the Jaluit Gesellschaft to 
Japan’s Nan’yō Bōeki kaisha (NBK), which by the end of the German occupation in 1914 
controlled most of the region’s foreign trade.24  
On the one hand, the plantations Pohnpei’s copra firms envisioned were the 
economic consequence of a simple technological innovation. In 1868, Theodor Weber of 
J.C. Godeffroy & Sohn developed a new process to dry coconut kernels on site, bag 
them, and then transport them to factories in Europe. There, coconut oil was extracted 
using industrial machinery and the coconut cake by-product sold for animal feed. Trading 	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firms then established plantations on islands and atolls across the Pacific to control 
quality and maximize production, remaking places like the Marshall Islands and Samoa 
into regional copra centers. On the other hand, the plantations of the German Pacific 
served a political function. They embodied a new model of humanitarian sovereignty that 
relied on the plantation as an instrument of its influence and a sign of its penetration.  
On the eve of the 20th century, many in Europe viewed Germany’s embrace of 
scientific research and its application of scientific methods in East Africa as a model for 
the modern colonial state, which they argued was more humanitarian than its antecedents. 
As Andrew Zimmerman notes, science was more than a means to enact this new form of 
humanitarian sovereignty. The two were inseparable. “Scientific law,” Zimmerman 
writes, “is universal, indifferent to political boundaries, and allowing of no dissent, not 
because it is tyrannical, but because it is true.” Thus scientific agriculture, with its 
systematic approach to land and labor management, became the preeminent tool by 
which German officials sought to regulate the political and economic lives of Africans. 
They did so not only by insisting that farmers replace efficient and productive 
intercropping with more labor-intensive plough-driven monocropping, but by developing 
agriculture programs that made intimate interventions in African households, 
transforming the gendered division of labor and relations with European capital along 
with the landscape itself.25 The cultural authority with which Western science was laden 
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thus made it an appealing tool for colonial governance, and a powerful rationale for 
rejecting Indigenous scientific knowledge.26 
 The coconut was just one of many cash crops that drew the attention of Western 
agriculturalists around the turn of the 19th century. Soon, the research this new class of 
coconut experts conducted in agricultural institutes and on plantations from Ceylon to the 
Philippines began to appear in a spate of new planters’ manuals.27 Despite their global 
origins, the manuals’ prescriptions and tendency to interpret the coconut in economic 
terms were generally quite consistent. In his 1914 book The Coconut, for instance, Edwin 
Bingham Copeland promised readers that he had “constantly kept emphatically in view 
the fact that the [coconut] is of interest only because of its business importance.” 
Promising that the physiology and proper management of the coconut palm were “the 
same the world over,” manuals like Copeland’s enlisted planters in a global project of 
curating and homogenizing coconut stocks in order to facilitate plantation agriculture and 
boost industrial production.28 
 Many of the world’s copra planters thus found themselves in search of what 
Copeland called “ideal coconut country.” The phrase appears in The Coconut, captioning 
an image of a tranquil coconut grove.29 An imposing volcano stands in the background, 
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with a thin line of palms and a placid lake below. The image represents orderly planting, 
a farm regularly maintained to prevent undergrowth and pruned to maximize crop yield, 
with pests held at bay using scientifically supported techniques. The geographic location 
is unmarked, and evidence of a human presence erased. The image reflects the logic of 
the planters’ manual, which demanded that the coconut, the land, and its inhabitants all 
be curated and homogenized in order to achieve ideal production conditions. A 1912 
British manual, for instance, offered a list of “Native errors” focused mainly on laborers’ 
failure to plant trees in well-spaced grid formations, which directly echoed mehn waii 
critiques of Pohnpeian coconut planting, as well as the planting requirements of 
Pohnpei’s German land code.30  
Pohnpei’s agroforests easily accommodate additional coconut plantings without 
damage to other crops, but reproducing “ideal coconut country” on the island demanded 
more than minor adaptations.31 Fortunately for the island’s copra firms, the reforms they 
envisioned frequently overlapped with the German administration’s own agenda. Where 
planters preferred land they could acquire easily, German officials pursued land reform in 
hopes of encouraging individual ownership and disempowering paramount chiefs, whose 
substantial land holdings were still underutilized after the massive epidemics of the mid-
19th century. Where planters preferred to work in peacetime, German officials hoped to 
forestall violent revolt by pursuing voluntary disarmament. And where planters 
demanded a pliant labor force, German officials conjured ways to educate Pohnpeians for 
labor in a capitalist system without deploying more than a handful of officials or foreign 
laborers to the island.   	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When the first German warship arrived to take possession of Pohnpei in 1899, it 
set in motion a brief period of relative calm after years of chaotic Spanish rule. The 
island’s first German district officer, Albert Hahl, threw open the doors of the old 
Spanish fort, worked in consultation with the island’s traditional leadership, and pursued 
a cautious approach to political and economic reform. Tending toward an outward respect 
for Pohnpeian culture, Hahl learned Pohnpeian, appeared at feasts in traditional dress, 
drank sakau, and took a Pohnpeian mistress.32 But he also modeled the long-term 
transformations he hoped to see, personally tending a small experimental garden on the 
north bank of the Dauen Neu River.33 Hahl never persuaded Pohnpeians to adopt the 30 
or so cash crops he introduced to the island, but in the meantime he could often be seen in 
Kolonia among his test plantings of coffee, cotton, cocoa, rubber, hemp, and vanilla, and 
a few head of cattle.34 In time, Hahl imagined, Pohnpei’s tribute feasts would be 
eliminated and “landed property” brought to its commoners, whose rights he once 
compared to the slaves of ancient Sparta. Then, perhaps, the island might be made safe 
for commercial agriculture, and life redefined as the agroforest faded to the background.35 
Yet even as Hahl toiled silently away, parts of the island were already being remade by 
Pohnpei’s most successful copra planter: a wealthy Pohnpeian man named Henry Nanpei 
who was already becoming a key ally to the German regime, and an antagonist. 
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Henry Nanpei, copra planter  
 
Travellers who navigate through one of the channels in Pohnpei’s reef and across 
a short distance of open sea will find themselves at And, a picturesque coral atoll nine 
miles off Pohnpei’s southwestern coast. While And’s lagoon covers more than 28 square 
miles, the atoll itself consists of less than a square mile of land thickly blanketed by self-
propagated coconut palms. And is uninhabited today, but from the late 19th century until 
the 1950s the atoll housed a vibrant community of laborers engaged in copra production 
for Pohnpei’s Nanpei family.36 And’s coconut trees are the descendants of one of 
Pohnpei’s only true copra plantations, comprised of palms once neatly planted in rows 25 
feet apart at the strict instruction of the family’s patriarch, Henry Nanpei.37  
Like Nanpei himself, the plantation at And walked a line between Pohnpeian and 
mehn waii ways of being: reflective of a deep tradition of strategic adaptation to outside 
influence, yet unthinkable without its foundation in local culture and relationships. And’s 
grid-like plantings no doubt stemmed most directly from Nanpei’s embrace of the 
principles of scientific agriculture, perhaps mediated through advice from resident mehn 
waii or his own reading, but they were just as much the product of Nanpei’s personal 
relationships with the atoll’s community of laborers. The rows of palms also suggest 
Nanpei’s awareness of colonial discourses that tied land use practices to cultural 
sophistication, and were meant to signify his own advancement, no less than the 
European-style homes he built or the business suits he often wore. Pohnpei’s published 
histories have routinely featured Nanpei as a major political player on Pohnpei and in the 
Island Territory, but his approach to agriculture is perhaps just as revealing. As historian 	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Tesiwo Liwy suggests, Nanpei’s Mortlockese employees not only produced copra but 
“worked hard to show the Germans how Henry [Nanpei] developed the land” at And as 
well.38 
Copra made Nanpei Pohnpei’s richest man, and held out the promise of wealth to 
the handful of European traders who attempted plantation ventures on the island, among 
them Joaquin Kilmete in Nett, Oscar and Emil Loessner in Madolenihmw, and 
Dominique Etscheit at Mpwoampw, Dekehtik, and Sapwtik.39 These settlers’ plantings 
resembled Nanpei’s in most ways. Yet Nanpei’s path to prosperity was unique, from his 
reliance on mutual obligation for his labor supply to his broad family and clan 
connections and his zeal for leveraging his copra earnings into social prestige. He 
therefore played a critical role in introducing copra and cash to his island and in making 
economic commodities of Pohnpei’s coconuts, as he built a vast new network of wealth 
around his centers of power: And Atoll and the port of Rohnkitti. 
The foundations of Henry Nanpei’s copra empire lay in his family and the 
Protestant Church. Nanpei was born in 1860 to paramount chief Nahnken Nahnku of Kitti 
and Meri-An, the daughter of a Pohnpeian mother and the English beachcomber James 
Headley. In an “unprecedented, revolutionary departure” from matrilineal succession and 
the guardianship of the island’s paramount chiefs over its land, Nahnku willed all of the 
Kitti Nahnken’s land holdings directly to Henry. Those holdings included the fishing and 
farming preserve of And Atoll, whose transfer generated feuds with Enipein’s Sou Kitti 
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Sigismundo and his supporters for decades.40 As a young man, Nanpei was sent to 
Madolenihmw to attend the Protestant mission school at Ohwa. There he became the 
mission’s most prized convert, and the most prominent among a small circle of ambitious 
mission graduates. While still a student, Nanpei opened Rohnkitti’s only store. There, he 
sold to visiting ships and supplied “all the [imported] goods which Ponapeans coveted,” 
investing the profits in coconut plantings on his land nearby.41  
By 1890, Nanpei was the island’s wealthiest man. He operated stores at Rohnkitti 
and in the Spanish town of Santiago de la Ascension (later Kolonia), maintained 
plantations at Kitti and And, and operated a compound at the mouth of Rohnkitti’s Lehn 
Diepei River that included a wharf, boathouse, and storehouse. His ship, the Insular, 
made runs to And to transport copra back to Pohnpei.42 He expanded his landholdings by 
accepting land as payment when traditional leaders incurred debts. He embraced the 
trappings of Western culture, but his ability to offer yams, sakau, pigs, cattle, or dogs at 
traditional feasts also made him an exemplar of Pohnpeian masculinity, which was 
defined in part by the ability to give generously at feasts on short notice.43 Nanpei 
blanketed Rohnkitti with coconut palms, attracting a large community of Pohnpeians, 
Chuukese, Mortlockese, Pingelapese, Mokilese, and Nukuorans who travelled to or 
settled around his compound for work. Other Pohnpeians were active in the island’s 
foreign trade as well. The Soumadau of Sokehs, for instance, worked for Dominique 
Etscheit and owned a store at Mwalok before he became a leader in the Sokehs 
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Rebellion.44 But by the turn of the century, Nanpei had become Pohnpei’s principal copra 
planter and a force to be reckoned with.45 
In 1896, the English traveller F.W. Christian visited Pohnpei and praised the 
“magnificent groves” that stretched across And’s islets.46 Most European planters of the 
time assumed that plantation workers were most effectively motivated when their 
survival depended on their labor, as when they earned cash to purchase imported foods. 
But Luelen Bernart, Nanpei’s political ally and brother-in-law, believed that And’s 
productivity was the result of Nanpei’s generosity, a management method that 
approximated traditional Pohnpeian governance. Bernart wrote that: 
Henry Nanpei had a little copra from the low island of Ant, which could produce 
about twenty tons or so. But the copra workers did not pick up all the coconuts 
from under the trees, and the workers enjoyed drinking the green nuts. And when 
he sent workers to [And] to make copra he would sell the copra and then he would 
have to pay them but if they wanted some little things or the like he would give 
them what they wanted. This was when he began to make more money.47 
 
Nanpei’s workers traded their labor for the benefits of life on the atoll: use rights to the 
land, access to gifts of food, cash, and other goods, and life in a close-knit community 
that eventually numbered around 200 people and included numerous homes and a small 
community church. According to Luelen, Nanpei was also unique among the island’s 
buyers in offering good prices even when copra’s value fell on the world market. As a 
result, Nanpei earned a fierce loyalty among his workers.48  
Increasingly, Nanpei leveraged his economic power and influence in the church to 
advance his political interests, pulling strings out of public view in the style of traditional 	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Pohnpeian politicking. His interests were numerous. He defended American Protestant 
missionaries against the machinations of Spanish priests, accompanied a group of 
missionaries to Washington to seek Benjamin Harrison’s intercession in Pohnpei’s wars 
with Spain, lobbied to end the island’s alcohol trade, and worked to install a quasi-
parliamentary “council of the wise” with himself as chair.49 Nanpei’s political dealings 
earned him praise and scorn from the island’s foreign regimes. Spain awarded him a 
medal for protecting Spanish lives during a battle at Ohwa, but suspected him of 
gunrunning and jailed him as an American spy.50 Some German officials relied on his 
diplomatic skill, and Nanpei became the only Pohnpeian to adopt Albert Hahl’s cattle 
ranching scheme, but others suspected him of supplying anti-German forces in the 
Sokehs Rebellion.51 In later years Japan fêted him at public events, but suspected him of 
being an anti-Japanese activist, erecting a small police station just outside his home at 
Rohnkitti that Nanpei believed was built specifically to monitor his activities.52   
Henry Nanpei passed away in 1928, leaving control of the family business to his 
son Oliver. By 1935, the Nanpei Company controlled And Atoll and half of Pohnpei’s 
indigenous-held land, or about 9,800 acres.53 Oliver remained a force on the island well 
into the 1950s, his influence rooted in copra just as his father’s had been. At times, 
colonial officials seemed to find the Nanpei family’s success difficult to interpret. The 
German regime’s reports and official correspondence often slighted Nanpei’s prowess in 	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the copra trade, either erasing his presence altogether by classifying him as an unnamed 
“native planter,” indirectly critiquing his planting methods, or taking credit for his work. 
Yet the Nanpeis also charted a unique vision for Pohnpei’s future, one alternately 
community-minded and self-interested, which integrated monocropping techniques into 
the Pohnpeian landscape without dislodging agroforests or the families who depended on 
them. Amid typhoons, a rebellion, and war, that framework’s endurance on the island 
bore testament to its potency, and to the Nanpeis’ power. 
 
 
Educational typhoons, neighborly relocations, and a coconut land reform 
 
 When a devastating typhoon struck Pohnpei in April 1905, German colonial 
policy on the island suddenly began to move in fast forward. The storm must have 
seemed apocalyptic, and stories of its impacts resound through oral histories and the 
colonial archives. Luelen describes the typhoon as a “fire of spray,” a storm with a 
twisting wind that overturned every one of the island’s large trees and flattened all of its 
dwellings.54 Twelve Pohnpeians were killed, and more than 200 wounded. Settlements at 
Kolonia, Lenger, and Ohwa were flattened. Younger, more flexible coconut trees fared 
better, although many were broken or shorn of leaves. But breadfruit trees were 
devastated, yams damaged, animals drowned, and food stores waterlogged.55 Fallen trees 
blocked footpaths for years, and both the Jaluit Gesellschaft and the German government 
saw boats they relied on for transportation sink or founder on the reef.56 The storm also 
wreaked havoc in the Marshalls, Kosrae, and on outer islands nearby. On Pingelap, 	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around 200 perished as a result of the storm, and those who remained on the atoll endured 
a painful famine.57 On Mokil, not a single house or coconut tree was left standing in the 
storm’s aftermath. Desperate for food, Mokilese dug up buried coconuts, sent children 
out onto the reef to collect coconuts the storm had washed into the lagoon, and dug into 
the taro patch to eat bits of taro rotten from seawater intrusion.58 
The storm produced a clear-cut humanitarian crisis, but German officials used 
another word to describe it: erzieherisch, or educational.59 Micronesia’s German 
government had left administering any program of formal schooling to missionaries, as 
the Spanish had before them. Yet German officials throughout the territory frequently 
suggested that “the natives must be trained to work,” that “drought, locust, famine or 
other causes… might have an educational effect,” or that “a structured occupation, 
strongly disciplined, will be an education for the indolent island people.”60 This sort of 
coerced agricultural “education” had been impossible when Pohnpeians were able to 
fulfill their necessities through the island’s agroforestry system. But the storm’s crop 
damage set off a chain reaction that at first seemed to provide the regime an opportunity 
to steer Islanders into capitalist labor and consumption on a long-term basis. With sudden 	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leverage over hungry Islanders, typhoon-damaged land in need of replanting, and Outer 
Islanders from atolls more conducive to plantation copra seeking relocation, Pohnpei’s 
German officials and copra traders began pursuing a radical remaking of the region’s 
land, vegetation, and people.  
In the short term, the storm enabled Pohnpei’s German regime to demonstrate its 
benevolence, and perhaps its indispensability, through an energetic program of typhoon 
relief. On the one hand, German aid efforts approximated the functioning of traditional 
inter-island networks, which had long enabled residents of storm-damaged atolls to seek 
refuge with fellow clan members on undamaged islands. In December of 1905, district 
officer Viktor Berg wrote that Pohnpeians were “literally in competition to receive the 
Pingelap people with mainly unselfish hospitality” as his own administration attempted to 
do the very same thing.61 On the other hand, Berg was quick to take advantage of 
Pohnpei’s food shortage to fulfill a long-sought aim of disarmament, and he offered 
Pohnpeians 35 Marks or a supply of imported rice, canned salmon, or canned beef for 
each weapon they surrendered.62 As district officer Georg Fritz later remarked, 
disarmament not only contributed to the island’s security but was a “prerequisite” for 
everything from a “more dignified” relationship with Pohnpeians to land reform and 
economic development.63  
Despite the scale of the damage, some of Pohnpei’s agroforest crops proved 
surprisingly resilient. Pohnpeians told ethnographer Paul Hambruch that many of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Petersen, Glenn. Traditional Micronesian Societies: Adaptation, Integration, and Political Organization. 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009), 10; Imperial District Administration, Ponape to Foreign 
Office, Colonial Division, Berlin, 10 January 1906, RGIG, vol. 9, Item 9-3, Document 1, 3-4. 
62 Hambruch, Ponape, 283. 
63 Georg Fritz. Ad majorem Dei gloriam! Die Vorgeschichte des Aufstandes von 1910/11 in Ponape. 
(Leipzig: Dieterich’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1912), 40. 
	   46	  
island’s denuded breadfruit trees sprouted leaves and walnut-sized fruits only two months 
after the 1905 storm, and that bare coconut palms sprouted new fronds.64 Prospects for 
leveraging the food shortage into a long-term wage labor force therefore proved illusory, 
with employment peaking at 53 in April of 1906 and then declining rapidly as conditions 
improved.65 Government efforts to reconfigure Pohnpei’s plant and human populations 
proved more enduring. Farmers welcomed the opportunity to receive seeds for maize, 
peanuts, sweet potatoes, yams and other plants from the German administration at no 
cost. Even Henry Nanpei dispatched a request for yam sprouts to Herbertshöhe after 
returning from a trip to Germany and finding his property in ruins.66 Those distributions 
enabled Berg to deliver 30,000 seed coconuts to Pohnpei, Mokil, and Pingelap along with 
instructions for their proper planting, making sure to include industry-preferred varieties 
from Chuuk and Nukuoro.67 The storm also offered the opportunity to initiate voluntary 
relocations of Outer Islanders to high islands. On Pingelap, the relocations to Saipan and 
Pohnpei that occurred in 1905 and 1906 appear to have been the first large-scale 
emigrations in the atoll’s modern history.68   
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In Berlin, meanwhile, colonial policy was undergoing a sharp transformation. 
Driven by condemnation of genocides in South-West Africa and a series of other 
scandals and abuses, Bernhard Dernburg was made secretary of a recognized Colonial 
Office in 1907. There, he advocated for “scientific colonialism,” stressing economic 
development and social change in hopes of transforming colonies into producers of raw 
materials and consumers of industrial goods. In the Island Territory, power then shifted 
away from district officers and toward the governor of New Guinea, and renewed 
emphasis was laid on administrative efficiency, economic development, and boosting tax 
revenues.69  
The tensions generated as district officer Georg Fritz and his successor Gustav 
Boeder attempted to press these reforms on Pohnpei ultimately led to the Sokehs 
Rebellion, about which a great deal of historical scholarship has already been produced.70 
In short, Fritz, followed by the more imperious Boeder, carried out a series of 
negotiations and coercions between 1907 and 1910 meant to enact major changes in the 
island’s land tenure, labor system, tribute feasting complex, and road network. These 
reform efforts then collided with Henry Nanpei’s behind-the-scenes machinations, 
attempts by traditional leaders to protect their power, and a series of perceived insults 
leveled by Boeder against the paramount chiefdom of Sokehs. Finally, in October of 
1910, the Soumadau of Sokehs took charge of a roving five-month war that began with 
the assassination of Boeder, three other Germans, and four Mortlockese boatmen and 
ended in the rebels’ defeat the following March. 	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Germany’s mass execution of at least fifteen Sokehs rebels and the indefinite 
exile of the chiefdom’s remaining 460 residents was an unprecedented show of colonial 
violence for Pohnpei, and it remained firmly lodged in the island’s collective memory for 
decades.71 But the rebellion also became a critical boost to the administration’s 
resettlement program and its land reform efforts. German officials moved swiftly to fill 
an emptied Sokehs with relocated Outer Islanders, including Mortlockese who had 
already been finding shelter on Pohnpei since a typhoon struck their islands in 1907. 
Chiefs from Pingelap, Mokil, and Ngatik inspected vacant plots around Sokehs, and the 
German regime extended the Nett nahnmwarki’s political authority to encompass Sokehs 
as well.72  
In 1912, the administration’s annual report framed these relocations as an effort to 
“unify the various tribes scattered over the numerous Micronesian atolls,” and to alleviate 
the “misery and complete helplessness of these natives after the constantly recurring 
typhoons.” Resettlement, the report argued, would restore self-confidence and 
“confidence in life” to Outer Islanders who “have lived in seclusion and loneliness for so 
long.”73 The extent of the crisis in the storm-damaged Mortlocks was undeniable. In fact, 
gratitude for the “love and compassion” demonstrated by Pohnpei’s traditional leaders 
and for the German evacuations has proved so enduring that it can still be seen on a small 
plaque outside the Mortlockese church at Sokehs Pah, installed at the typhoon’s 2007 	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centennial. Nonetheless, the relocations left behind large tracts of unused land in the 
Mortlocks, whose atolls approximated the ideal coconut country of the planters’ manual 
far more closely than did rainy, densely forested Pohnpei.74 Officials therefore moved to 
lease that land to businessmen, who they promised could then “exploit the lands for 
plantations to the fullest possible extent.”75  
The rebellion aided in securing land reform on Pohnpei as well. That reform was 
wide-ranging, and included an island-wide land survey, deeds granting individual 
families legal ownership of their land, a shift from matrilineal to patrilineal inheritance, a 
prohibition on female land ownership, a reduction of honor feasts, and the prohibition of 
land seizures by traditional leaders, among other measures.76 While the violence of the 
German response to Sokehs strengthened the administration’s hand in advancing these 
reforms, the growing penetration of trade copra on the island played a role as well. 
Wealthy Pohnpeians like Henry Nanpei endorsed the administration’s land proposals as a 
way to boost their economic influence. But they also modeled a new form of cash-based 
prestige toward which trade copra was the only obvious route for commoners. Years 
later, Mamken Peleleng, recalled widespread elation at the passage of the reform, 
remembering that “when we were given land, we were so delighted.”77 Thus, whereas the 
island’s traditional leaders had strenuously opposed land reform efforts only a few years 
earlier, by 1911 those who came to Kolonia to negotiate terms with district officer 
Hermann Kersting voiced their unanimous support.78  
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 On the back of each land deed, the German administration placed a series of 
coconut planting requirements. Those requirements were detailed and meticulous, and 
Pohnpeians who failed to follow them were punished with hard labor. Farmers were 
required to use government-selected seednuts, plant them eight meters apart, keep new 
plantings four meters from boundary lines, and plant other government-regulated foods 
once their coconut quotas had been fulfilled.79 The planting regulations were unpopular 
but effective, despite accounts of Pohnpeians who deceived inspectors by shifting 
seedlings from one homestead to the next. Luelen later recalled that, “during first three 
years [after the reform], there was no work other than planting of coconuts.”80 With the 
help of energetic private planters, like the Pohnpeians who planted even the ruins at Nan 
Madol with coconuts, post-typhoon Pohnpei was then revegetated around the coconut 
tree and its people drawn into the cash economy copra had built.81  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Pohnpei’s German regime was unceremoniously ejected from power in the fall of 
1914, by a small fleet of Japanese warships.82 At the time, Germany’s land reforms may 
have appeared fragile. Yet while unpopular provisions such as the stricture against female 
land ownership were later removed, the reform’s broad outlines and the reshuffling of 
Pohnpei’s human and plant populations proved remarkably enduring. When a group of 
traditional leaders sat down at the Japanese land office in Kolonia in 1938 and 1939 to 
reflect on the legacy of the 1912 land reform and the copra trade, they spoke dramatically 	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of persistent, wide-ranging transformations. Madolenihmw’s Kurou en Roi spoke of men 
who leveraged deeds to seize land from their female kin, a previously unthinkable 
practice he believed demonstrated that “the people have become selfish and egotistical.” 
Henry Nanpei’s old rival Sigismundo complained that land deeds, not familial 
relationships, now seemed to define land ownership.83 Mamken Peleleng agreed, telling 
the land officers, “I do not understand the thinking of the younger generation.”84 Still, 
individual land ownership had become widely accepted, and no movement to seek its 
repeal ever arose.  
 Many of the coconut trees Pohnpei planted under German rule remained 
productive until the 1950s, when American agriculturalists began a large-scale replanting 
campaign across the island.85 In the meantime, the island’s Japanese and American 
administrations each expressed admiration for German agricultural policy, and each 
sought to emulate it. Japan built an agriculture station on the site of Germany’s old 
experimental gardens, which the United States inherited after the Second World War. 
Together, they introduced hundreds of additional crops to the island.86 Japan halted 
Germany’s resettlement programs, but in 1917 repatriated most of the Sokehs rebels, 
leaving the resettled residents of Sokehs unmolested and directing them to build a 
Pohnpeian-style title system of their own.87 In later years, additional migrations 
strengthened those Outer Islander communities further, and added new ones.  	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 Other than the increase in coconut plantings, many of them lightly used after the 
copra industry’s decline in the 1960s, the Pohnpeian landscape bears few visible markers 
of German rule today. A handful of ruined roads and structures remain, and deer released 
into the island’s interior still roam. There is also the mwet en kehp, a style of yam 
cultivation known as the “yam plantation” that arose under German occupation and may 
have originated as an interpretation of European monocropping.88 Yet the “soft bullets” of 
the copra trade endured as Pohnpei’s primary cash crop for nearly a century, forming the 
foundation of Pohnpeian access to the island’s commercial economy when nearly every 
introduced cash crop seemed destined for failure. As Manuel Amor recalled, even under 
the intense Japanese agricultural experimentation of 1930s Pohnpei, only coconuts 
remained reliable because “only copra could become money.”89 Trade copra held an 
allure on Pohnpei that other cash crops did not, demanding neither commercial fertilizer 
nor pesticides, neither land clearing nor the disruption of agroforests. Still, copra 
reshaped Pohnpei profoundly, and helped set the stage for the much deeper penetration of 
the cash economy in recent decades, with all its cascading effects on the island’s ecology, 
sovereignty, culture, and health. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE RICE GRAIN AS RACIAL BORDERLAND:  
RACE, STATUS, AND BELONGING ON JAPANESE POHNPEI 
 
 As 1936 drew to a close in the Japanese agricultural colony at Palikir in the 
southwestern edge of Sokehs, the rice was not growing well. With a thriving settlement 
of more than 2,000 already established at Kolonia, the Japanese regime had moved into 
Palikir nine years earlier in hopes of nurturing a model agricultural community there. 
Officials named it Haruki-mura: “coming of spring” village.1 At first, according to a 
visitor named Takuro Hasumi, the Nan’yō’chō (South Seas Government) “broke its back” 
to encourage Haruki-mura’s mostly Hokkaido-born farmers to grow enough rice to make 
the colony self-sufficient. But hard labor, excessive rainfall, easily exhausted soil, pests, 
and a disease that festered in the paddies and left farmers jaundiced stirred a quiet 
rebellion against the Nan’yō’chō’s agriculture station back in Kolonia. The result was a 
cluster of paddies half-heartedly planted, and a community of farmers leading 
hardscrabble lives amid Haruki-mura’s roughly cleared fields and barracks-like housing, 
looking as impoverished as the rice they grew. “There are rice plants in the paddies,” 
Hasumi observed, “but some seem to contain rice grains while others don’t.” For the 
farmers, he could offer only pity.2  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In 1935, Kolonia had a population of 2,287, with 1,385 Japanese (including Koreans, Taiwanese, and 
settlers from Sakhalin), 891 Islanders, and 11 others. The island’s total population was 8,169, with 95% of 
settlers residing in Kolonia. Keiko Ono and Tetsuya Ando. “A Study of Urban Morphology of Japanese 
Colonial Towns in Nan’yo Gunto: Part 5, Ponape, Yap and Jaluit branch districts (shicho).” Journal of 
Architecture and Planning 77, no. 676 (June 2012), 1522; Wakako Higuchi, “Chronology of Micronesia 
under Japanese Administration,” 1985, University of Hawai’i Pacific Collection, 4. 
2 The cause of the jaundice was Weil’s disease, a form of leptospirosis transmitted by rats. The agriculture 
station later pushed back against these criticisms. arguing that short-term visitors gained only a partial view 
of their operations, and minimizing the threat of Weil’s disease and the levels of discontent at Haruki-mura. 
Noboru Yoshina [???], “Activities of the Pohnpei Agriculture Station” [????????????], 
Nan’yō Guntō 3:3 (1937), 25; Takuro Hasumi [???? ], “Traveling Through the Eastern Pacific Islands, 
Part 4 [????? (???)]”, Nan’yō Guntō 2:11 (1936), 34; Takuro Hasumi [????], “Struggling in 
Palikir” [??????? ], Nan’yō Guntō 2:12 (1936), 28. 
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While other crops grew well enough for Palikir’s Japanese farmers to trundle 
periodically over the rough road to Kolonia’s markets, only the wealthy Omura family 
seems to have made a success of rice culture at Haruki-mura prior to the Pacific War. For 
this, agriculturalists credited Mr. Omura’s character and work ethic, boasting that his 
hard work had made him wealthy and allowed him to cultivate rice paddies that even 
Hasumi agreed were an “outstanding success.”3 Through much of Pohnpei’s Japanese 
occupation, Nan’yō’chō officials blamed settlers’ moral character for poor rice yields 
while dismissing Islander capacity for rice cultivation out of hand. Meanwhile, farmers 
groused that agriculturalists were obsessed with crossbreeding a perfect Pohnpei-grown 
rice at the expense of practical support or community education.4 As agriculturalists 
dragged their feet, settlers in town grew so dependent on food imported from Japan that 
visitors worried for their health.5 Still, the regime continued to break its back for rice, 
because rice was unlike any other crop that accompanied mehn waii to Pohnpei.6  
Rice and rice cultivation were burdened with implications for race and status in 
Japan well before the first Japanese settler reached the Nan’yō Guntō (South Sea Islands). 
Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney argues that rice has acted as an enduring, bifurcated metaphor for 
the Japanese self: “on the one hand, ‘rice as our food’ and, on the other hand, ‘rice 
paddies as our land,’ each reinforcing the other.”7 But this mutually reinforcing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Hasumi, “Struggling in Palikir,” 28; Yasutaro Ogusu [?????], “Following the Tracks of 
Development in the South Seas, Part 3” [??????????(?)], Nan’yō Guntō 5:10 (1939), 95. 
4 Mitsuyuki Kaneya and Rokuro Kitahara [????,???? ], “Nan’yō Travel Journal (Hizakurige), 
Part 7” [?????], Nan’yō Guntō 2:10 (1936), 47-48. 
5 Umesao Tadao [????], “Travelogue” [??] in Pohnpei Island [????], ed. Kinji Imanishi [??
??]. (Tokyo: Shoko Shōin, 1944), 451. Willard Price, Pacific Adventure, (New York: John Day, 1936), 
169. 
6 Hasumi, “Traveling Through the Eastern Pacific,” 34. 
7 Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney. Rice as Self: Japanese Identities through Time. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1993), 4. 
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relationship between rice, landscape, and Japanese racial identity acquired powerful new 
layers of meaning when it traveled to imperial spaces, particularly those judged suitable 
for rice cultivation like Korea, Taiwan, or Pohnpei. There, rice became a racial 
borderland, where naichi (home island) Japanese could be marked from Islanders and 
one’s standing within the colonial order realized and contested.   
Rice reveals a colonial hierarchy far less fixed than is implied by the Nan’yō 
Guntō’s informal pecking order: Japanese on top, followed by Okinawans, Koreans, 
Chamorros, and Carolinians.8 In fact, the territory’s racial boundaries were subject to 
constant manipulation. Colonial authorities and Islander elites worked its racial 
boundaries to their own political or economic advantage. Islanders started families with 
settlers, embraced or dismissed Japan’s nationalistic bluster or, on Pohnpei, declined to 
incorporate rice as a prestige food within the traditional political system despite its 
symbolic power within colonial society. Islanders took note of the slippage between 
racial categories among settlers as well, styling Okinawans as “Japanese kanaka” (the 
Islanders of Japan) or observing that, “the Japanese did not care about the Koreans but to 
fight with a Japanese or Okinawan was a serious offense.”9  
Implicit in these negotiations was a contestation over the boundaries of ethnic 
Japanese identity and the naichi (??). Naichi is a deceptively simple term for 
“domestic” or “inland” that is applied both to rice (naichi hakumai) and people (naichi 
Japanese). Like the English term “mainland,” naichi distinguished the Japanese 
metropole from its hinterland and established the former as the “central reference of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Wakako Higuchi. The Japanese Administration of Guam, 1941-1944: A Study of Occupation and 
Integration Policies, with Japanese Oral Histories. (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 
2013), 144. 
9 Max Iriarte. Interview by John Fischer. Pohnpei, May 14, 1951, in Eastern Carolines Field Notes, John L. 
Fischer, Tozzer Library, Harvard University (hereafter HFP), reel 2, Disc 8, Side 1 [frame 784] 
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value” within national space. It also naturalized colonial relations with exterior colonies 
like Taiwan and interior territories like Hokkaido, and helped draw them in or push them 
away.10 Japan’s colonization of Micronesia, for instance, generated the novel category of 
“inner Nan’yō” in order to distinguish it from Southeast Asia and the rest of the Pacific, 
and in so doing to extend the outer fringe of knowable Japanese space.11 
The Nan’yō Guntō’s entangled race relations were partly rooted in naichi Japan’s 
unique relationship with those interior/exterior colonies. Robert Tierney argues that 
modern Japan developed a “hybrid imperialism” that was distinct from, but also mimetic 
of, Western imperial regimes. With the West a steadfast but silent presence, Japan 
promoted a “fictive unity and imaginary kinship” with the people it colonized, enabling it 
to condemn Western powers while also mimicking the tactics those same powers had 
once used to erode Japan’s sovereignty.12 In the Nan’yō Guntō, this tendency surfaced 
everywhere from ethnographies that baselessly pegged early Micronesian navigators as 
Japanese emigrants to settlers who asserted an intimate cultural familiarity with the 
Islanders around them.13 At the same time, Tierney suggests, a persistent trope of 
savagery enabled Japanese to assert their distance from and superiority over the 
indigenous population of the Nan’yō Guntō. Japanese novelists, ethnographers, 
policymakers, folklorists, and racial scientists therefore imagined the Nan’yō Guntō’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Susan Najita. Decolonizing Cultures in the Pacific: Reading History and Trauma in Contemporary 
Fiction. (New York: Routledge, 2006), 5. 
11 Mark Ombrello, “Japanese Conceptualizations of the South Seas (Nan’yo) as a Supernatural Space from 
Ancient Times in the Contemporary Period.” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawai’i at Manoa, 2014), 
68. 
12 Robert Tierney, Tropics of Savagery: the Culture of Japanese Empire in Comparative Frame. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2010), 3-4, 15, 21, 33. 
13 See, for instance: Shizuo Matsuoka [????]. Ethnography of Micronesia [????????? ]. 
(Tokyo: Iwanami, 1943), 87; Seitaro Yasutake, Interview by Wakako Higuchi. Tokyo, Japan, 10 October, 
1986, in Micronesia Under the Japanese Administration: Interviews with Former South Sea Bureau and 
Military Officials. (Agana, Guam: Micronesian Area Research Center, 1987), 61. 
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“innocent, happy primitive[s]” as foils to their own cultivation and modernity, or as 
objects of nostalgia that demonstrated the need to recover the “purity and original nature 
of the Japanese people.”14  
The Nan’yō’chō’s obsessive dedication to developing a Pohnpei-grown rice 
despite the range of economic, labor, and environmental challenges it presented was, in 
part, an attempt to enact this distinct settler colonial vision onto the land. Since Japan’s 
1868 Meiji Restoration, a growing network of government agriculture stations and the 
aggressive promotion of fertilizers, pesticides, and insecticides had helped to nationalize 
the naichi landscape and standardize Japanese agricultural knowledge.15 As Japan’s 
empire expanded, that model of industrial agriculture was used to assimilate colonial 
environments as well. In the Nan’yō Guntō, perhaps no island landscape was more 
transformed than that of Tinian, in the Mariana Islands. There, Japan put the entire island 
to service as a vast sugar plantation, sidelining the handful of remaining indigenous 
residents and creating a powerful cautionary tale for Pohnpeians who later worried of 
being entirely relocated themselves, to Kosrae.16 
Yet Pohnpei-grown rice was as much as means of assimilating a landscape as it 
was a strategy to support the Japanese Navy’s long-range program of southward advance, 
or nanshin. Until the exigencies of the Pacific War suddenly made local rice production 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 While both framings occurred in Japanese colonial writings concurrently throughout the interwar period, 
Tierney suggests that a major shift occurred from the former to the latter during the 1930s. Tierney, Tropics 
of Savagery, 10, 55. 
15 Brett Walker. Toxic Archipelago: A History of Industrial Disease in Japan. (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2010), 57. 
16 Tinian’s small interwar population was the result of depopulation from introduced disease, followed by 
Spanish relocations to Guam in the early 18th century. John Fischer, “During the preparation of paper on 
Ponapean Land Tenure in 1954,” in HFP, reel 2, Disc 35, Side 1, 1 [frame 603]. See: Keiko Ono, John P. 
Lea, and Tetsuya Ando, “A Study of Urbana Morphology of Japanese Colonial Towns in Nan’yo Gunto, 
Part 1: Garapan, Tinian and Chalan Kanoa in Northern Marianas.” Journal of Architecture, Planning and 
Environmental Engineering 556 (June 2002): 337. 
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indispensible, the Nan’yō Guntō’s rice projects aimed neither for profitmaking, export, 
nor self-sufficiency. Nor did the Nan’yō’chō primarily intend its intensive program of 
economic development and government-subsidized colonization to turn a substantial 
profit or create the “idealistic flower garden” of nationalist propaganda. Instead, islands 
like Pohnpei served a largely strategic function. They were “just a base to expand further 
south… too small to support productive agriculture,” tropical proving grounds whose true 
value to Japan lay in the lessons they held for future expansion to resource-rich Southeast 
Asia.17 Ultimately, however, each of these projects broke down upon sustained contact 
with the Nan’yō Guntō’s land and people and with the Pacific War, whose overwhelming 
force and seemingly impersonal violence reminded many Islanders of a typhoon.18  
Pohnpei’s Japanese occupation proceeded in three phases. First there was an 
initial period of Naval rule (1914-1922), relatively uneventful in terms of settlement or 
economic development but far more chaotic and violent than its official reports implied. 
Then, a civilian government operating under the League of Nations Mandate system 
(1922-1936), which drew on powerful behind-the-scenes support from the Japanese Navy 
to facilitate development projects and promote settlement.19 During this period, Japan 
imported an underclass of Okinawan and Korean workers, breaking from the habit of 
Oceania’s European powers of working to lure or impress Islanders into plantation labor. 
By the end of the 1930s, nearly 60% of Nan’yō Guntō settlers were Okinawan, another 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Kakuichiro Murayama. Interview by Wakako Higuchi. Tokyo, Japan, 16 October, 1986, in Micronesia 
Under the Japanese Administration, 73; Kiyomatsu Aoki. Interview by Wakako Higuchi. Iwate, Japan, 15 
October, 1986, in Micronesia Under the Japanese Administration, 22. See also: Higuchi, Japanese 
Administration of Guam, 43. 
18 Lin Poyer, Suzanne Falgout, and Laurence Marshall Carucci. The Typhoon of War: Micronesian 
Experiences of the Pacific War. (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001), 330-332. 
19 As Wakako Higuchi suggests, the Japanese Navy continued to oversee Nan’yō’chō policymaking 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s, securing prodigious levels of government funding, shuffling accounts to 
create the illusion of an independent territorial economy, and ensuring that civilian economic development 
projects also met military requirements. Higuchi, Japanese Administration of Guam, 25, 28, 87. 
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6% were Korean, and settlers constituted nearly two thirds of the territory’s population.20 
Finally, there was a period of joint military-civilian governance (1936-1945) marked by 
rising nationalism, war, and collapse.  
This chapter follows grains of Japanese rice and constructions of Japanese race as 
they circulated and evolved from the naichi, to Korea and Taiwan, and to Pohnpei. It 
traces rice varieties rich with symbolic value for Japanese consumers but dispensable for 
Pohnpeians, and examines how the powerful Nanpei family and Nan’yō’chō branch 
manager Shigeru Tanaka navigated the racial boundaries that so structured Japanese 
Kolonia. It closes with the Pacific War, whose deprivations raised questions that 
powerfully reframed the issues of belonging and identity that had hung in the air since 
Shizuo Matsuoka and his men first crossed Pohnpei’s reef in the fall of 1914. 
  
 
Nanjing rice, naichi hakumai, and yams: food, race, and status 
  
 For decades, Japan used the penetration of rice consumption to shorthand the 
progress of its civilizing mission and economic development in the Nan’yō Guntō.21 But 
long before the first ship carried domestically grown white rice (naichi hakumai) across 
Pohnpei’s reef, many Pohnpeians had already embraced imported rice, as a low-status 
food. The island’s earliest encounters with rice recede into its deep past, though they may 
have mirrored the disgust a group of wayward navigators from Fais experienced in 1696 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Settlers and Islander populations on Pohnpei were near parity on the eve of the Pacific War. On 
urbanizing Saipan, settlers outnumbered Islanders by a factor of ten to one. Keiko Ono, “Building Paradise: 
The Establishment of Japanese Colonial Towns in the Western Pacific.” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Sydney, 2002), 2, 81, 199; Okinawa Prefecture, “History of Okinawan Prefecture [????]” in Mark 
Peattie Papers, Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam [hereafter MPP], Box 1, Folder 13, 
399. 
21 See, for instance: Kiyoshi Yoshida [???]. Album of the South Sea Islands Under Japanese Mandate 
[?????? ?????????]. (Garapan, Saipan: Kenbunsha, 1931), 22. 
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when, stranded in the Philippines, they recoiled from boiled rice grains they believed to 
be worms.22 By the 19th century, however, rice was a staple of Pohnpei’s trading posts, 
sourced mainly from China after Germany reoriented shipping routes to locate the island 
between Hong Kong and Sydney.23 Pohnpeians saw in this rice a fast-cooking substitute 
for starchy staples like breadfruit or yams, not glutinous enough to stick to their fingers as 
they ate.24 But Japanese settlers saw something else: nankinmai, the notorious “Nanjing 
rice” associated with Japan’s very lowest classes, possessed with the power to dislocate 
the eater from ethnic Japaneseness and, it was rumored, to pose a physical danger to 
Japanese bodies.25  
Nanjing rice cut to the heart of the class and ethnic tensions of turn-of-the-century 
Japan, but the rice itself made for a slippery category. Often used to refer to any foreign 
rice, Nanjing rice was typically imported not from the Chinese city of Nanjing but from 
the prolific rice-producing regions of Southeast Asia.26 Nanjing rice was first introduced 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Francis X. Hezel. First Taint of Civilization: a History of the Caroline and Marshall Islanders in the Pre-
Colonial Days, 1521-1885. (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1983), 36-37. 
23David Hanlon. From Mesenieng to Kolonia: An Archaeological Survey of Historic Kolonia. (Saipan: 
Historic Preservation Office, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1981), 63. See also: Ponape to Foreign 
Office, Colonial Division, Berlin, 11 August 1905 in Susanne Moyal. Records of the German Imperial 
Government of the South Seas Pertaining to Micronesia as Contained in the Archives Office, Australian 
National Government, Canberra. (Saipan, Mariana Islands: Division of Lands and Surveys, Dept. of 
Resources and Development, Trust Territory Govt., 1975) (hereafter RGIG), vol. 6, Item 8-3, Document 9, 
27-32. 
24 Kanichi Uchida [????]. “Management of the New Territories in the South Seas” [???????
?????]. South Seas Association Report 4 (May 25, 1915) [??????]. Japan Institute for Pacific 
Studies archive, Tokyo, Japan [Hereafter JPS], 76; B.F. Johnston, Mosaburo Hosoda, and Yoshio Kusumi. 
Japanese Food Management in World War II. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953), 51. 
25 Despite the Japanese government’s assurances that Nanjing rice was nutritionally sound, particularly 
during the nation’s 1918 rice riots, Nanjing rice was widely rumored to bring “disorderly bowels” or 
diarrhea to the Japanese who consumed it. Miono Yamamoto [ ?????]. “Report on the Pacific Islands 
in the South Seas Territory,” [????????(?)] The Sun [?? ] XII, no. 11 (September 1915) in 
MPP, Box 1, Folder 8, 110; Uchida, “Management of the New Territories,” 76; Johnston et al., Japanese 
Food Management, 51. 
26 By the early 1920s Nanjing rice constituted more than 5 percent of Japan’s total rice consumption. Most 
of its foreign rice was imported from “Rangoon, Saigon, or Siam” and aimed at its poorest consumers. 
Seiichi Tōbata, “The Japanese Rice Control,” in Commodity Control in the Pacific Area. W.L. Holland, ed. 
(London: George Allen & Unwin), 157. 
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to Japanese consumers during the 1890s. It swiftly became infamous for its yellowed, 
slippery grains that smelled of petroleum, a remnant of the oil-treated hemp sacks used to 
transport it.27 Its appearance rankled, clashing with the “luster, purity, and whiteness” that 
characterized an ideal bowl of naichi hakumai and evoking the dark skin of the non-
Japanese who cultivated it.28 Encounters with Nanjing rice provoked shame, disgust, or 
rage. In the streets, poor shoppers hid the Nanjing rice they purchased from prying eyes. 
In Natsume Sōseki’s 1908 novel The Miner, the title character found himself “absolutely 
mystified” by the “dingy-looking rice” that slipped sickeningly from his chopsticks and 
tasted of wall mud. At the Ashio copper mine in 1907, laborers angrily interpreted their 
foreign rice rations as a “particularly egregious abuse of managerial power,” and rioted.29  
These aversions were partly rooted in class anxiety, exacerbated by the third-rate 
restaurants where Nanjing rice was served and stereotypes of the “low-class, marginal, 
and vaguely menacing” miners with whom it was often associated.30 But, for many 
Japanese, consuming foreign rice also provoked a deeper hurt. It cut painfully against 
nativist discourses that had linked Japanese rice and traditional agrarian practices to a 
distinctive ethnonational identity since the Tokugawa period, first as a means to distance 
Japan from China and then to distance it from the West.31 That linkage intensified as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The Japanese Ministry of Agriculture insisted in 1918 that these petroleum-treated sacks were no longer 
in use, and that the “strong odor” of Nanjing rice had completely vanished. Still, consumers remained 
skeptical. Michael Lewis. Rioters and Citizens: Mass Protest in Imperial Japan. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990), 31-32, 258 n.24. 
28 Ohnuki-Tierney, Rice as Self, 76; Walker, Toxic Archipelago, 81. 
29 Johnston et al., Japanese Food Management, 51; Walker, Toxic Archipelago, 82; Natsume Sōseki. The 
Miner. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 88. 
30 Lewis, Rioters and Citizens, 199; W. Donald Burton. Coal Mining Women in Japan: Heavy Burdens. 
(New York: Routledge, 2014), 147. 
31 Among the nativist scholars who particularly emphasized rice as a marker of Japan’s distinction from and 
superiority to China was Atsutane Hirata (1776-1843). Hirata valorized the “pure ‘Japaneseness’ of 
agricultural practice and Shinto belief, asserted that Japanese rice possessed a divinity that ensured the 
“uniqueness and superiority” of those who ate it, and argued that Chinese rice produced “weak and 
enervated” bodies. Harry Harootunian. Things Seen and Unseen: Discourse and Ideology in Tokugawa 
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Meiji government adopted agrarian imagery to spur industrial and agricultural 
productivity. It intensified further when the Shōwa military began promoting naichi 
hakumai as a symbol of the “purity of the Japanese self” and a food uniquely equipped to 
supply soldiers with the energy needed for victory.32 By the late 1930s, rice consumption 
had peaked as a percentage of Japan’s total calorie intake.33 A food considered a luxury 
only a century earlier had become indispensible for many Japanese, even as the whiteness 
consumers now demanded from the polished rice grain stripped it of critical vitamins like 
B1, resulting in epidemics of nutritional deficiencies like beriberi.34  
Still, for many naichi hakumai remained out of reach. Colonies like the Nan’yō 
Guntō, however, held out the promise of regular rice consumption as well as the status 
that came with marking oneself off from Nanjing rice-consuming Islanders. That bargain 
held particular appeal to naichi tenant farmers and many Okinawans, for whom the 
poverty and overpopulation of their home islands meant they “couldn’t eat” or were 
forced to substitute potatoes for rice in their daily meals.35 The promise of a rice-laden 
good life even featured in pro-settlement boosterism. In the 1935 book Japanese Islands 
in the Tropical Pacific, Hidekichi Shimura vividly contrasted the lives of farmers in the 
naichi and the Nan’yō Guntō. Whereas naichi peasants faced crop failures that forced 
them to eat starvation foods and left them unable to scrounge even one bottle of sake for 
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festivals, he argued, the Nan’yō Guntō was a “paradise.” There, Islanders never went 
homeless. Settlers traded their morning tea for the Okinawan rice liquor awamori, 
humming and singing as they worked. Their lives, he concluded, were “as alike as clouds 
and mud.”36 
Pohnpeians, by contrast, fixed rice near the bottom of the hierarchies they used to 
mark food, status, and ethnicity. Rice was quite unlike prestige crops like yams or sakau, 
whose associations with ambition and masculinity granted them substantial leverage to 
determine status or mark ethnic boundaries. Because attaining it reflected neither 
assiduous labor nor a mastery of Pohnpeian agricultural practices, rice could not be 
offered as doadoahk en wahu, the “works of honor” that demonstrated the bearer’s 
esteem for their traditional leaders. Yams, on the other hand, required so much 
agricultural prowess that they became the island’s “most pertinent symbol for expressing 
man’s diligence.”37 Exceptional yams offered up at feasts led to title promotions and 
enhanced status and, as Kurekohr of Soune explained to an American anthropologist in 
1950, were “the same as money.”38 Alternatively, bananas were so easily planted that 
they signified a man’s laziness or, metaphorically, a woman’s promiscuity.39 Rice did 
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signal access to Pohnpei’s cash economy, but its primary value still lay in freeing up time 
to cultivate crops of greater value, or to supplement the diets of landless outer Islanders. 
Imported foods like rice therefore played a far smaller role in defining 
relationships between Pohnpeians and outsiders than did the title system and feasting 
complex. Japanese sailors and a handful of settlers were the island’s most visible new 
residents, but most of the Sokehs rebels returned to Pohnpei in 1917, lodging with family 
rather than displacing the Pingelapese, Mokilese, and Mortlockese Germany had resettled 
on their land.40 Outer islands produced new migration as well. In 1919, a settlement 
sprouted at Kolonia’s Porakied after a lengthy drought on Kapingamarangi. Economic 
migrants trickled in throughout the 1920s and 1930s.41 Some of these outer Islanders 
were formally drawn into Pohnpei’s traditional governance when Germany and Japan 
attempted to standardize the chiefly system for administrative convenience. In Sokehs, 
for instance, Japanese officials installed a full complement of titled chiefs, most of whom 
were not Pohnpeian.42 But many outer Islanders and mehn waii operated outside the 
traditional leadership system altogether, whether from disinterest, exclusion, or lack of 
access to farmland. The discrimination that resulted could be powerful, as 
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(Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2010), 196; Tesiwo Liwy. Interview by author. Kolonia, Pohnpei, 29 April 2015. 
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nonparticipation rendered outsiders functionally invisible. Or, as one Pohnpeian man put 
it in 1965, “a man without a title is not a person.”43  
For both Pohnpeians and Japanese, the closely entwined relationship between 
ethnicity, status, and food implied an intimate, mutually sustaining connection between 
human beings and their immediate natural environments. But because cultivated rice was 
unfamiliar and disconnected from Pohnpei’s deep past, it fell outside the island’s prestige 
system despite being labor intensive and locally grown.44 Likewise, the painstaking 
approach Japanese agriculturalists took in crossbreeding naichi hakumai signaled an 
imperative to translate the deep ties between Japanese people and their rice to a new 
place, to acclimate the crop to Pohnpei’s tropical climate without erasing its essential 
character. But while imports like pigs could become Pohnpeian prestige foods given 
sufficient time and care, the sudden impact of an unfamiliar environment on Japanese 
foods and bodies evoked a host of settler anxieties over climate, lifestyle, and proximity 
to Islanders. The imperial rice paddy, constructed at the intersection of Japanese agrarian 
tradition, scientific agriculture, and empire, was among the Nan’yō’chō’s most visible 
attempts to address those anxieties. 
 
 
Japan’s imperial rice paddies 
 
The prospect of a Micronesian high island achieving self-sufficiency in rice 
production has possessed each of the region’s colonial powers, but has seemed time and 
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44 Rainer Jimmy. Interview by author. Kolonia, Pohnpei, January 13, 2015. 
	   66	  
again to be just out of reach.45 Pohnpei’s wet, fertile terrain led to vague Spanish 
promises for future rice projects, German test plantings at Kolonia’s agriculture station, 
and major multi-decade rice initiatives under Japanese and American rule.46 Each of these 
initiatives ultimately flopped, but Japan’s rice projects stood out. Not only were its 
attempts to crossbreed naichi hakumai especially dogged, the Japanese regime’s attempts 
to marshal the rice paddy as a settler colonial scheme were unique. The paddies 
agriculturalists helped create on Pohnpei and Palau were rooted in the upheavals of an 
expanding, industrializing Japanese Empire. In time, they may have facilitated a radical 
reorientation of Pohnpei’s ecology and economy around Japanese desires, had the Pacific 
War not intervened. But while Nan’yō’chō attempts at paddy cultivation were sincere, it 
was knowledge about rice cultivation rather than rice itself that was the most valuable 
product of its rice research: knowledge that might someday have facilitated mass 
expansion into the resource-rich islands of New Guinea, Malaysia, and Indonesia. 
Rice is an honest, delicate crop. It requires no processing other than threshing and 
milling before it can be cooked, and its grains can be consumed without any other 
ingredients. Yet producers have long believed rice to be predisposed to “high levels of 
power and control, manipulation, and machination” in cultivation, from the water 
management practices needed to sustain irrigated paddies to the negotiations required to 
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balance market demand, labor practices, and political imperatives.47 Collisions between 
these imperatives and local environments have produced thousands of distinct rice 
varieties globally. As Francesca Bray suggests, each of those varieties encapsulates 
histories of “various kinds of knowledge, skill, and desire” that converge to create both a 
distinct grain of rice and a “material, social, and political landscape.”48 The rice paddy, in 
other words, is an intensely political space. When agriculturists across Japan’s rice-
producing colonies crossbred new rice grains, as they did on Pohnpei over nearly two 
decades, they were therefore working to encapsulate the imagined future pasts of 
Japanese settler colonialism there. When planted and harvested, they expected those rice 
grains to bring forth territories integrated into the Japanese homeland, whether as a 
periphery to be exploited, an assimilated naichi space, or a combination of the two.  
In a sense, Japan’s imperial rice paddies were an outgrowth of a process of 
domestic ecological and economic integration that began in the 18th century. As Edo’s 
urban population expanded, the nation began “economically colonizing itself,” drawing 
the Japanese periphery into monocropping regimes in service of ballooning metropolitan 
demand for products like soybeans and rice and, at times, producing crushing famines in 
agrarian areas.49 As the industrialization of the Meiji era drew laborers from farm to 
factory, scientific agriculture and the heavy use of chemical fertilizers and insecticides 
extracted greater output from fewer farmers.50 Those strategies helped boost domestic 
rice consumption and made Japan a net exporter of rice until the First Sino-Japanese 	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War.51 But with traders diverting supplies to a hungry Chinese market, rising production 
costs, rapid inflation, and spiking rice prices, Japan increasingly relied on imports of the 
hated Nanjing rice as naichi hakumai fell farther out of the reach of many Japanese 
families. The otherwise strong economy during the First World War helped spark a crisis: 
eight weeks of nationwide rioting in 1918, with consumers railing against an established 
order unable to supply them with Japanese rice at a fair price.52 
In the wake of the riots, the Japanese government worked to restore self-
sufficiency in rice by further integrating Japan with the economies and environments of 
its rice-producing colonies. As the nation stabilized its rice markets, built local 
warehouses, and reclaimed land, colonial governments attempted to transform Korea and 
Taiwan into “reserve rice baskets” for the home islands.53 In the short term, colonial 
administrators created artificial rice surpluses for export, surpluses Japanese officials 
sometimes called “starvation exports.”54 Sorghum was shipped from Manchuria to Korea, 
compelling Korean consumers to substitute sorghum for rice in their daily meals. 
Taiwanese consumers were likewise compelled to replace some of the rice they ate with 
sweet potatoes.55 In the long term, Japan simply transplanted much of its domestic 
agricultural policy to the colonies in service of its naichi consumers. As agriculturalists 
crossbred new strains of high-yielding Japanese rice adapted to the climates of Korea and 
Taiwan, colonial regimes funded irrigation and water control projects, subsidized the 
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purchase of chemical fertilizers, and supported the transfer of new agricultural 
technologies.56 
As a result, production and exports from the colonies surged as Japanese markets 
became swamped with colonial rice that approximated naichi hakumai in an increasingly 
convincing way. Between 1915 and 1935 net imports of rice from Korea and Taiwan 
increased more than sixfold. During the same period, Japan’s total rice imports increased 
from 5 to 20 percent of domestic production, even as shipments of Southeast Asian 
Nanjing rice waned.57 As Michael Schneider suggests, we may be left to speculate as to 
whether Japanese were elevated by their control over colonial food systems, degraded by 
consuming colonial rice, “proletarianized” through their participation in mass urban food 
consumption, or simply placated by rice that had become “not much inferior in taste and 
quality” to its naichi cousin.58 We do know, however, that these Japanese-style paddies 
had the deliberate side effect of disciplining colonial land and labor, planting critical 
signifiers of naichi Japan in colonial landscapes, and acting as proving grounds for the 
character of the laborers who worked them.  
Of course, Pohnpei’s relationship to Japan’s interwar rice markets was quite 
unlike colonial rice regimes in Korea and Taiwan. On the one hand, land suitable for rice 
cultivation on the island was limited, and some of it already planted in coconuts for the 
copra trade. Even had Nan’yō’chō agriculturalists managed to fully plant Pohnpei in rice, 
the export value would have been negligible. On the other hand, because most of the 	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Nan’yō Guntō’s major economic initiatives relied on settler labor rather than on 
Islanders, the territory’s rice paddies were not invested with the urgent “educational” 
designs Germany had held for its copra plantations. Officials instead embedded their 
interventions in Pohnpeian agricultural practices elsewhere.59 In 1915, for instance, the 
Japanese Navy established public schools called kōgakkō to teach Islanders Japanese and 
train them for colonial labor.60 By the 1930s students at Kolonia’s kōgakkō were tending 
sweet potatoes, daikon, pumpkins, squash, pineapples, bananas, soursop, and cotton in 
the school garden.61 The regime also instituted a suite of agricultural regulations and 
delegated their enforcement to its omnipresent police officers, who along with teachers 
were the only government officials many rural Islanders ever encountered.62  
Further, it is unlikely that Pohnpei’s Japanese military government would have 
been disciplined enough to transform the island into a “rice basket” for the Nan’yō 
Guntō. While the Navy’s own reports paint a picture of cautious, scrupulous leadership, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer Morie Ōno offered a portrait of a young regime that 
had already become profoundly disordered.63 During his 1914-1915 journey through the 
territory, Ōno spoke with Congregationalist missionary Kinzō Tanaka, who accused a 	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Japanese officer of taking three mistresses and then issuing threats to Islanders unless 
they brought him Henry Nanpei’s daughter as well. He found Nanpei waxing nostalgic 
over German rule, lamenting the decline of Pohnpei’s morals now that alcohol was so 
readily acquired from Japanese sailors. The Chief of Civil Affairs told of a group of 
Islanders who asked to dance at a party aboard the Kasuga-kan, but who first demanded 
assurances that they would not be beaten. Those assurances were ignored, and sailors set 
upon them with wooden sticks, producing skull fractures, broken bones, and bloodied 
bodies.64 Islanders unwilling to endure public beatings for offenses as minor as tipping 
their hats or nodding rather than saluting became apprehensive of military personnel. 
Some came to view the dormitory at the Kolonia kōgakkō as “a place surrounded by 
tigers and wolves.” Ōno concluded that the regime was functioning on a “politics of 
intimidation” that was doing serious damage to Japanese rule.65 
Pohnpei’s Naval regime did fulfill some of its policy objectives, but this early 
turmoil had serious repercussions for its agricultural ambitions. With fewer than 150 
Japanese settlers on the island by the end of the 1910s, the Navy presided over 
construction of four NBK stores and four police stations by 1919, new kōgakkō at 
Kolonia and Kitti, and the controversial seizure of the land remaining in each wehi after 
Germany’s 1912 allotments, known as the luhwen wehi.66 There were visits from 	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researchers, expulsions of German residents, and the entry of the Congregationalist 
Nan’yō Dendō Dan mission as well.67 But the German agriculture station at the Dauen 
Neu River fell into disuse, although researchers did recommend test plantings of wetland 
and dryland rice.68 Japanese entrepreneurs poured into islands to launch agricultural 
ventures, but without adequate vetting many turned out to be ill prepared or reckless.69 
Only copra seemed to be on a firm footing. NBK, for instance, relied on the Japanese 
Navy’s protection and a new, exclusive contract for freight, passenger, and mail service 
to expand the near-monopoly it held over the copra trade in the Marianas and Western 
Carolines. The company inherited the Jaluit Gesellschaft’s Nan’yō Guntō holdings as 
well, including its plantation in Madolenihmw.70 
Still, none of these initiatives bore as much potential consequence as the founding 
of the South Seas Industrial Experiment Station in 1922, the same year the Navy yielded 
formal authority to the civilian Nan’yō’chō government. The Industrial Experiment 
Station was situated a short distance from Nan’yō’chō headquarters in Palau, modeled 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Division of Lands and Surveys). Hamilton Library Microfilm Collection, University of Hawai’i at Manoa 
(hereafter TJLD). reel 22, (73) 1711:18-20; Noble’s House, Ponape Congress to Hon. Elbert Thomas, High 
Commissioner of the Trust Territory, May 13, 1952, “Request for the return of the ‘remainder of the wehy’ 
and the mangrove forests,” in HFP, reel 2, 2. [frame 818] 
67 The Navy’s 1915 initial “fact-finding mission” was composed of journalists, writers, scholars, and 
government officials and was meant to spur public interest in southern expansion. J. Charles Schencking, 
“The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Constructed Consciousness of a South Seas Destiny, 1872–1921.” 
Modern Asian Studies 33, no. 4 (1999), 791. See also: Department of Education Bureau of Special School 
Affairs [???????? ]. Report on Observations in the Newly Occupied Territories of the South 
Seas. [??????????] (Tokyo: Monbushō Senmon Gakumukyoku), 1916; Carl Heine to 
Nathaniel G. Grasty. 5 May 1919. American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions Papers, 19.4, 
vol. 5, no. 197, 4. 
68 Junius Boyd Wood. “Japan’s Mandate in the Pacific.” Asia 21, no. 9 (September 1921), 752; Ryozo 
Kanehira. Flora Micronesica, vol 1. Hisayoshi Takeda, trans. (Tokyo: Office of the Engineer, United States 
Army Pacific, 1958), 66-67; Department of Education, Report on Observations in the Newly Occupied 
Territories vol. 2, 91. 
69 The Orient Sugar Company, for instance, arrived on Pohnpei in 1916 and established a sugar plantation 
that limped along for four years before succumbing to rainfall and insects, ultimately costing its backers 
between ¥300,000 and ¥400,000. Mark Peattie. Nan’yo: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 
1885-1945. (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1988), 118; David C. Purcell, Jr. “Japanese Expansion 
in the South Pacific, 1890-1935.” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1967), 29. 
70 Peattie, Nan’yo, 120-121. 
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after the experiment stations that promoted industrial agriculture across the Japanese 
Empire. A Pohnpei branch was established in 1926, and swiftly became a linchpin of 
Japan’s research into tropical agriculture. Visitors lavished praise on the “small 
agricultural kingdom” Pohnpei branch director Moritarō Hoshino built at Kolonia’s 
southern end over two decades of importing and crossbreeding economic, subsistence, 
and medicinal plants. But they took particular note of Hoshino’s “pet project” to 
hybridize a Japanese-Pohnpeian rice. American journalist Willard Price, for instance, 
hailed a strain he believed blended the “good breeding” of Japanese rice with the “rain-
defying hardihood” of an Indian import.71 Yet the meticulous rice experiments that 
consumed Hoshino’s team after 1927 were neither an innocuous pet project nor even a 
scheme to reconstruct Pohnpei as a naichi Japanese space. Instead, the station’s research 
was a single key step in a longer-range project to extend Japanese settlement, trade, and 
power to the south. It was a tool of nanshin: southward advance. 
The scale and potential impact of that project was reflected in the deliberate pace 
of Hoshino’s work. Through the balance of the 1920s, the Nan’yō’chō embarked on an 
accelerated program of infrastructure development, building wide roads, hospitals, 
schools, radio stations, telephone systems, and electric lights on each of the territory’s 
major islands. Pohnpei saw a new kōgakkō at U, a shōgakkō for Japanese students in 
Kolonia, and the launch of a major land survey, among other developments.72 In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Peattie, Nan’yo, 135, 332n28; Ragone, et al., “History of Plant Introductions,” 294; Price, Pacific 
Adventure, 249-250; R.V.C. Bodley. The Drama of the Pacific: Being a Treatise on the Immediate 
Problems Which Face Japan in The Pacific. (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1934), 146-167. 
72 Peattie suggests that only 70 new Japanese settlers arrived on Pohnpei between 1923 and 1930. Catholic 
priests on the island, however, noted the arrival of 200 Okinawan families destined for plantation labor in 
1928. Both the U kōgakkō and Kolonia shōgakkō were established in 1926. South Seas Government, 
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meantime, Hoshino’s team worked methodically through 112 rice varieties it imported 
from Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, South Asia, and Indonesia.73 By 1935, with economic 
development continuing apace, Pohnpei’s settler population had mushroomed: Kolonia 
now housed nearly 1,400 settlers and 900 Islanders. There was a booming company town 
on Madolenihmw’s Ledau River, supporting the new starch factory planted by Nan’yō 
Kōhatsu Kabushiki kaisha (South Seas Development Company, or NKK). In Palikir, 
settlers farmers slogged away at the agricultural settlement, Haruki-mura. But despite 
some visible progress, Hoshino’s rice research appeared no closer to a usable product, 
and in 1936 the Nan’yō Guntō magazine teased his team for “analyzing rice grains at 
their desk all day long” while settler farmers became impoverished waiting for their 
results.74  
Hoshino repeatedly insisted that Pohnpei’s agriculture station was a “pure 
scientific project,” but he cannot have been unaware of its expansionist implications.75 
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Analysis & Treatment Proposal for the Japanese Agriculture Station, Pohnpei FSM: Cultural Landscape 
and Concrete Conservation, 2006, University of Hawai’i Pacific Collection, 20-21. 
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Those implications were spelled out with increasing clarity once Japan made its 1935 exit 
from the League of Nations. The Nan’yō’chō then defined the Nan’yō Guntō as “bases 
for southward advance and national defense” for the first time. The South Seas Industrial 
Experiment Station was charged with an expanded research portfolio and reorganized as 
the Tropical Industries Research Institute, modeled after a similar organization in 
Taiwan.76 Six years later, in 1941, Hoshino’s team finally delivered a hybridized 
Japanese-Pohnpeian rice to Haruki-mura, which it designated 158x123. But while 
158x123 was successfully cultivated on wartime Pohnpei, it was never a major player in 
the island’s peacetime food supply.77 Instead, the Nan’yō’chō built settler societies across 
Micronesia that were utterly dependent on imported foods, whose complex racial 
boundaries barely resembled the imperial paddy’s promise of totalizing settler colonial 
transformation. 
 
 
The Nanpeis and Shigeru Tanaka: working Kolonia’s racial borders  
 
Anyone familiar with the sleepy settlement that surrounded Kolonia’s fort under 
Spanish and German rule would have struggled to recognize the briskly expanding town 
in the mid-1930s. But while the old Spanish walls no longer separated rulers from ruled, 
Kolonia had become divided in less apparent ways. A visitor disembarking onto the 
government pier would have emerged from a drab industrial waterfront onto Kaigan 
Dōri, a lively commercial strip crowded with settlers and Islanders. Roads opposite the 
pier led toward a handsome hilltop complex of schools, administrative buildings, and a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 The Nan’yō’chō first formally identified the islands of the Nan’yō Guntō as “bases” in the 10-year 
development plan of 1935. The Tropical Industries Research Institute pursued research into agriculture, 
forestry, and mining. Higuchi, Japanese Administration of Guam, 33. 
77 Higuchi notes that 158x123 was a descendent of a breed the station called No. 158, a cross between ADT 
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courthouse, hospital, and post office. There, a second commercial strip had developed 
along Namiki Dōri, which boasted shops, a photography studio, and the Ponape Theater. 
But farther south was a pleasure district, where Okinawan and Korean homes were 
crowded among cafes, sushi bars, and segregated restaurant-cum-brothels staffed by 
geishas.78 Closer examination would have revealed naichi Japanese mostly clustered in 
Kolonia’s center, Islanders residing at the town’s outskirts and in rural areas, and 
Okinawan and Korean laborers congregating wherever there was work to be had.  
Once noticed, segregation in the Nan’yō Guntō was hard to miss. It ran from the 
territory’s colonial education system to its race-based wage scales, from the prohibition 
on Islanders consuming alcohol to the restriction on Islander men marrying settler 
women. Even the rice on store shelves seemed to echo the territory’s racial boundaries: 
from the multiple grades of naichi hakumai preferred by Japanese to the Okinawan, 
Korean, and Nanjing rice favored by other groups.79 But, perhaps because the boundaries 
of the naichi were themselves in flux, these divisions were more elastic than they first 
appeared. Japan’s Pacific colonial towns were actually less segregated than their 
European counterparts.80 Even if Islanders were merely shifting from “remote Other” to 
“close Other” in Japan’s colonial discourse, or being reframed as “potential Japanese” 
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incapable of shedding that potentiality, identification with Japan could still be 
manipulated, stretched, and undermined.81 Henry Nanpei’s tumultuous mentorship of his 
son Oliver and their skillful navigation of the island’s racial boundaries suggest just how 
pliable and penetrable those boundaries could be, particularly for Islanders with money or 
power. Likewise, Nan’yō’chō branch manager Shigeru Tanaka’s fading connection to the 
naichi raised the troubling possibility for some settlers that their own identification with 
Japan may be less permanent and more susceptible to Pohnpei’s unfamiliar environment 
and people than they had assumed.  
Oliver Nanpei was born in Rohnkitti in 1882, the eldest son of Henry and 
Caroline Nanpei. Seeking the advantages of an American education for his son, Henry 
enrolled Oliver at the Kamehameha School’s Preparatory Department in 1890 during a 
stopover in Honolulu.82 Oliver remained at Kamehameha until 1901 to study engineering, 
ultimately returning home when Henry became dissatisfied with reports of his 
performance.83 Back on Pohnpei, missionary Leta Gray saw in Oliver a sturdy man of 
nineteen, a natural leader whose smoking habit and “slangy” English accompanied him 
from the city. But Gray also detailed dramatic scenes of conflict between father and son. 
After one quarrel, Oliver was disowned, chastened, enrolled at Ohwa’s mission school, 
and then withdrawn after a tearful late night apology to his father. Accumulating scandals 	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in the exile of the island’s Protestant missionaries. Later, when he arrived in San Francisco, Nanpei joined a 
network of ministers and representatives of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions on 
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at Rohnkitti eventually led Henry to sentence his son to six months of hard labor under 
guard, though Oliver’s charismatic influence and band of unruly followers made it 
impossible to keep him under lock and key.84  
In her account of Pohnpei’s Protestant mission during those years, Leta Gray 
depicts Henry Nanpei as a man overcome by family turmoil and his own poor health, and 
increasingly at odds with missionaries like herself and her husband. One evening, she 
writes, Henry swallowed enough laudanum to “kill three men,” narrowly escaping death 
and retreating to Ohwa to convalesce. Then, when Oliver stood accused of running off 
with another man’s wife, Henry asked the colonial government to hold his son in 
“protective custody” until he returned from a lengthy trip to Germany with the Jaluit 
Gesellschaft’s Emil Loessner.85 Government boats landed at Ohwa and Oliver 
surrendered peacefully, but Henry set upon the woman, knocking her to the ground as his 
son struggled to pull him away.86 Oliver remained in jail while his father traveled, at 
times working a chain gang. But when Henry returned home to find his possessions 
devastated by the 1905 typhoon, he threw himself into rebuilding. He engineered Oliver’s 
release, revived his copra empire, and was eventually able to secure major new 
concessions during the German land reform.87 By the time Henry returned to Germany in 
1912 to enroll his sons Robert and Enter in the mission school at Bad Liebenzell, Oliver 	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had been entrusted with operations on And and was helping oversee the family’s stores 
and plantations on Pohnpei.88 
Henry Nanpei’s grandest political ambitions may have been a casualty of the 
Sokehs rebellion, but he and Oliver continued the family’s artful political maneuvering 
under Japanese rule.89 Henry appeared as a guest of honor at one of Kolonia’s extravagant 
festivals for the Emperor’s birthday in the late 1910s, cutting a figure so statesmanlike 
that family friend Toshio Iwase saw in him the dignified, sorrowful cast of Jean Valjean 
and pronounced him a “phoenix among sparrows.” At his home in Rohnkitti, Iwase found 
Nanpei relaxing in a yukata with a bottle of Mitsuya Cider. There, he protested his 
surveillance by military police as an anti-Japanese activist, decried their harassment of 
his daughter, and declared himself “just a Christian,” “pure of heart,” and “very pro-
Japanese.”90 Henry could be pointed in his praise for Germany or his criticism of Japan. 
But he also profited from sales of livestock to settlers and in 1923 toured the Japanese 
mainland, probably as a guest of the Nan’yō’chō.91 When Henry passed away in 1928, 
Oliver took the helm of the Nanpei Company. Among his first major statements was a 
memorial to his father at Rohnkitti, an imposing statue he erected with NBK’s help at 
cost of ¥20,000.92 
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Even without ingratiating themselves to the Nan’yō’chō, the volume of Nanpei 
land holdings at the time of Henry’s death made the family an inescapable presence on 
the island. By 1935, the Nanpei Company controlled And Atoll and half of Pohnpei’s 
indigenous-held land, about 9,800 acres.93 Those holdings continued to grow under 
Oliver’s management, in part because he shared his father’s willingness to hold land titles 
as collateral for Pohnpeians seeking loans. In 1938, for instance, a man named Bernardo 
backed out of an agreement to sell his land at Pehleng to the Wakamoto Company. 
Instead, he planned to use the land to satisfy a debt of ¥1,910, accrued when Oliver 
loaned him funds for a group tour of Japan and a surgical procedure. Wakamoto, which 
hoped to build a cassava plantation on the site, filed a formal complaint with the land 
office. There, they accused Oliver of “scheming” to obstruct their acquisitions, presiding 
over a vast area of unused land on Pohnpei, and willfully interfering with the island’s 
development.94 
Nonetheless, Oliver continually worked to enhance his family’s influence by 
deepening its ties to Japan. He encouraged his daughters to find Japanese husbands, sent 
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a son to be educated in the naichi, and toured the country himself. In time, his daughters 
Daisy and Luise married the brothers Shigedō and Kandō Muriyama and Keity married a 
man named Takeno, men who served the family directly at the Nanpei Company and 
indirectly through Pohnpei’s land office.95 But Oliver was also eager to see his 
grandchildren raised “strictly in the Japanese ways” and, according to the island’s first 
American military governor, even declined to speak Pohnpeian with them at home.96 So 
eager was Oliver to demonstrate his loyalty to Japan that in 1939 he donated ¥10,000 for 
“national protection,” a gift the Nan’yō Guntō magazine boasted was beyond the means 
even of elite Japanese settlers.97 These overtures paid off. When the Nan’yō’chō seized 
possession of Pohnpei’s mangrove swamps in the 1920s, the Nanpei family was 
exempted.98 When Pohnpeians were a minority in Kolonia, the Nanpeis maintained a 
stately home in the town’s most established area, at Kaigan Dōri’s northern end. And 
when the territory’s colonial education system was its most powerful sign of racial 
segregation, Oliver sent his children to the shōgakkō with the progeny of the town’s 
settler elites.99 
The Nanpei family’s wealth set them apart, but their engagement with settler 
society was not entirely unique. Islanders attended Kolonia’s churches and schools, 
strolled its streets, and patronized its shops, and in 1935 made up about 40% of the 
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town’s 2,287 residents.100 They developed affinities for some imported foods and disgust 
for others, such as the edible snails that escaped Kolonia’s shops and overran the island in 
the 1930s.101 Some expressed pity for Japanese who neglected foods they knew to be 
delicious, such as the Pohnpeian students who visited Tokyo in 1937 and speculated that 
the apparent absence of fruits other than watermelon there meant Japanese “don’t know 
other fruits.”102 Barred from more prestigious jobs, Islanders took posts at the lower rungs 
of the settler economy, as assistant police officers, assistant teachers, laborers, and 
household servants to gain access to the commercial economy, and continued producing 
copra as well. Traditional leaders were also drawn in. In 1922, the Nan’yō’chō designated 
a headman and assistant headman in each wehi, salaried positions usually filled by the 
nahnmwarki and nahnken.103 When these leaders passed away or failed to demonstrate 
adequate fealty to Japan, the Nan’yō’chō engineered a replacement, often a young man 
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with ties to the regime. These men then assumed both the traditional titles and 
bureaucratic responsibilities of their predecessors.104  
As the Nan’yō’chō blurred Pohnpei’s colonial and traditional governance, some 
traditional leaders pursued opportunities to profit from their titles. A few sold the yams 
they received at feasts.105 Others leveraged their land holdings and ties to settler society 
into business operations. Nett Nahlaimw Joseph Iriarte, for instance, had served as 
translator to the German regime and personal secretary to Max Girschner, and then as an 
NBK copra buyer. By 1923, he was operating a 36-acre copra plantation and building a 
reputation at the Nan’yō’chō as a thoughtful, sensitive man of intelligence.106 When he 
became assistant headman of Nett in 1939, Iriarte had already been circulating among 
Kolonia’s elites for years, and could be found anywhere from a kamadipw to the 
Nan’yō’chō offices to the Carlos Etscheit home, hashing out matters of the day over 
glasses of wine in fluent German.107 
As Pohnpeians and outer Islanders drew closer to Japan, naichi bureaucrats, 
traders, and settlers like Shigeru Tanaka seemed to be drawing closer to the islands. 
Tanaka, Pohnpei’s Nan’yō’chō branch manager between 1936 and 1939, first came to the 
Nan’yō Guntō in 1919 from Miyazaki prefecture on Kyūshū’s southeastern coast. He 
served with the territory’s military administration, became Saipan’s branch manager in 
1933, and took the same role on Pohnpei three years later. Branch managers generally 
implemented orders from above rather than shaping policy themselves, but Tanaka’s 	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proponents championed him as an indispensible “living dictionary of Pacific Islands 
administration” nonetheless.108 As one visitor remarked, “Tanaka is a little guy, but he 
talks big.”109 And perhaps Pohnpei did appear to be Japanizing under Tanaka’s tenure. 
His arrival coincided with the Nan’yō’chō’s Ten Year Development Plan, which freshly 
prioritized Pohnpei for settlement and development. The pages of local newspapers were 
filled with items from the naichi rather than the Nan’yō Guntō, and some Japanese 
families seemed to be maintaining exclusive diets of imported foods at the expense of 
their own health. Some visitors even asserted that Pohnpei’s Japanese community was 
living “completely isolated from the island and its people.”110  
But the disregard some settlers may have felt for their surroundings belied the 
complexity of the island’s social landscape and its mounting racial anxieties. A 1936 
edition of the Nan’yō Guntō magazine, for instance, includes a satirical tour of Pohnpei in 
which the experienced hand Mitsuyuki Kanetani introduces newcomer Rokurō Kitahara 
to life on the island. As they stroll by Tanaka’s hilltop office overlooking Kolonia, they 
catch a glimpse of him from the sidewalk.111 “Oh,” Kitahara exclaims, “he’s really dark. 
Nan’yō colored.” “Tanaka has been working in the Nan’yō Guntō for 14 years,” Kanetani 
replies. “He knows everything, and he’s an expert on Nan’yō Guntō administration. Even 
his bones are black. The color of his face is a trademark of life in the Nan’yō.” But, 
Kitahara wondered, does living in the Nan’yō Guntō “make you black?” Certainly, 
Kanetani declares, referencing a handful of prominent Japanese officials and settlers. 	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“Everyone living in the Nan’yō for a long time becomes Nan’yō-colored. Look at the post 
office ship. It’s black too.”112 While the inexperienced Kitahara seems to fret over the 
precariousness of his Japanese identity, the magazine also turned its mockery on settlers 
who became obsessed with such questions. A later issue includes a cartoon of a Japanese 
man in a business suit, drinking hot tea as perspiration rains down from his forehead. 
Alongside the image, Kanetani jokes, “In Japan, it’s customary to serve hot tea and wear 
an obi even if it gives you heat rash.”113 
Nothing more crystalized the anxieties evoked by Tanaka’s “blackness” or 
underlined the plasticity of the territory’s racial boundaries than intermarriage, which the 
Nan’yō’chō permitted so long as mehn waii men were paired with Islander women. 
Presumably, the naichi settlers most possessive of their Japaneseness avoided these 
relationships, but many Okinawans and Koreans felt no such obligation. Even prominent 
Japanese men like NBK branch managers Kohachirō Uemoto and Raichi Akinaga and 
Kolonia mayor Michio Suzuki pursued marriages with Islander women, whether for love 
or access to local family and clan networks. Still, the products of these relationships 
struck a predictably distressing chord with naichi Japanese who feared they “would make 
our blood polluted or make our family record dirty.”114 In 1935, for instance, naichi 
visitor Sakan Ando narrated his journey to Kolonia as a kind of racial melodrama. 
Strolling down Kaigan Dōri, Ando recalled, he happened upon a Pohnpeian-Japanese 
child named Gina. Ando learned that her father was a copra trader, that her parents were 
away in the outer islands, and that she was staying with her Pohnpeian relatives. 	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Suddenly gathering up the confused girl in his arms, Ando found himself filled with 
shame at her father’s “love affair,” her Pohnpeian home, and her enrollment in a kōgakko. 
He agonized over the imminent moment when she realized her “destiny” and found 
himself, “frozen with sadness.” As they parted, Ando was overcome, longing to ask her 
why she was born.115 
On the eve of the Pacific War, Oliver Nanpei, Joseph Iriarte, Shigeru Tanaka, and 
Gina represented just a handful of the Nan’yō Guntō’s prospective futures. On the one 
hand, men like Nanpei and Iriarte had opened cracks in the territory’s racial hierarchies 
and slipped through, performing assimilation successfully enough to bolster the interests 
of their families without being swallowed into settler society. On the other hand, people 
like Tanaka and Gina were complicating the notion that islands like Pohnpei could 
simply be transformed into naichi space, whether through colonial education, settlement, 
or rice culture. For Kitahara and Kanetani, it was Tanaka’s knowledge of the Nan’yō 
Guntō that “made him black,” the same knowledge that should have enabled him to 
perform effectively in his job. But for Sakan Ando, mixed children like Gina signified an 
even more distressing future, not because of her mixed parentage but because her family 
seemed to favor their ties to Pohnpei over her Japanese identity. Had peacetime 
settlement endured in the Nan’yō Guntō, it seems likely that these questions would have 
grown even more complex. In the crucible of war, however, the island’s ambivalent racial 
lines came to a sharp point, until they became scrambled once again. 
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Feeding and being fed: racialized rationing, forced labor, and wartime collapse  
 
 On the morning of December 8, 1941, air raid sirens blew over Kolonia. At the 
shōgakkō, the news from Pearl Harbor propelled students to a small Shinto shrine where 
they bowed toward Japan and prayed for victory. Later in the day, the children joined in 
an exuberant parade through town, clutching Japanese flags, shouting “banzai,” and 
singing military songs.116 Outwardly, these celebrations seemed to signal the Pacific 
War’s arrival on Pohnpei. But those familiar with the fragile supply chain that 
undergirded the island’s import economy had seen cracks forming since the 1937 
invasion of China: rice shortages, imports disappearing from store shelves, and farmers 
replanting their land with rice substitutes.117 In the weeks after December 8th, those omens 
of future deprivation became concrete. Staple foods were rationed, the Nan’yō’chō seized 
Mpwoampw for use as a military base, and the military began taking an increasingly firm 
hand in the island’s administration.118  
Islanders, settlers, soldiers, and sailors soon found themselves at the intersection 
of a deceptively inclusive wartime nationalism, racialized food and labor systems, and 
daily food deprivations. Those forces sharpened some of Pohnpei’s hierarchies, but they 
helped overturn others. Rice’s symbolic power put it at the very center of the island’s 
wartime power struggles, and negotiations over food and feeding powerfully reframed the 
contestations over belonging and identity that had hung over Japanese-occupied Pohnpei 	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since 1914. Who could produce rice, who could eat it, who needed to be fed, and who 
could do the feeding became critical questions that reshaped policy, bodies, and 
relationships, and set the stage for Pohnpei’s impending American occupation. 
 In a war that claimed as many lives from malnutrition and starvation as from 
military deaths, the overriding concern with food and feeding that absorbed wartime 
Pohnpei was not unique. As Lizzie Collingham suggests, securing food by exploiting 
occupied territories or denying it to enemy nations through blockades was a “central 
preoccupation” for both sides throughout the Second World War.119 In Japan, however, 
rice’s unique association with identity actually provoked fractures in the food system 
prior to the outbreak of hostilities. When the Great Depression sent agricultural prices 
into a tailspin, naichi farmers had responded by railing against the now popular and 
inexpensive colonial rice that filled Japanese store shelves, and in 1934 plans to expand 
Korean rice production were shelved.120 As military operations expanded, productive 
farmers became hungry soldiers, agricultural output declined, and the government 
gathered up naichi hakumai so soldiers could have the energy needed for victory (or so it 
claimed).121 Allied blockades then made it increasingly difficult to transport supplies, 
even within the naichi. By 1943, Japan was addressing the resulting food crisis with a 
policy of “self-sufficiency.” In many cases, this simply meant soldiers and civilians 
fending for themselves: foraging, capturing enemy supplies, or planting fast-growing 
crops like the ubiquitous sweet potato anywhere they could.122  
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On outer atolls like Ngatik, which were largely self-sufficient already, the 
breakdown of these supply chains had little effect.123 In New Guinea, however, where 
fighting was desperate and life barely sustainable, food shortages resulted in widespread 
starvation. Food deprivation even contributed to a “systematic and organized military 
strategy” of cannibalism there, whereby Japanese soldiers targeted Allied servicemen, 
Asian POWs, indigenous people, and other Japanese. Some of the soldiers stationed in 
New Guinea pursued their victims indiscriminately. But others consciously animalized 
non-Japanese: consuming “black pigs” (indigenous civilians) but not “white pigs” (Allied 
soldiers), or consuming either so long as they avoided fellow Japanese.124 A few cases of 
Japanese cannibalism even reached Chuuk Lagoon, where Islanders crowded among 
thousands of civilians and personnel associated with the Japanese Navy’s Combined 
Fleet.125 Pohnpei avoided that outcome, and in fact weathered a near tripling of its 
wartime population better than any of the Nan’yō Guntō’s other high islands. Yet 
suffering there was acute nonetheless, and the island’s entanglement with the warring 
Japanese Empire no less fraught with potential dangers.126 
 Wartime rationing in the Nan’yō Guntō segregated access to commercial goods 
for the first time, and access to rice swiftly became the territory’s primary marker of 
“true” Japaneseness. On Pohnpei, rice was among the first staples to be rationed, along 	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with flour, milk, and canned goods.127 In Palau, Japanese and Palauan-Japanese families 
received monthly distributions of rice, soy sauce, miso, and clothing. Palauan families 
received the same distributions in smaller amounts at first, but these were eliminated later 
in the war.128 On Guam, rice was reserved exclusively for Japanese, and the price of other 
staples increased at least eightfold for Chamorros.129 Of course, most of the territory’s 
settlers really were more dependent on imports than Islanders. But the Nan’yō’chō’s 
eagerness to racialize rationing also reflected its long-held apprehension of Islanders as 
happy-go-lucky primitives inhabiting a tropical paradise.130 The administration’s 1932 
decennial report, for instance, declared that Islanders had no need of imports at all, “as 
they make a living happily without them.” According to the report, the only articles 
Islanders purchased were “luxuries” such as toiletries, canned goods, rice, cloth, and 
tobacco.131 The century-long history of these items in the region went without comment. 
The Nan’yō Guntō’s rationing strategies revealed a critical tension in the 
nationalism that swept the islands after 1937, whereby the Nan’yō’chō increasingly 
incorporated Islanders as equal beneficiaries of the Emperor’s care in its public 
statements while alienating them from the privileges of full citizenship. Nationalist 
rhetoric could then be found everywhere from the territory’s kōgakkō, where students 
pledged to become “splendid Japanese nationals” each morning, to the symbolic rewards 
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issued to adult Islanders who performed exceptional acts of national service.132 In 1942, 
for instance, 20 Pohnpeians bound for war in New Guinea were given license to violate 
restrictions against indigenous alcohol consumption at a farewell party in Kolonia. A 
Japanese sailor friendly with the group interpreted their celebratory drinking as a sign 
they now belonged to the army and, more dramatically, that they were “not Islanders 
anymore.”133 For most Islanders, however, the territory’s hypernationalist turn resulted in 
an appreciable loss of status, just as its ostensibly need-based rationing system resulted in 
a loss of access to rice and other consumer goods. 
On Pohnpei, this loss of status was most visible in the racialized labor regimes the 
military instituted for the island’s defense preparations. Because Pohnpei was the 
territory’s second largest landmass, its abundant farmland combined with the regime’s 
growing focus on self-sufficiency elevated its strategic value as an agricultural center. 
Thus, Islanders were probably more likely to be pressed into agricultural labor on 
Pohnpei than anywhere else in the Nan’yō Guntō. As Wakako Higuchi suggests, the 
impulse to assign the harshest labor and longest hours to Islanders, Okinawans, and 
Koreans was rooted in prewar assumptions about “organic differences” among racial 
groups and the Nan’yō’chō’s tendency to structure education and labor around “original 
racial ability and particularities.”134 Islanders were therefore enlisted in projects such as 
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rice cultivation, road building, airport construction, and heaving antiaircraft guns up 
mountains, though initially as contract employees working within their own wehi.135  
Yet one’s status within the colonial order still mattered. Many Pohnpeian and 
Pohnpeian-Japanese elites were able to maintain positions of relative privilege, 
continuing their work as police officers, hospital employees, or on their own farms.136 
Oliver Nanpei offered coconuts, pigs, and cows to Japanese soldiers throughout the war, 
and those soldiers not only left his family unmolested but thanked him profusely at the 
war’s end, some of them in tears.137 Even migrant laborers found loopholes. A Chuukese 
man named Nutkas, for instance, traveled from Fefan to work the NKK plantations at 
Ledau. On his first day of work, he wore a small rising sun emblem that indicated 
achievement at his kōgakkō. It caught the eye of a high-ranking company official, and 
Nutkas was installed as the Fefan group’s new translator and leader. He spent the 
remainder of the war in search of opportunities to better his standing. He worked in the 
NKK offices while others labored in the fields and fled Ledau to protest his low pay, 
seeking refuge with the wealthy William Helgenberger. He was found and beaten along 
with other deserters, fled again, returned, and secured higher wages. He oversaw the 
Chuukese workers at a Wakamoto Company plantation, but finding that “all the Trukese 
men hated me,” he came back to Ledau. There, he “bossed all the workers” and freed his 
family from their labor obligations. “Everyone (else) old and young worked very hard at 
that time,” Nutkas later recalled. “We were very comfortable.”138  
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Initially, rice was the linchpin of the island’s wartime food strategy. Pohnpei’s 
agriculturalists developed a plan to harvest nearly 69,000 gallons of the 158x123 variety 
annually from 735 acres to supply 3,000 Japanese consumers.139 Their attempt to enact 
this plan resulted in the first large-scale production of the station’s bespoke Pohnpei rice, 
and the Nan’yō’chō established or enlarged dryland and wetland rice fields in Nett, 
Palikir, and Ledau. The war also brought 158x123 to Guam, which could have signaled 
an important victory for the station’s research. But with Guam’s shortages of labor and 
supplies, yields in the first year amounted to less than half of what Pohnpei produced, and 
insect damage the following year caused the project to be abandoned.140 Pohnpei’s own 
labor and fertilizer shortages never resulted in the end of rice cultivation there, but did 
lead the regime to refocus its self-sufficiency strategy around faster-growing cassava and 
sweet potatoes, in addition to crops like rice, potatoes, yams, pineapple, cucumbers, 
papaya, and cabbage.141  
Pohnpei’s wartime plantations initially depended on short-term contract laborers, 
some of whom took their assignment as a competition. Kitti people gained a reputation 
around the island for their “stupid work”: a willingness to complete assigned projects 
ahead of schedule in order to return home early, sometimes to the anger of Japanese 
officials. As the pressures of war intensified, however, the contract labor system became 
compulsory. Plantations then received Islanders, Okinawans, and Koreans who worked 
for little or no compensation, including children. Able-bodied Pohnpeians were shifted 
around the island and to places like Kosrae for agricultural labor and defense 	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preparations. Those assigned to rice production were lodged in rough dormitories nearby 
the paddies. There, they began work at five or six each morning, seven days a week.142  
In peacetime, the Nan’yō’chō had dismissed Islanders’ capacity for rice 
cultivation out of hand, and generally limited their efforts to promote it to settlers alone. 
Japanese officials, scholars, and those eager to develop the territory’s commercial 
agriculture had pinned this alleged inadequacy on Islanders’ moral and cultural failings, 
just as the kōgakkō system promoted a scheme of “moral education” in order to transform 
Islanders into “earnest people able to work.”143 In 1927, for instance, Shizuo Matsuoka 
speculated that Chamorros on Rota were “gradually abandoning” traditional rice 
cultivation because rice “calls for hard work, irrigation, protection against mice, and 
demands great painstaking.”144 Moral critiques of rice farmers had even extended to 
settlers, as when an agriculturalist and Nan’yō’chō official blamed the wilting paddies at 
Haruki-mura on the indolence of its settler farmers and their tendency to cheat the land 
office by claiming improperly cleared farmsteads.145 Other than the few kōgakkō 
graduates who attended the agriculture station’s small boarding school, therefore, most of 
Pohnpei’s Islanders had no experience growing rice prior to wartime.146 
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Nonetheless, the war now placed the territory’s rice supply in the hands of 
Pohnpeian labor for the first time, producing a collision between longstanding mehn waii 
tropes of “lazy and shiftless” Islanders and the assimilationist rhetoric of wartime 
nationalism.147 This collision appeared particularly dramatically in the letters of 
Nakahashi Kiyoshi, a schoolteacher on wartime Guam. Prior to the collapse of Japanese 
rice cultivation there, Kiyoshi lavished praise on the Chamorro laborers forced into 
paddies from “early in the morning until late at night,” while also maintaining that 
Chamorros “don’t like to work.” When fully-grown grains of Guam rice reached his 
table, however, Kiyoshi interpreted them as a sign that “both this island and its natives 
are Oriental, and have an Oriental character.” Even a single grain of this rice seemed to 
Kiyoshi to signal that Chamorros, like the Ainu, were “destined to be included in our 
race.”148 Pohnpei’s Japanese farmers were less theatrical, but no less invested in coaching 
Islanders to become efficient agricultural laborers. An elaborate set of instructions for 
managing agricultural contract workers offered Japanese overseers advice for everything 
from handling Islanders’ sexual proclivities to avoiding conflicts among laborers from 
different wehi, and even stipulated procedures for hosting feasts after work.149 
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As Pohnpei labored through 1943 and 1944, the war’s worst violence drew ever 
closer. Waves of Japanese soldiers began to arrive in the fall of 1943, using the island as 
a staging area to support fighting elsewhere and further straining local resources. A single 
American plane spotted flying low in January of 1944 turned out to be a harbinger of 
destruction to come. In February, B-24s arrived from Tarawa and dropped more than 
6,000 incendiary bombs and 118 tons of high explosives on the island. The bombers 
incapacitated the airstrip and seaplane base at Lenger and, along with the consuming fires 
they triggered, leveled nearly all of Kolonia with the exception of the agriculture station 
and a few other buildings.150 Because American military planners had designated Pohnpei 
a “bypassed” island, a potentially punishing land invasion was shelved in favor of daily 
bombing raids aimed at neutralizing the island’s offensive capability. By mid-1944, 
American aircraft were arriving predictably each day at 8am, pockmarking the airfields at 
Lenger, Nanpohnmal, and Palikir and various other locations while soldiers and civilians 
sheltered from harm.151 
While the destruction of Kolonia did not trigger a complete breakdown of 
authority on Pohnpei, it did move the island significantly closer to a state of collapse. In 
February of 1944, the Nan’yō’chō implemented the Plan for Urgent Countermeasures for 
Supplementing Food, imposing “self-sufficiency” on civilians in order to boost military 
food supplies.152 In practice, this meant settlers scattering in search of sustenance and 
soldiers seizing the crops Pohnpeians planted for their families, beating those who 
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refused.153 The military and Nan’yō’chō also restricted feasting and sakau consumption, 
and demanded that Islanders secure official permission to slaughter their own livestock.154 
Given the deep resonance of food and feeding for framing Pohnpeian values and 
relationships, these seizures amounted to a fundamental breach of the social contract. 
Stories of particularly egregious offenders, like the Japanese police officer who barked at 
Rosete Hebel that, “one drop of alcohol is more important than the lives of [Pohnpeian] 
people” circulated through the island and lodged deep in memories.155 
Many Islanders were victimized by this breakdown of the colonial order, but 
others found that the war had scrambled Pohnpei’s hierarchies in more complex ways. 
Alcohol restrictions were lifted island-wide, and while liquor was still hard to come by, 
the effects of this “concession” were dramatic enough for one of the island’s Catholic 
priests to declare it a “crime against humanity.”156 A Pohnpeian man named Iowanis later 
recalled that sexual boundaries seemed to fall away in wartime, and that “after the war 
started we could sleep easily with Japanese women.” He then described ten Japanese 
women who worked at the same company as him, trailing off as he spoke, “I worked with 
them just like…”157 Some Pohnpeians used their knowledge of the island’s environment 
to take revenge on Japanese soldiers, positioning one under a falling coconut or fooling 
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another into grabbing the sharp spine of a speared rabbit fish.158 Others subverted power 
relationships with kindness, feeding settlers who evacuated Kolonia utterly unprepared to 
live off the land, and even caring for some of the island’s better-natured military 
personnel. In many cases, the relationships they built in the process endured well after the 
war’s end, and sparked correspondences, gift exchanges, and visits that lasted decades.159 
The politics of wartime feeding ascribed a power to the giver that was no less 
meaningful for Japanese soldiers than it was for Pohnpeians. Takehiko Akita, who 
commanded a small army group on Pohnpei, prided himself on his ability to keep his men 
fed without relying on the meager, irregular rations available from military headquarters. 
His unit leveled a Sokehs coconut plantation to plant sweet potatoes, stole supplies from 
Islanders, fished, raised snails and rabbits, tried (and failed) to smoke sakau leaves in lieu 
of tobacco, and worked to avoid treacherous foods like improperly prepared cassava. 
Akita later boasted that his unit managed its food supplies so skillfully that others 
approached them to trade.160 Toshinaga Hisaichi recalled a more punishing ordeal: 
stealing food, fishing with high explosives, and eating everything from coconuts and 
bananas to snails, frogs, dogs, cats, potato leaves, and tree roots. Yet Hisaichi too framed 
his survival as a validation of his masculine self-reliance and, declaring he had “proved 	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that humans can live without eating rice,” perhaps a subtle rebuttal of the nationalistic 
equation of rice with the “purity of the Japanese self” as well.161 
Emperor Hirohito’s unconditional surrender in August of 1945 now seems to 
signal the inevitable unraveling of the Japanese presence in the Nan’yō Guntō, but that 
unraveling did not go uncontested. Feeding continued to frame Pohnpei’s power struggles 
even after its daily bombing runs were replaced with airdrops of sweets, tobacco, and 
surrender demands. Unwilling to yield defeat without a lengthy internal debate, Japanese 
military command stubbornly maintained its control over Pohnpei’s remaining food 
reserves. In the meantime, some Japanese soldiers were dispatched to gather up the 
airdropped boxes and deliver them to headquarters, while settlers spread rumors that the 
military intended to use its remaining food supplies to continue fighting.162 Plantation 
overseers also briefly withheld news of the war’s end from Islanders, whether in hopes of 
maintaining a willing labor force or avoiding violent reprisals from harried workers.163  
Bedraggled representatives from the Japanese Army, Navy, and Nan’yō’chō 
finally boarded the USS Hyman on the morning of September 12, the “shabby remains of 
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their full dress uniforms” marking a striking contrast with the well-supplied Americans.164 
There, Kaneto Tsukahara briefly engaged an American officer in a tense argument over 
the feasibility of assembling Pohnpei’s scattered population. But once the surrender 
documents were signed, Tsukahara later recalled, “the circumstances on the ship became 
friendly” and the Americans offered their Japanese guests ice cream and tobacco.165 
Shortly afterwards, a small contingent of American sailors crossed Pohnpei’s reef for the 
first time, staging a flag raising ceremony and taking command of the 5,400 Islanders, 
7,800 military personnel, and 6,000 settlers remaining on the island.166  
As American officials took stock of work to be done and took charge of Pohnpei’s 
remaining food reserves, they briefly seemed to take on the role of a nahnmwarki, 
revealing their power through the generosity of their food distributions.167 For many 
Islanders, shortages of clothing and healthcare ultimately proved most urgent, but they 
nonetheless accepted gifts of American corned beef and distributions of canned foods and 
rice from Lenger’s emergency stocks as gratefully as settlers did.168 At the makeshift 
Nan’yō’chō office, Americans praised Japanese leaders for their discipline and skill in 
managing Pohnpei’s food supplies, compliments those leaders received with some 
gratitude.169 As Pohnpeians returned to their homes, revived their farms, and picked up 
the pieces of their lives, Japanese settlers joked that losing the war had suddenly left them 
with too much food, some of it far less desirable than it had been a short time before. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 “Eye Witness Account of the Surrender of Ponape” in “Japanese Departure from Ponape,” Micronesian 
Seminar Archive, Chuuk. 
165 Interview with Kaneto Tsukahara in Higuchi, Micronesia Under the Japanese Administration, 46-47. 
166 “On the USS Hyman, Ponape Island, Sept. 11 (Delayed)”, in “Japanese Departure from Ponape,” 
Micronesian Seminar Archive, Chuuk. 
167 For a similar claim regarding the American military presence in the Marshalls, see: Poyer et al., Typhoon 
of War, 245. 
168 Poyer et al., Typhoon of War, 189; Falgout et al., Memories of War, 177-178, 199. 
169 Interview with Kaneto Tsukahara in Higuchi, Micronesia Under the Japanese Administration, 47; 
Tokumi, “Memory of Pohnpei,” 189. 
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Sweet potatoes were now so numerous, they teased, that anyone who crossed the bridge 
over the Dausokele River received more than 80 pounds whether they wanted them or 
not. But settlers also mocked the Japanese soldiers who fumed whenever they found 
once-precious potatoes abandoned by the bridge or at the bottom of a boat, seemingly 
chagrined over America’s ability to offer a 2,200-calorie diet to anyone in need.170 
In spite of these friendly overtures, behind the scenes American Naval planners 
had determined to eliminate Japaneseness from the Nan’yō Guntō entirely. On Pohnpei, 
every settler and soldier was summarily deported without regard to family relationships 
or land ownership by Christmas of 1945.171 Before they left, however, settlers and 
soldiers like Takehiko Akita had time to reflect on the meaning of the colony they helped 
to build and the war they helped to fight. Appropriately, Akita and his men reminisced 
over bags of rice. Like many of Pohnpei’s other Japanese soldiers, Akita’s unit had flatly 
refused to be fed by an opposing army, citing their “bushidō spirit” and leaving American 
sailors to grumble over having to eat the California rice they brought themselves. As a 
result, the Americans offered their rice to Islanders, as Akita discovered when an 
unnamed Islander approached him bearing a 40-kilogram bag. “We don’t usually eat 
rice,” the man explained. “We prefer taro and breadfruit. I want to give this to you 
instead, and I want to talk.”172 
Unwilling to be fed by the Americans, Akita’s unit was happy to be fed now. 
Akita read the gift as a window onto the past, a sign that the man remained pro-Japanese, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Tokumi, “Memory of Pohnpei,” 192. 
171 Some of these settlers clearly planned to return to Pohnpei. Between September and December of 1945, 
a number of them sought certificates of ownership for their land on the island from the Nan’yō’chō. TJLD, 
reel 20, (62) 13X-000002 through 13X-000024; Asia Mapping, Inc. Japanese Language Documents in 
Ponape, 1970, 3 
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determined to rebuild blood ties momentarily broken by war out of sight of the 
Americans. Here, Akita believed, was evidence of a racial affinity that the Americans 
would never be able to achieve; the same affinity that struck a Nan’yō’chō official on 
wartime Palau who asserted that American soldiers believed “their white hands became 
dark after shaking hands with Islanders.”173 But while Akita took the rice as a vindication 
of the past, the Islander offering it was already looking toward a post-Japanese future. 
Akita’s unit was occupying the man’s land, and in spite of the enormous cultural weight 
rice had accrued among Nan’yō Guntō settlers, for many Pohnpeians the war had only 
reinforced the value of what truly endured. Ultimately, the man was able to leverage a 
few deliveries of rice and some tobacco for the return of his land and a new home built by 
Akita’s grateful men.174 With the war finally at an end, his land could then provide him a 
foundation for managing yet another colonial regime. Across Pohnpei and the erstwhile 
Nan’yō Guntō, thousands of other Islanders were making the same calculations. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Japan had seized the Nan’yō Guntō from Germany without firing a shot, but the 
Pacific War left behind a territory in ruins. There were families separated, loved ones 
lost, bodies laboring under the effects of malnutrition or painful cases of yaws. There 
were scars on the land, from the bombed out wreckage of Japanese colonial towns to 
ruined warships and aircraft leaching oil at the bottoms of lagoons. On Pohnpei, copra 
plantations were uprooted, factories sat moldering, and the jungle was swiftly reclaiming 
monocropped farmland. The island’s ecology was transformed as well. There were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Interview with Seitaro Yasutake in Higuchi, Micronesia Under the Japanese Administration, 61. 
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lingering effects of the taro blight of the 1920s, wild yams devastated by Giant African 
Snails, and the general destruction of wild foods by Japanese who trudged through the 
interior mountains during the war.175 The agriculture station’s rice research could only be 
partly salvaged through publication, but it had introduced nearly 200 unique plants to the 
island, of which some had longer lives as usable crops and others became invasive 
weeds.176 
 Yet the level of destruction was deceptive. Many of the region’s new American 
occupiers assumed the war’s consuming fire had burned up all the legacies of Japanese 
rule along with colonial infrastructures and island environments. An American 
geographer who visited Haruki-mura in 1947 found it overgrown with weeds and vines, 
and interpreted the abandonment of rice culture and monocropping there as a general 
“revulsion against all things Japanese including Japanese crops and methods.” Yet he 
also noted that sweet potatoes and cassava remained, incorporated within the Pohnpeian 
agroforestry system.177 Japaneseness had not been erased, but incorporated: within the 
genealogies of Islander families, in the land, in brand loyalties and food preferences, and 
in an emergent colonial elite that would soon seek to reposition itself under a new 
occupier.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 The wild yams referenced here were kehpeneir (southern yams), which grow “semiwild, free of cultural 
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The wartime environmental damage to the island’s interior had many causes. In 1951, a man named 
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CHAPTER 3: VITARELLI’S SPAGHETTI: IMPORTED FOODS,  
INDIGENOUS MODERNITIES, AND IMPERIAL ANXIETIES ON  
COLD WAR POHNPEI  
 
 In the spring of 1984, William Vitarelli sat down to reflect on his career in the 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands of the 1950s. As he reminisced over his advocacy 
for community-based education and school initiatives aimed at making Islanders “world 
mobile,” Vitarelli abruptly turned to imported foods. “We were all colonialists,” he began 
to insist. “We couldn’t help it. There’s no way to – just being there and eating a can of – 
making some spaghetti and meatballs… we were changing things.”1 This interjection of 
spaghetti into a discussion of colonial education policy may appear an idle remark, 
perhaps one rooted in longtime mehn waii suspicions that Pacific Islander bodies and 
cultures were uniquely susceptible to contamination by the harms of the modern world. 
But Vitarelli’s framing of spaghetti and meatballs as simultaneously irresistible and 
potentially ruinous also points to the indispensability of imported foods to America’s 
colonial project in Micronesia, and the instability of the project itself.  
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, as US Navy rule gave way to the Interior 
Department’s civilian staff families, imported foods repeatedly insinuated themselves 
into the territory’s most consequential political discourses. They helped remake Islander 
homes and kitchens and maintained the baseline standard of living needed to draw mehn 
waii families to the islands. They aided in disentangling social relations between 
Kolonia’s mehn waii and Islander communities and in drawing the town toward self-
government. Imported foods lay in the background as the Ponape Women’s Association 
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grew into a multiethnic social force that articulated an indigenous modernity at times 
allied with and at times resistant to mehn waii domesticity. And they enabled American 
staff families to grapple with their anxieties over postindustrial life and their own 
indeterminate missions as they caroused at Club Kolonia, whose gatherings missionary 
Margery Terpstra described as the “great American pleasure” of 1950s staff life.2 
  This chapter traces the routes products like corned beef, canned salmon, canned 
milk, flour, tinned vegetables, and alcohol took through the mehn waii and indigenous 
households and bodies of early Cold War Pohnpei. It argues that the American Navy’s 
confident vision of postwar Kolonia as an import-dependent base town ultimately broke 
down in the wake of mehn waii unease with modernity’s impacts on Pacific Islander 
bodies and landscapes, and in light of Kolonia’s flowering into a multiethnic hub whose 
own use of imports granted it a measure of independence from outside leadership. As the 
Mokilese statesman Bethwel Henry notes, Islander demand for imports like rice, flour, 
and canned goods was “always there” through the hardships of the Pacific War and 
Pohnpei’s American occupation.3 But unlike Germany’s obsession with coconuts or 
Japan’s quixotic pursuit of a Pohnpeian rice, Americans were decidedly ambivalent about 
their need to surround themselves with imported foods. Nowhere was this ambivalence 
more pronounced than with canned goods, whose overcooking and incorporation of 
produce from different regions often rendered their taste and texture off-putting and their 
terroir ambiguous. Still, canned foods seemed to function for many Americans as a 
metaphor for their own presence in the islands: preconditions for modernity that might 
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family away from Club Kolonia. Margery Terpstra. Telephone interview by author. October 7, 2016. 
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cripple what was most precious in island life, harbingers of self-sufficiency that drew the 
region ever closer to foreign economic and political powers, and pervasive reminders that 
American home life could almost be reconstituted abroad, but not quite. 
 Pohnpei’s written history has tended to pass quickly over the island’s 1950s life 
as an American-run United Nations Trust Territory. Developmentalist critiques headline 
the era’s economic stagnation, attacking overcautious military planners and overzealous 
liberals for seeking to shield Islanders from all outside influence. In this reading of the 
Trust Territory as “rust territory,” nothing of real significance occurred between postwar 
reconstruction and the funding surges of the Kennedy era other than the moldering of the 
region’s Japanese-era infrastructure.4 More critical scholarship has also tended to read the 
1950s backward, through the lens of the territory’s 1960s-era independence movement 
and the explosion of economic development that accompanied it. Yet in attending to 
1950s Pohnpei’s consumption habits, a great deal is revealed: an uncertain colonial 
regime undergirded and undermined by its own imports, an island at the intersection of 
American Cold War consumerism and a cash-poor citizenry, the remaking of Kolonia 
Town, and the emergence of critical new multicultural solidarities among Islanders that 
profoundly shaped Pohnpei’s future.  
 Vicente Rafael has argued that “imperialism appears as domesticity on the move.5 
In fact, colonial domesticity within American imperial spaces grew exponentially more 
mobile and more responsive to domestic trends over the course of the 20th century as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See, for instance: Carl Heine, Micronesia at the Crossroads: A Reappraisal of the Micronesian Political 
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A Study of the Consolidation of US Rule in the Pacific (Washington DC: University Press of America, 
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production and consumer acceptability of canned and processed foods increased and 
logistics improved. Commercial canning operations in particular had cultivated a 
mutually constitutive relationship with militarism and empire almost from canned food’s 
first appearance in the Parisian confectioner Nicolas Appert’s laboratory in 1809.6 
Canned foods supplied European voyages of exploration through Oceania, facilitated 
America’s westward expansion, supplied the Japanese military in its war with Russia, and 
allowed British residents of 19th century China to spurn local cuisines and, if they wished, 
those who enjoyed them. In 1948, Chicago-based Libby, McNeill & Libby claimed 
substantial credit for American victories in the First and Second World Wars, declaring 
the canning industry “one of the nation’s greatest bulwarks against the enemies of 
freedom.”7 By the Vietnam War, the American military was flooding its war zone with a 
broad range of consumer goods in hopes of raising morale and strengthening its military 
operations.8  
Bulk military purchasing in turn accelerated the canning industry’s growth. But 
that growth would have been unsustainable if not for the industry’s aggressive pursuit of 
peacetime customers. Libby’s, for instance, participated in government rationing 
programs during World War II while targeting its advertising at American housewives 
who often found their local markets sold out of Libby’s products. Once the war was over 
the company exploited the pent-up demand, praising women for their crucial aid in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Katarzyna Cwiertka, for instance, has called war the canning industry’s “principal patron.” Katarzyna J. 
Cwiertka, Modern Japanese Cuisine: Food, Power and National Identity (London: Reaktion Books, 2006), 
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7 Annual Report for the Year Ended February 28, 1948. (Chicago: Libby, McNeill & Libby, 1948), 3, 20-
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University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 4, 6. 
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bolstering America’s military preparedness.9 But the postwar moment also coincided with 
other key boosts for the consumer acceptability of canned and processed foods. The food 
industry successfully concluded a decades-long joint effort with the USDA to investigate 
the biochemistry of canned goods and allay longstanding consumer safety concerns. The 
proliferation of home refrigeration made convenience foods more practical. Canned 
goods began to appear more widely on store shelves, and in popular cookbooks like Joy 
of Cooking.10 And Cold War America increasingly came to revolve around family values, 
consumerism, and a newly ascendant food culture.11  
This reorientation of mainstream American life meant surges in consumer 
spending in the home, which in turn helped establish a “new minimum standard of 
living” for America’s middle class.12 Interior Department families and, to a lesser extent, 
Naval personnel brought this minimum standard with them to the Trust Territory, making 
Pohnpei among the first places to experience a collision between colonial domesticity and 
postwar American consumer culture. Consumerism of some variety had, of course, been 
a fixture of Pohnpeian life since the 19th century. Pohnpeians themselves repeatedly 
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(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 157.  
12 Lair, Armed with Abundance, 10. 
	   109	  
invoked the bustling marketplaces of Japanese Kolonia during the postwar period as a 
critique of American economic policy. American protests that staff wives would never 
agree to “give up canasta and live like a pioneer” likewise recalled Nan’yō’chō efforts to 
sustain Japan’s colonial project by fostering comfortable home lives for its settlers.13 But 
never had Pohnpei seen consumerism become so central to a colonizer’s identity, nor a 
foreign power’s concerns over the impact of consumer goods become so urgent. 
 The Trust Territory’s American military personnel and civilian staffers were 
entrusted with a mission that could appear quite opaque. Facing a war-wounded military 
that vowed to never again let the Pacific Islands be used “as springboards for aggression 
against the United States or any other nation,” they helped facilitate the indefinite 
occupation of nearly three million square miles of ocean as Harry Truman declared the 
United States did not desire “one inch” of territory anywhere in the world.14 They 
governed under the novel and oxymoronic category of a “strategic trusteeship,” in theory 
both yielding to international pressure to foster self-government in the islands and 
affording primacy to American strategic interests there.15 Interior staffers were 
themselves split between Eisenhower conservatives and exiled New Dealers, and they 
repeatedly clashed over whether they were temporary consultants training an emergent 
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class of political leaders or professionals whose work was hindered by headstrong 
Islanders and an obdurate colonial bureaucracy.  
Americans, even those who understood their position as more camp counselor 
than political animal, often seemed to regard Oceania from amid a haze of literary, 
artistic, and filmic representation that Paul Lyons has called American Pacificism. They 
read Micronesia as a series of stepping-stones to the East, just as the Navy had in 
prosecuting its wartime “island hopping” campaign. But, to varying degrees, they also 
regarded islands like Pohnpei as “ends-of-the-earth, cultural limit-cases unencumbered by 
notions of sin, antitheses to the industrial worlds of economic and political modernity,” 
and compared the “unfamiliar natives” they encountered there to racial minorities already 
familiar to them.16 Military personnel tended to transpose anti-blackness onto the 
Islanders they met, or to conjure up images of vanishing Indians in considering their own 
impacts on island cultures and ecologies.17 Many Interior staffers, by contrast, came to 
the Trust Territory by way of colonial spaces like Guam, Hawai’i, or Alaska or were 
themselves racial minorities, and drew from an even broader range of comparison. 
These men and women could be seen sporting aloha shirts, hosting luaus, arguing 
for English instruction in schools based on past experience teaching Dick and Jane to 
“Eskimos,” or boozily declaring that Micronesians were “hundreds of years ahead of 	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Navahos” due to their readiness to sing in public.18 A few took their previous work in 
colonial governance as an affirmation of their opposition to imperial rule. The territory’s 
longtime education director Robert Gibson, for instance, grounded his evangelism for 
Micronesian self-determination in a nagging suspicion that his prior association with 
education administrations in America’s Japanese internment camps and the South Korean 
Interim Government had done more harm than good.19 Others leaned on more prosaic 
juxtapositions to think their way through Micronesia, though they helped to draw the 
islands into a broader universe of American colonial policymaking just the same. 
The American Navy landed on Pohnpei in the fall of 1945. For the next six years, 
it maintained an occupying force of only 40 to 50 sailors there, supplanting some 6,000 
Japanese civilians and 7,800 military personnel. The Americans thus offered Pohnpeians 
a stark contrast with the Nan’yō’chō from the very start.20 The regime’s comparatively 
small footprint persisted well past 1951, when the Navy was itself supplanted by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Many Islander elites also adopted the Hawaiian-style aloha shirt/trouser combination under American 
rule. The official arguing for English-only instruction was High Commissioner Maurice Goding. The 
official who referenced Navajos was PITTS principal George Fleishman. Office of the District 
Administrator, Welcome to Ponape (Ponape: Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1959), 7; Robert 
Trumbull, Paradise in Trust: a report on Americans in Micronesia (New York: W. Sloane Associates, 
1959), 21. See also Toomin, Black Robe, 195, 235; Robert Gibson, interview by Karen Peacock, April 18, 
1984, folder 9, transcript, KPI, 1; John Fischer, “Fleischman/Initiative,” March 29, 1949, Eastern Carolines 
Field Notes, John L. Fischer, Tozzer Library, Harvard University (hereafter HFP), reel 1 [frame 605]. 
19 Gibson did, however, claim that these experiences qualified him to work with non-white communities. 
He argued that his past work provided him with an “appreciation for the value of cultural integrity” and an 
unwillingness to assert the “cultural superiority of Western, industrialized society and its values.” Robert 
Gibson, interview by Karen Peacock, January 26, 1984, folder 2, transcript, KPI, 27; Robert Gibson, 
interview by Karen Peacock, January 19, 1984, folder 1, transcript, KPI, 14-17, 19-20; Robert Gibson, 
“Trust Territory: Cultural Education and Westernized Schooling,” n.d., folder 15, KPI, 1-2. 
20 Bascom writes that Pohnpei’s American garrison stood at around 50 personnel in the summer of 1946. 
Personnel rosters suggest Pohnpei hosted an occupying force of between 40 and 50 during 1948 and 1949 
as well. Sherman Lee Pompey. “Micronesia.” (Independent Research Project for Sociology 190, Fresno 
State College, 1968), 89; William R. Bascom, Ponape: A Pacific Economy in Transition. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1965), 5; Office of the Civil Administrator, Ponape District, “Roster of 
Enlisted Personnel and Officers,” Quarterly Report 2-48 (April-June 1948), Enclosure C, 1-2; Office of the 
Civil Administrator, Ponape District, “Roster of Enlisted Personnel and Officers,” Quarterly Report 3-48 
(July-September 1948), n.p.; Office of the Civil Administrator, Ponape District, “Roster of Enlisted 
Personnel and Officers,” Quarterly Report 4-48 (October-December 1948), Enclosure C, 1-2. 
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Interior Department in most of the Trust Territory.21 Even so, Americans and the foods 
they imported in those early years produced an enduring legacy that belied their small 
numbers. As Christine DeLisle suggests, in spite of a persistent mehn waii tendency to 
equate modernity with foreign rule, indigeneity and modernity are neither mutually 
exclusive categories nor inherent polar opposites.22 America’s true legacy in early Cold 
War Pohnpei, therefore, was not a modernity imposed from the top but a cluster of new 
ways of being indigenous and modern produced through contestation, negotiation, and 
encounter – which imported foods are uniquely suited to reveal. 
 
 
Prehistories of postwar consumerism: making the colonial kitchen in Pohnpei 
 
 In 1936, Tokuzo Akiyama, the official chef to Emperor Hirohito, placed an article 
in the Nan’yō Guntō magazine entitled “The Tropics, Flavor, and Cooking.” Akiyama 
described the obstacles facing Japanese in the tropics, where the climate brought settlers 
sweaty bodies, itchy throats, weak stomachs, and an unpleasant taste to the mouth. With 
familiar ingredients in short supply and no real precedent for tropical cooking in 
mainland Japanese cuisine, diets became unbalanced and meals lost their flavor. But for 
the capable cook, Akiyama believed, the use of local ingredients, spices to cool down the 
body and stimulate a strong appetite, and new methods to preserve and flavor rice could 
produce healthy, balanced diets with an impact far beyond the domestic sphere. In fact, 
he argued that skillful tropical cooking was more important than fostering good 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Naval rule persisted in the Northern Marianas until 1961 when it too came under Interior’s purview. In 
the interim, the Central Intelligence Agency operated a secret program on Saipan to train Chinese 
Nationalists in jungle warfare techniques, using facilities that later housed the Congress of Micronesia. 
Hezel, Strangers, 283. 
22 Christine Taitano DeLisle. “Navy Wives/Native Lives: The Cultural and Historical Relations between 
American Naval Wives and Chamorro Women in Guam, 1898-1945.” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Michigan, 2008), 210. 
	   113	  
governance or erecting fine buildings. “Although surrounded by nature’s bounty,” he 
wrote, “island life becomes monotonous, settlers lose interest in food, and they yearn to 
return home filled with longing for the Japanese cooking they miss. This is the 
housewife’s shame, for it is they who run the kitchen.”23  
Like Akiyama, the Nan’yō’chō had maintained that kitchens, home gardens, and 
store shelves were critical sites for sustaining settler morale and the settler colonial 
project itself. But neither Pohnpei’s Japanese settlers nor the Americans who came in 
their wake set the long process of gendered mehn waii interventionism in the island’s 
domestic sphere in motion. In fact, what Margaret Jacobs might call Pohnpei’s “domestic 
frontier” had been a site of “ongoing tension, instability, and constant negotiation” since 
the 19th century.24 The fruit of these negotiations was the Pohnpeian colonial kitchen. 
These kitchens appeared both in settler colonial and indigenous iterations. The former 
was stocked with imported foods and staffed by servants striving to reconstruct the 
domestic life of the metropole. The latter, by contrast, was transformed by imported 
goods though not dependent on them, influenced by gendered mehn waii ideologies yet 
grounded in a feasting and exchange system that asserted its own powerful, evolving 
notions of Pohnpeian masculinity and femininity.  
In the last decades of the 19th century food imports began to penetrate the daily 
lives of Pohnpei’s mehn waii settlers, for whom a well-stocked pantry could have 
profound implications. Imported foods could disempower a pre-1912 nahnmwarki who 
might otherwise extract concessions for access to the fruits of his land. They could offer a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Tokuzo Akiyama [????], “The Topics, Flavor, and Cooking” [???????], Nan’yō Guntō 2:6 
(1936), 36-37. 
24 Margaret Jacobs. “Working on the Domestic Frontier: American Indian Domestic Servants in White 
Women’s Households in the San Francisco Bay Area, 1920-1940.” Frontiers 28, no. 1/2 (2007): 167. 
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settler the stability and independence otherwise available only to Pohnpeians who were 
comfortably self-reliant in food production. And they could grant settlers comfort and 
familiarity, smoothing their transition to island life. The Polish naturalist and 
ethnographer Johann Kubary must have felt just this sort of gratification in 1876 when he 
reassured his sister that his Nett home was “full of European delicacies,” his garden 
brimming with produce, and that he lacked for nothing.25 In this sense, Pohnpei’s mehn 
waii were not unlike patrons of settler colonial kitchens the world over. In them were 
glimmers of the British residents of 1870s Shantou, China, whose disdain for Chinese 
food and culture drew them to a special “metallic” menu prepared entirely from canned 
goods. Likewise the ranchers of 1880s Montana, whose obsessive consumption of canned 
goods resulted in piles of tin cans moldering under each of their shacks.26 As Patricia 
Limerick notes, these heaps of tin signified a celebration of independence and a vital tie 
to the world outside, seeming to represent the settlement’s continuity “simply by staying 
in place.”27 Pohnpei’s more enduring settlers may have found a similar comfort in the 
rusted evidence of their own tenuous ties to home. 
Household servants also became a fixture of turn of the century mehn waii homes. 
Servants were commonplace in American missionary households and the homes of 
German settlers, from the Chinese chef who accompanied Albert Hahl on his travels 
through the Pacific to the young Pohnpeian girl working in the Sokehs residence of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 “Kubary’s Residence on Pohnpei,” n.d., Pohnpei State Historic Preservation Office Archives, Kolonia, 
Pohnpei. 
26 Cwiertka, Modern Japanese Cuisine, 36. 
27 Patricia Nelson Limerick. The Legacy of Conquest. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987), 17-
18. 
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overseer Otto Hollborn.28 The market for domestic help remained small until the 
Nan’yō’chō began actively encouraging Japanese settlement, establishing a kōgakkō 
system around the same time that was aimed largely at training boys as laborers and girls 
as domestics.29 In fact, kōgakkō were linked directly to settler homes throughout the 
Nan’yō Guntō. Schools frequently assigned upper level girls and boys to do simple 
household chores for settler families in exchange for a small allowance.30 Mehn waii 
elites also hired their own housekeepers, as did some mixed Japanese-Islander families.31  
Yet while some housekeepers assisted with food preparation, granting servants 
full authority over settler kitchens seems to have been a bridge too far for most families. 
Recipes in the Nan’yō Guntō magazine, for example, were aimed directly at Japanese 
housewives and rarely mentioned domestics. Living in Kolonia homes the magazine had 
once joked were barely distinguishable from those in Osaka, housewives were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Victor Berg reported in 1901 that around a dozen Chinese servants were working as cooks and servants 
on the island, most presumably in Kolonia. Berg also made several proposals that year to recruit additional 
Chinese emigrants to Pohnpei, including a gardener to work the land at the government agriculture station 
(who he hoped might also be skilled in shoemaking) and a group of Chinese peasants to farm the land 
nearby once he and his family had become settled. Albert Hahl. Governor in New Guinea. (Canberra: 
Australian National University Press, 1980), 75-76; Ponape to Foreign Office, Colonial Division, Berlin, 
October 21, 1901 in Susanne Moyal. Records of the German Imperial Government of the South Seas 
Pertaining to Micronesia as Contained in the Archives Office, Australian National Government, Canberra. 
(hereafter RGIG) (Saipan, Mariana Islands: Division of Lands and Surveys, Dept. of Resources and 
Development, Trust Territory Govt., 1975), vol. 10, Item 121, Document 19, 3-4; Ponape to Foreign 
Office, Colonial Division, Berlin, October 24, 1901, RGIG, vol. 10, Item 121, Document 19, 7; Paul 
Ehrlich. “‘The Clothes of Men’: Ponape Island and German Colonial Rule, 1899-1914.” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1978), 164.  
29 John Fischer. “The Japanese Schools for the Natives of Truk, Caroline Islands.” Human Organization 20, 
no. 2 (Summer 1961): 84. 
30 Advanced Palauan students in Koror’s public school were dispatched in boy/girl pairs to Japanese homes 
after school to perform chores like heating the bath, housecleaning, laundry, and babysitting. By the 1940s 
most of these students received ½ yen per day for their work. Machiko Aoyagi, Modekngei: A New 
Religion in Belau, Micronesia. (Tokyo: Shinsensha Press, 2002), 87. See also: Keiko Ono and Tetsuya 
Ando. “A Study of Urban Morphology of Japanese Colonial Towns in Nan’yō Guntō, Part 4: Natsujima, 
Truk Islands” Journal of Architecture and Planning 77, no. 671 (January 2012), 212; Maki Mita. Palauan 
Children Under Japanese Rule: Their Oral Histories. (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 2009). 
31 The Uemoto family, for example, offered nankinmai rice and canned goods to neighbors in exchange for 
cleaning and laundry during Pohnpei’s later Japanese era. Carlos and Simone Etscheit also employed maids 
during the island’s Japanese era. Sei Uemoto. Interview by Tamaki Levy and author. Kolonia, Pohnpei, 
April 23, 2015; Yvette Etscheit Adams. Island Traders: Memories of the Carlos Etscheit Family. (Pohnpei, 
2009), 77. 
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encouraged to prepare Japanese, Chinese, and Western dishes that only sometimes 
acknowledged their tropical surroundings: fish meunière with pickled papaya, steamed 
fish with lemon, roast pork, vegetable stew, French fries, chicken with eggplant, pork 
stew with sake, Chinese pork stew, papaya curry, tapioca balls, boiled breadfruit with 
sugar syrup, and banana pudding.32 Many mehn waii families in the Japanese era dined on 
these and other familiar dishes almost exclusively, relying on the mothers and daughters 
of the home to supervise their proper preparation. Among them was Sakae Taira, who 
traveled with his wife from Okinawa to work Ledau’s sugar fields. All of the Taira 
family’s home meals were Japanese, prepared with Japanese ingredients from Ledau’s 
company store or their home garden. And, Taira recalls, all of his Okinawan neighbors 
ate in the same way.33  
For others, particularly Pohnpei’s growing number of racially mixed families, the 
kitchen became a culinary middle ground. Under the care of their Pohnpeian mothers, 
families like the Uemotos grew and ate yams, taro, breadfruit and bananas, pounding rice 
and banana together until they resembled mochi. They cooked taro and ground tapioca 
together in the family uhmw, rolled it into balls, and dipped the balls in coconut milk. 
They used the uhmw for local bananas and Japanese pumpkins. They dined on sashimi, 
sea cucumber, pigs, and chickens, kept a store of canned goods, and ate both imported 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Mitsuyuki Kaneya and Rokuro Kitahara [????,???? ], “Nan’yō Travel Journal (Hizakurige)” 
[?????], Nan’yō Guntō 2:11 (1936), 46; Seiko Kimura [????], “Three Recipes for the Pacific 
Islands and Creating a Homemade Fish Scaler” [?????????????????? ], Nan’yō 
Guntō 3:10 (1937), 55-57; Seiko Kimura [????], “Recipes for the Pacific Islands” [????? ], 
Nan’yō Guntō 3:11 (1937), 60-62; Seiko Kimura [????], “Three Recipes for the Pacific Islands” [?
??????], Nan’yō Guntō 3:12 (1937), 68-69; Seiko Kimura [????], “Four Recipes for the 
Pacific Islands” [???????], Nan’yō Guntō 4:1 (1938), 67-69. 
33 Sakae Taira. Telephone interview by Tamaki Levy and author, April 1, 2015. 
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Japanese rice and nankinmai.34 Some Pohnpeian women seem to have so staked their 
claim to their kitchens as to drive their Japanese husbands out during mealtimes. Kolonia 
mayor Michio Suzuki, for instance, preferred to retreat to the town’s ryōtei for most 
meals in order to be served Japanese food on porcelain dishes as geisha attended to him.35  
Pohnpeian homes, particularly those of the emergent Islander elite, were in turn 
transformed by the settler kitchen’s presence. Until the mid-19th century, Pohnpeian 
households did not maintain kitchens of the sort most mehn waii would have recognized. 
Most Pohnpeians lived with their extended families on farmsteads similar to the ones 
ethnographer Paul Hambruch observed in 1910: with dwelling houses, feast houses 
(nahs), boathouses, cookhouses (wonuhmw), and other structures depending on status and 
circumstance.36 The small, open-walled wonuhmw was largely the province of Pohnpeian 
men, who used it to prepare both daily food and seasonal tributes to traditional leaders.37 
Women took charge of some daily food processing and feast contributions, several of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Sei Uemoto. Interview by Tamaki Levy and author. Kolonia, Pohnpei, April 23, 2015. 
35 Yukio Suzuki. Interview by Tamaki Levy and author. Kolonia, Pohnpei, October 16, 2014. 
36 Prior to the island’s missionization, Pohnpeian extended families were matrilocal, but missionary 
interventions in marriage culture were successful in pushing for patrilocal residence. Early 19th century 
Pohnpeian farmsteads therefore would have hosted matrilineal extended families, while most of the 
families Hambruch observed in 1910 were patrilineal. See Kim Kihleng’s dissertation for a more detailed 
explanation of the Pohnpeian extended family’s evolution. Kimberlee Sterritt Kihleng. “Women in 
Exchange: Negotiated Relations, Practice, and the Constitution of Female Power in Processes of Cultural 
Reproduction and Change in Pohnpei, Micronesia.” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawai’i at Manoa, 
1996), 103-112; Seberiano Barnabas and Francis X. Hezel, “The Changing Pohnpeian Family,” 
Micronesian Counselor 12 (November 1993); Mark L. Berg, “‘The Wandering Life among Unreliable 
Islanders’: The Hamburg Sudsee-Expedition in Micronesia.” Journal of Pacific History 23, no. 1 (1988): 
96. 
37 Hambruch writes that Pohnpeian cookhouses were of simpler construction than dwelling houses, open on 
all sides, with blocks rather than interior purlins and no middle posts in the middle of the structure. He 
writes, “only the oblique, lower parts of the gable, tisak, and the long sides are covered with palm leaves 
like the roofs of the dwelling houses.” Hambruch, Paul and Annelise Eilers. Ponape, Vol. 2: Gesellschaft 
Und Geistige Kultur, Wirtschaft Und Stoffliche Kultur. Ergebnisse Der Sudsee Expedition 1908–1910, 
II.B.7. (Hamburg, 1936), 304. 
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which were quite prestigious.38 That participation in the island’s feasting and exchange 
system was deeply valued, and the labor they contributed an important reservoir women 
drew on to maintain their high social status under colonial rule.39 
Most of the ingredients that found their way to the uhmw, however, were products 
of men’s labor: items like breadfruit, yams, fish, and pigs.40 The uhmw and the nahs 
constituted symbolically rich spaces for the performance of Pohnpeian masculinity, but 
their meaning for the family as a whole was more expansive. They represented the “focal 
point[s] for the family identity,” with the nahs drawing the extended family together over 
shared meals and bolstering the family’s prestige as gifts of food issued from the uhmw 
and arrived at feasts elsewhere.41 But over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, 
Pohnpeian women increasingly became associated with imported material goods, food, 
and food production. These associations became so deeply rooted that by the 1990s 
anthropologist Kim Kihleng could rightly assert that food and what it signified lay “at the 
center of formal, nonformal, and informal exchange as well as [Pohnpeian] culture as a 
whole,” and that food production had come to be considered “quintessentially” female 
work.42  
This shift to more female-centered food production was dramatic, and driven 
primary by new cooking equipment and food imports, evolving housing styles, and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Emelihter Kihleng notes that sugar cane’s ritual usage and manner of consumption lent it a reputation as 
the sakau of women. Emelihter Kihleng. “Menginpehn Lien Pohnpei: A Poetic Ethnography of Urohs 
(Pohnpeian Skirts).” (Ph.D. dissertation, Victoria University, 2015), 147. 
39 Kihleng, “Women in Exchange,” 37. 
40 Glenn Petersen also offers a description of the “traditional” division of labor in Pohnpeian food 
preparation that also applies to most prewar Pohnpeian families. Andrew Cheyne. The Trading Voyages of 
Andrew Cheyne 1841-1844 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1971), 188; David Hanlon, e-mail 
message to author, August 9, 2016; Glenn Petersen. Traditional Micronesian Societies: Adaptation, 
Integration, and Political Organization (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009), 97.  
41 Seberiano Barnabas and Francis X. Hezel, “The Changing Pohnpeian Family,” Micronesian Counselor 
12 (November 1993). 
42 Kihleng, “Women in Exchange,” 45. 
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steadily growing influence of gendered colonial education.43 The iron pot became a kind 
of metonym for this transition. First crossing Pohnpei’s reef in significant numbers 
during the early 19th century whaling trade, the iron pot became ainpwoat: a method of 
cooking, a new category of cuisine consisting of flavored soups and stews, new 
nonformal feasting styles, and a nonformal female counterpoint to male feast 
presentations.44 So influential were imported cooking utensils on Pohnpeian cuisine that 
of the five categories of daily cooking anthropologist Akitoshi Shimizu observed in the 
1970s, at least three required imported metalware: uhmw, ainpwoat, pwoail (boiling), 
pwuraing (frying), and inihn (roasting).45 Women first adapted these new utensils to 
outdoor cooking. But gradually, evolving housing styles began to move much of a 
family’s cooking indoors: to the perehn kuk, or kitchen.  
Today, the perehn kuk is a critical site for Pohnpeian women’s labor, although 
many women and men continue to cook outdoors. But it spread slowly through Islander 
homes, starting from the small class of Pohnpeian elites who broadcast their ties to their 
island’s emergent cash economy by building homes modeled after (or intended to 
overshadow) those of resident mehn waii. The powerful Nanpei family was among the 
first to build American-style residences for itself, one of which missionary Leta Gray 
believed was aimed specifically at outdoing the home she shared with her husband at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Kihleng, “Women in Exchange,” 187.  
44 Kim Kihleng calls ainpwoat “the quintessential food prestation for nonformal feasts and their proper 
performance,” noting that an ainpwoat feast can be broadly defined as any feast that does not use an uhmw. 
She describes contemporary variants such as the precooked food (always consisting of some type of meat 
and starch) that is served informally to high ranking individuals at formal feasts, nonformal feasts meant to 
celebrate life events or repay certain local practitioners, and the tehpil en Hawaii in which long tables of 
precooked food are served luau-style. David Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar: A History of the Island of 
Pohnpei to 1890 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1988), 84; Kihleng, “Women in Exchange,” 143-
144. 
45 Akitoshi Shimizu. “Cultural Complexes of the Ponapean Life Found around the Cooking Method of 
Stone Oven.” Annual Report of Social Anthropology 2 (1976), 189. 
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Ohwa.46 By 1910, Kolonia hosted a small number of Pohnpeian and outer Islander 
families living in houses with board walls and corrugated iron roofs, which Paul 
Hambruch observed might have been taken for European homes “in an off moment.”47 
The construction of these residences, most of which maintained outdoor cooking areas, 
increased markedly during Pohnpei’s Japanese occupation.48  
The Japanese regime’s land records reveal that a few Islander elites built perehn 
kuk into their homes during the 1920s and 1930s. Among them was William 
Helgenberger.49 Sent along with another student to the German government school in 
Qingdao in 1910, Helgenberger enlisted in the German Navy at the outbreak of the First 
World War. He then spent five years as a prisoner of war in Japan and did not return to 
Pohnpei until 1920. Taking a position as an NBK trader, he married, farmed copra at his 
wife’s land at Kinakapw in Madolenihmw, and in 1927 built a three-room cottage near 
Kolonia’s Kaigan Dōri without an indoor kitchen or toilet. In 1935, he petitioned to build 
a larger two-story residence on the same land. Blueprints suggest the home’s Japanese 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Leta Gray. Uriel of Ponape, 1971. Micronesia Mission Hawai’i Evangelical Association Papers, Mission 
Houses Museum, Honolulu, Hawai’i, 54. 
47 Hambruch, Paul. Ponape, Vol. 1: Allgemeiner Teil: Geschichte, Geographie, Sprache, Eingeborenen. 
Ergebnisse Der Südsee Expedition 1908–1910, (Hamburg, 1932), 341. 
48 A booming cash economy, the spread of settlers across the island, and government-sponsored tours of 
Japan for selected Islanders were reason enough for the mounting popularity of this new housing style 
under the Japanese regime. But Nan’yō’chō public health advocates also urged Islanders to build “modern 
style” residences by offering training in home construction and subsidies for renovations, acting under the 
assumption that such homes were more sanitary than dwellings made with traditional materials. The 
Nan’yō’chō even went so far as to build model homes on Yap in the 1930s, though without indoor kitchens. 
Other than a handful of Islander families who were permitted to reside within Kolonia’s boundaries during 
the Japanese era, most of these settler-influenced Islander homes were built elsewhere on Pohnpei during 
this time. Tadao Yanaihara. Pacific Islands Under Japanese Mandate (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 
Limited, 1939), 291. Japanese Government. Annual Report to the League of Nations on the Administration 
of the South Sea Islands under Japanese Mandate for the Year 1933 (Tokyo, 1933), 61-62. For a 
description of some of these model homes see Willard Price, Pacific Adventure (New York: John Day, 
1936), 138-139. 
49 William Helgenberger, son of Jaluit Gesellschaft agent August Helgenberger and a Parem woman named 
Bermihna, was Pohnpei’s second richest Islander after Henry and Oliver Nanpei during the island’s 
Japanese era, and patriarch to a large family that remains prominent on Pohnpei. Hezel, Strangers, 56; 
Takuya Nagaoka, Project Report: Archaeological Survey of Lenger Island (Pohnpei: Division of Historic 
Preservation, Pohnpei State Government, 2008), 17. 
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influences, with sliding glass exterior doors and windows, a wood-floored hallway, two 
large rooms separated by a sliding door that may have been a fusuma or shōji, a 
decorative alcove (tokonoma) and closet, separate toilet and bathrooms, and a concrete-
floored perehn kuk that opened to the outdoors.50 The Nanpeis likewise expanded their 
two-story Kaigan Dōri home in 1927. It featured a wraparound porch, four spaces that 
could have been living rooms or bedrooms, separate toilet and bathrooms, and spacious 
interior kitchen and dining rooms.51 Both families probably maintained perehn kuk for 
female cooks and outdoor uhmw for men’s ceremonial use.52  
Even among Islander families without perehn kuk at home, gendered education 
and economic pressures slowly drew women and girls to cooking. A handful of 
missionary-run girl’s schools planted around the turn of the 20th century worked to instill 
the discipline, regular habits, spiritual understanding, and cleanliness young girls would 
need to become “useful Christian women,” helpers to their husbands, efficient managers 
of the private spaces of their households, and vessels for spreading the faith.53 By the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Miscellaneous Nan’yō’chō Land Documents [?????????]. (Saipan: Division of Lands and 
Surveys, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands). Hamilton Library Microfilm Collection, University of 
Hawai’i at Manoa (hereafter NLD), 13J 133, 141-142, 144, 151; Boaz Poll, “An Account of World War 
One,” in Oh Mehjwa: Chants, Songs, Accounts, and Tales of Mwoakilloa Atoll, Micronesia, ed. Takuya 
Nagaoka and Barbara Hicks (Pohnpei: Pohnpei Historic Preservation Office, 2004); “At 63 He’s the New 
Credit Manager,” Micronesian Reporter V, no. II (March-April 1957), 3.  
51 NLD, 9Y 23-25; NLD, 9Z 157, 161, 163, 164.  
52 John Embree notes that the women of the women of the Nanpei family prepared food for him in the 
kitchen at their Rohnkitti home during his visit shortly after the Pacific War, suggesting that the perehn kuk 
may have been used as a female space there. Yvette Etscheit Adams also recalled that Oliver Nanpei built a 
large uhmw nearby his Kolonia home whenever the Insular came into port bearing copra from And. Nanpei 
invited friends and neighbors to share in feasts of pigs, turtles, chickens, and fish, probably to signal his 
family’s generosity and the masculine culinary prowess of his kinsmen. John F. Embree, Field Report on 
Trip to Micronesia, December 14, 1945 – January 5, 1946, 1946, Pacific Collection, University of Hawai’i 
at Manoa, 72; Adams, Island Traders, 67-68. 
53 These quotations come from American Congregationalist missionaries, who began offering gender-
specific education on Pohnpei starting in the 19th century. A group of Franciscan nuns from Strasburg 
planted Pohnpei’s first Catholic girl’s boarding school in 1907 for similar purposes. Ida Foss to Judson 
Smith, December 10, 1902, Series 19.4, Letters 1890-1899, Ida Foss Letters, Papers of the American Board 
of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 51; Callistus Lopinot. Caroline Mission of the Spanish and 
German Capuchins 1886-1919, 1964. Micronesian Seminar Archives, Weno, Chuuk, 19; Francis X. Hezel, 
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1930s, the Protestant Nan’yō Dendō Dan, the Mercedarian Sisters, and government 
kōgakkō were all teaching classes in cooking, meal planning, and dining etiquette.54  
Mehn waii offered home economics instruction partly under the assumption that 
Islander women could be made more modern, civilized, or Christian by becoming 
ensconced within the domestic sphere, although many also hoped to keep their own 
homes stocked with skilled household servants. Still, as Kim and Emelihter Kihleng 
suggest, these efforts did not necessarily constrain women to domestic life, nor did they 
render women unable to continue participating in feasting or exchange. In fact, newly 
introduced cooking and sewing methods perpetuated women’s roles as “essential links” 
between Pohnpei’s domestic and public spheres, and in many cases even enlarged their 
public influence.55 Those skills proved doubly useful as colonial regimes drew men into 
wage labor, and women stepped in to fill some of the territory in home and ceremonial 
cooking their male family members had ceded to them.  
The colonial kitchen as archetype easily survived the chaos and devastation of the 
Pacific War, even as bombing raids leveled most of the kitchens themselves. Postwar 
mehn waii maintained their dependence on domestic servants and food imports, while 
Islanders continued to adopt and adapt the perehn kuk to their purposes. The kitchen lived 
on as a quietly subversive space in the postwar era. There, Islander cooks generated 
demand for imports the American regime preferred to exclude from the territory and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“German Catholic Missions in Micronesia” in Deutschen Südsee 1884-1914: Ein Handbuch, ed. Hermann 
Hiery (Paderborn, Munich: Die Deutsche Bibliothek, 2001). 
54 These classes featured in larger curricula that included sewing, housework, hygiene, first aid, music, 
morals, reading, arithmetic, and gardening, among other skills. South Seas Mission [?????], South 
Seas Mission Report of Activities [?????????], 1930, Japan Institute for Pacific Studies, Tokyo, 
7; South Seas Mission [?????], South Seas Mission Report of Activities [?????????], 
1933, Japan Institute for Pacific Studies, Tokyo, 16; “Spanish Jesuits – Ponape,” El Angel papers, Francis 
X. Hezel Collection, Micronesian Seminar Archives, Weno, Chuuk, 8; Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, 173-
174. 
55 Kihleng, “Women in Exchange,” 4, 35, 70. See also: Kihleng, “Menginpehn Lien Pohnpei.” 
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Americans fretted their servants might come to know them too well. In 1952, for 
instance, an American anthropologist warned his colleagues that Micronesians had 
become quite knowledgeable about the “intimate details of our everyday life and work 
habits,” and that this knowledge could undermine the regime’s interpretation of the 
character of the United States and its own aims.56 Still, the island’s domestic frontier 
persisted, as much a site of negotiation under the microscope of Cold War America’s 
idiosyncratic anxieties as it had been before. 
 
 
Susceptible bodies, consumer goods, and the evils of empire 
  
In 1947, Deputy High Commissioner Carleton Wright issued a public warning to 
his colleagues at Trust Territory headquarters, then nestled within Oahu’s Diamond Head 
crater at Fort Ruger. Writing in the Saturday Evening Post, Wright enjoined Naval 
planners to shield Micronesians from the “evils” foreign rule had already visited upon 
American Indians and Oceania’s intensively colonized perimeter. With islands like Guam 
now rendered, in his view, “at best only a poor imitation of the Anglo-Saxon and 
Hispanic civilizations,” the way forward for the Trust Territory appeared simple: a slow-
paced, limited program of reform, with imports like radios, jukeboxes, and button shoes 
strictly excluded.57 Peculiar as his concern for the malevolent influence of button shoes 
may appear, Wright was no voice in the wilderness. Throughout the early Cold War era, 
the Trust Territory’s economies and social landscapes were profoundly remade by 
American officers, sailors, and academics who voiced concern over the deleterious 
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effects imports like Coca-Cola, rice, or alcohol might have on American military security 
and Pacific Islander bodies. 
As Don Rubinstein notes, these objections came at a moment when the American 
regime displayed a heightened interest in the Pacific War’s effects on Islander health. But 
they were also voiced in the context of a “widely held conceit” that Pacific Islander 
populations were inherently soft, vulnerable to European disease, and doomed to 
extinction should they fail to adequately cope with the Western world.58 The Navy wrote 
that conceit into policy in large and small ways: whether by ordering a mass deportation 
of the territory’s Japanese residents or quibbling over whether or not customer orders 
constituted “essential” purchases. Some of those early regulations were overturned 
following a widespread consumer pushback that leveraged Cold War American faith in 
capitalism to compel a liberalization of the territory’s import policies. But much endured: 
homes broken and a community diminished by deportations, an empowered traditional 
leadership, and a body of nutrition research that became the foundation for postwar 
knowledge of Islander health.  
Naval strategists demonstrated a powerful skepticism of foreign influence and 
imported foods in Micronesia even before the Pacific War was over. The Navy 
envisioned the Trust Territory as a strategic buffer zone between the United States and 
hostile powers to the west. It therefore sought to exclude potentially subversive foreign 
influence by excising Micronesia’s colonial pasts and stripping it of non-US foreign 
influence: a policy Hal Friedman has called “cultural security.” Islanders’ racial 
composition, political leanings, cultural values, language use, and consumer habits 	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therefore took on an unlikely geopolitical urgency.59 The Navy first deported all of the 
territory’s Japanese residents, limited travel into and outside of its borders, and excluded 
foreign economic activity. Sailors then deconstructed Japanese towns, sometimes 
bulldozing still-usable structures but more often encouraging Islanders to disassemble 
prewar buildings for their own use.60 Finally, the Navy-operated United States 
Commercial Company embarked on a limited program of economic development. This 
was meant to make US-produced “necessities” available in trade stores, nudge Islanders 
toward capitalism, and redevelop the region’s export industries. The Navy hoped the 
territory might then become “practically self-sustaining at a satisfactory subsistence 
level” in addition to being made secure, and less costly to administer in the bargain.61 
These cultural security initiatives initially manifested more as attacks on foreign 
influence than programs of Americanization. During their first year on Pohnpei, 
American sailors were therefore almost entirely absorbed with establishing a base of 
operations, exchanging yen for dollars, destroying Japanese ammunition, and repatriating 
soldiers and settlers. Needless to say, the deportations had a substantial human impact. 
Yvette Etscheit later recalled sobbing as she watched friends, classmates, teachers, and 
colleagues of her father Carlos searched and deported. Afterwards she felt utterly 
abandoned as she walked through a Kolonia Town that felt “dead.”62 Islanders 
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experienced the deportations with a mix of emotions. There was relief at the departure of 
the Japanese military, joy for those reunited with family relocated for wartime labor, 
hope for relocated outer islanders who elected to remain and make new lives on Pohnpei, 
and despair for those indefinitely separated from mehn waii family and friends.63  
The Navy gave little attention to Pohnpei’s economy or most other dimensions of 
governance as it reshuffled the region’s population. Without a land invasion, Pohnpei 
never saw the “gratuitous issues” of food and supplies that earned Americans goodwill 
elsewhere in the region. Instead Pohnpei’s store shelves sat bare for much of 1945 and 
1946 as military planners warned against the danger of “spoiling” Islanders with an 
overabundance of generosity.64 In fact, Pohnpei labored under shortages of clothing and 
other necessities so severe that, in anthropologist William Bascom’s reading, “they would 
have caused violent unrest in any American community.”65 When the USCC eventually 
restarted the flow of imports, its employees could be remarkably strict with Islanders who 
ordered “luxury” products not available through the company’s list of essential items. In 
1946, for instance, an American anthropologist criticized sailors on Yap for engaging in 
“arbitrary and vicarious” cancellations of customer orders on the grounds that “natives 	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don’t need goods.”66 Some Islanders subverted these restrictions by ordering from 
catalogs or asking American friends to ship them goods directly. Others took the Navy’s 
vague assertions that Pohnpei was “liberated” seriously, refusing government work 
orders and returning to their farms to resolve food shortages on their own terms.67 
Ironically, the Navy’s adherence to cultural security inadvertently worked to 
enhance the power of the traditional leaders. Fewer stores meant imports were less 
accessible, which enabled elites to assert control over the flow of goods to commoners. In 
Kitti, for example, a single trade store replaced nine prewar Japanese shops. Lieutenant 
Robert Halvorsen warned dramatically of a “clique” there who had become so powerful 
that, “unless you get down on your knees you cannot eat.”68 The need for a return to 
farming also led chiefs to reassert their role of mobilizing commoners to boost 
agricultural productivity.69 Some in Pohnpei’s military government embraced this 
resurgence of chiefly power as a revival of traditional culture. Critics like anthropologist 
Alfred Whiting, however, attacked the Navy for its failure to “suppress” traditional 
leaders’ power. Whiting believed traditional leaders had leveraged their ties to the Navy 
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for political and financial gain even as they withheld support for government initiatives 
like road construction and plantation rehabilitation.70 But Pohnpei’s power vacuum was 
also deliberate to a degree, a consequence of the Navy’s aim to build democratic 
institutions and reduce its expenses by delegating authority to the island’s political class. 
The Navy therefore asserted its power much more unevenly than the Nan’yō’chō had, 
despite its initial crackdown on the island’s ongoing relationship with Japan.  
Nor were the Navy’s cultural security programs capable of erasing all of 
Pohnpei’s ties to Japan, as anthropologist John Embree found when he strolled through 
Nett with a man named Tomas shortly after deportations concluded. The pair chatted in 
Japanese with Islanders who greeted them with a bow and spoke of their wehi using the 
Japanese term Notto. They met a prominent Nett family in the vacated home of a 
Japanese carpenter who sat passing the time as a phonograph played. Women strolled 
down the road with Japanese sunshades, men wore seinendan headbands and reminisced 
about victories in Japanese athletic contests, and mixed race children carried younger 
siblings on their backs in the Japanese style. Later, Embree was told that Pohnpeians had 
cheered an appearance of Emperor Hirohito in a newsreel, and that some revealed to one 
of the island’s American priests that they were happier under Japanese rule.71  
Pohnpeians did adapt to American rule in subsequent years, but the Japanese era’s 
mixed marriages left behind ties deeper than imported goods or American governance 
could cut. Mixed-race Islanders continued to correspond with family in Japan and lobbied 
the Trust Territory and United Nations for help reuniting them with relatives barred from 
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reentering the territory.72 In 1953, for instance, Takeshi Hadley wrote pleadingly to the 
UN, “there are many of us with Japanese fathers whose happiness cannot be made 
complete because of our longing for and [great desire] to be by the side of our fathers and 
brothers and sisters.” Nett nahnmwarki Max Iriarte petitioned for mixed families to be 
reunited the same year, though he specified that Pohnpeians did not support the large-
scale return of all Japanese settlers.73  
With mail orders mounting and demand for Japanese goods still high, the Navy’s 
restrictive import structure and cultural security policy came to be increasingly untenable. 
In 1948, Pohnpei’s military government therefore began shifting away from uniform 
stock lists and the Naval procurement system and toward more diverse offerings and non-
US importers. Japanese goods began appearing in Pohnpei’s stores the following year: 
canvas shoes, jikatabi boots, sandals, silverware, dishware, clocks, irons, lanterns, 
phonographs, watches, umbrellas, sewing machines, and a boat, among other items.74 
Japanese foods, including rice, followed shortly after. By 1951, the government-run 
Island Trading Company had so abandoned cultural security as to pursue an import 
partnership with NBK, the firm that had held a near-monopoly on the territory’s prewar 
trade.75 Even so, Islanders continued to agitate for greater access to Japanese goods well 	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Notes 1953, 1; Island Affairs Officer to District Administrator, “Background on petitions to UN Visiting 
Mission,” March 5-6, 10, 1953, SFP, Series 3 Ponape, Box 10, Notes 1953, 3. 
74 By 1950, more than 20% of ITC’s imports came from Japan. Office of the Civil Administrator. Quarterly 
Report: Ponape District (April-June 1949), 14-15; Navy Department, Report on the Administration of the 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Washington: Navy Department, 1950), 72. 
75 The Island Trading Company was the short-lived successor organization to the USCC. It ceased 
operations in 1952, having fulfilled its mission to devolve to Islander-owned wholesalers as soon as 
practicable. In Spivey’s reading, the ITC’s departure signified the refusal of the United States to follow 
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into the 1950s. Enerico Mallarme of Nett, for example, petitioned the United Nations to 
open “free trading channels between Japan and the Trust Territory” in 1953, arguing 
subversively that the widespread poverty of American-controlled Pohnpei made cheaper 
Japanese goods indispensible.76 
Despite these consumer-driven breakthroughs, which emanated from population 
centers like Saipan and Palau as well as from Pohnpei, suspicion of imports among 
nutritionists and anthropologists working in the territory far outlasted the Navy’s formal 
efforts to restrict trade there. Early researchers had often grounded their work in what 
William Jarvis has called the “myth of the healthy savage.”77 In 1947, for instance, 
anthropologist Rupert Murrill argued that dental caries were more common among 
“primitive peoples who have come into contact with the white man and his foods.” He 
therefore claimed the caries he found in “pure Ponapean types” gave witness to a long 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
previous colonizers in exploiting Micronesia economically. It also marked the culmination of a time-
consuming program of education in the rudiments of capitalism, directed at Islanders he believed had been 
isolated even from the prewar colonial economies of their own islands. Yet the Ponape Cooperative 
Company’s growing position in the island’s foreign trade complicated Spivey’s paternalist narrative of 
American do-goodery. In fact, the PCC drew as much on Pohnpei’s American present as its past, not only 
in its ongoing economic links to Japan but in its reliance on the prewar professional experience and the 
business, clan, and kin connections of its own staff, particularly of former NBK employee and PCC 
president William Helgenberger. Here too, postwar Pohnpei was no blank slate. John Spivey, “History of 
the Island Trading Company of Micronesia,” Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Archives, University of 
Hawai’i at Manoa (hereafter TTA), reel 118, 1-2, 4, 6, Appendix C: 3; “At 63 He’s the New Credit 
Manager,” Micronesian Reporter V, no. II (March-April 1957), 2. 
76 “Petitions to United Nations Visiting Mission, March 4-6, 1953, from citizens of Ponape District,” SFP, 
Series 3 Ponape, Box 10, Notes 1953, 2. 
77 Two groups of researchers were deployed to the Trust Territory during its US Navy occupation. 
Researchers for the USCC Economic Survey worked between 1945-1946, while researchers for the 
Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology were in the field from 1947-1949. Robert C. Kiste 
and Suzanne Falgout, “Anthropology and Micronesia: The Context,” in American Anthropology in 
Micronesia: An Assessment, eds. Robert C. Kiste and Mac Marshall (Honolulu, University of Hawai’i 
Press, 1999), 26; David Hanlon. “Magellan’s Chroniclers? American Anthropology’s History in 
Micronesia” in American Anthropology in Micronesia: An Assessment, eds. Robert C. Kiste and Mac 
Marshall (Honolulu, University of Hawai’i Press, 1999), 68; William T. Jarvis, “The Myth of the Healthy 
Savage.” Nutrition Today 16, no. 2 (March/April 1981).  
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history of colonial encounter.78 Similarly, a team from Harvard’s Peabody Museum 
leaned on the work of racial scientists to evaluate Yapese nutritional standards. The 
team’s report cited eugenicists like Earnest Hooton and the nutritionist Weston A. Price, 
who believed that “isolated remnants of primitive racial stocks” were generally free from 
“modern” diseases and tooth decay. The group also relied on head and body 
measurements taken by physical anthropologist Kotondo Hasebe under the Nan’yō’chō.79  
Elmer Alpert’s territory-wide 1946 nutrition survey has often been used as a 
baseline for evaluating postwar Micronesian health, but it rested on some similar 
assumptions. Alpert’s basic assessment was that Micronesian diets were nutritionally 
“deficient,” a conclusion he reached after repeatedly conflating the war’s temporary 
health impacts with longer-term effects of colonization. His recommendations for 
mitigating that deficiency included protein-rich foods, canned or fresh milk, enriched rice 
and flour, local foods rich in vitamin C, and a “concentrated educational campaign.” But 
Alpert was most troubled by the sale of soda and candy at the Navy’s trade stores. He 
expressed “shock” that Chamorros on Saipan were permitted to purchase Pepsi, insisting 
that Islanders could not help but waste their money on such luxuries “to the exclusion of 
much needed food.” Echoing the territory’s restrictive alcohol policy, Alpert then 
recommended the Navy add candy and soda to the list of items only mehn waii were 
presumed capable of consuming responsibly.80 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Rupert Ivan Murrill. Anthropological Study of the Ponape Islanders. (Pacific Science Board, 1948), 2, 
44.  
79 Weston A. Price, Nutrition and Physical Degeneration: A Comparison of Primitive and Modern Diets 
and Their Effects (Santa Monica: Price-Pottenger Foundation, 1977), 1; Peabody Museum of American 
Archaeology and Ethnology. The Micronesians of Yap and Their Depopulation; Report of the Peabody 
Museum Expedition to Yap Island, Micronesia, 1947-1948. (Cambridge: Peabody Museum, Harvard 
University, 1949), 1, 118-119, 146, 148. 
80 These misapprehensions of health and culture were certainly shaped by the researchers’ own prejudices, 
but they were also often exacerbated by methodological issues with the work itself. Alpert, for example, 
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While later scholars rejected racial science, whose influence mostly vanished 
from the territory after the 1950s, cautions against unregulated food imports remained. 
Māori anthropologist Te Rangi Hīroa, for instance, repeatedly celebrated the equilibrium 
he found in Kapingamarangi during his fieldwork there in 1950. He praised the atoll’s 
balanced diets and an economic stability that enabled families to provide for themselves. 
But he warned that an overabundance of trade goods could threaten that equilibrium, 
concluding that Kapingese had “nothing to gain from the outside world” beyond English 
education, medical attention, and a rudimentary trade.81 University of Hawai’i nutritionist 
Mary Murai issued a similar warning from Majuro. She reported that Marshallese 
laborers there lacked the time, money, and land to consume an adequate amount of 
nutritious food, and that their health had already been compromised.82 While probably 
rooted in a conviction that Aotearoa and Hawai’i had themselves been thrown off balance 
by colonial rule, Hīroa and Murai’s work could also be used to validate mehn waii 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
had conducted his study without benefit of a scale, laboratory testing equipment, or the ability to 
communicate with his research subjects, leaving him unable to record quantitative dietary histories or 
“exact” qualitative data. Alpert also asserted that Saipan Chamorros possessed no “native dietary in the 
usual sense of the term,” presumably under the assumption that excessive colonization had shattered 
traditional Chamorro culture. Elmer Alpert. “Nutrition and Dietary Patterns of Micronesia,” October 1946. 
TTA, reel 414, 3, 14-15, 21-23. 
81 Hīroa was also known as Sir Peter H. Buck. During the Trust Territory’s Navy occupation, as director of 
Hawaii’s Bishop Museum, he conducted his research on Kapingamarangi in conjunction with the 
Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology. Hīroa wrote at the time that his interest in 
Kapingamarangi and Nukuoro had been kindled by a desire to trace the routes of his Māori ancestors from 
Hawaiki to Aotearoa, a connection that presumably inspired him to perform a Māori chant in 
Kapingamarangi’s church during his fieldwork there. Peter Henry Buck. Material Culture of 
Kapingamarangi (Honolulu: Bishop Museum, 1950), 281, 285; Peter Henry Buck. “A Short Account of a 
Visit by an Anthropologist of Polynesian Ancestry to Kapingamarangi,” 1950. TTA, reel 509, 1. See also: 
School of Naval Administration Hoover Institute, Handbook of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 
(Washington: Navy Department, 1948), 153-154; Saul Riesenberg, “People… in Micronesia,” Paradise of 
the Pacific 63, no. 5 (May 1951), 25. 
82 Other observers attributed the health issues they noticed in the Marshalls to canned foods as well. The 
anonymous author of a 1947 history of the region, for example, suggested that excessive canned food 
consumption on Ebeye resulted in “deficiencies which manifest themselves in such ailments as neuritis and 
a proneness to respiratory diseases.” See also: Alexander Spoehr. Majuro: A Village in the Marshall 
Islands (Chicago: Chicago Natural History Museum Press, 1949), 152; Mary Murai. Nutrition Study in 
Micronesia (Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1954), 9; History of the Islands, 55-56.  
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theories of the susceptibility of Islander bodies. Or it could simply be ignored. This 
became the preferred option for an Interior Department that increasingly favored cheery 
assessments of its success combating infectious disease over confronting the still-
invisible health impacts of imported foods.83  
Some military personnel likewise maintained their skepticism of foreign imports 
throughout the territory’s Naval occupation, just as civilian mehn waii staffers of the 
Interior era did. On Majuro, for instance, a Navy captain remarked to John Embree just 
after the war’s end in 1945 that he opposed the continuation of the copra trade, movies, 
Coca-Cola, and “almost everything else that will change native life.”84 But at the same 
moment, thousands of American sailors were breathing free after years of confinement to 
military vessels. There, onboard stores of Coca-Cola had rapidly dwindled as the ships 
circulated through the Pacific, leaving sailors self-flagellating at “numerous memories of 
times [they had] passed up a plain hot dog and Coke.”85 In fact, Coca-Cola’s president 
had purposefully taken the war as an opportunity to expand worldwide, vowing after 
Pearl Harbor to make his product available to every American in uniform. This made it 
something of a global symbol of Americanization, provoking opposition among 
Europeans and Japanese who viewed it as a sign of cultural imperialism or, in the case of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Naval historian Dorothy Richard critiqued Murai’s work directly, dismissing it as “pessimistic” and 
attributable to a lack of education and a poor economy, if nutrition was a matter for concern at all. A 
decade later High Commissioner Delmas Nucker did the same thing, arguing that Murai’s findings were 
invalid because “it does not appear the same energy demands exist in Micronesia” as in the United States. 
Richard, United States Naval Administration vol. 3, 943-944; High Commissioner to Distad Ponape, 
“Addition of Enriched Rice and Flour to Micronesian Diet,” May 14, 1958, Robert E. Gibson Papers, 
Pacific Collection, University of Hawai’i (hereafter RGP), Box 7, Folder 93, 1-2; Fiske, “Speech 
Concerning the Trust Territory,” 4. 
84 Embree, Field Report, 10. 
85 Crist S. Lovdjieff. “A Sketch of the Marianas,” 1945, accessed March 26, 2014, 
http://www.kmitch.com/Huerfano/lovdjieff1.html. 
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European Communists, of capitalist decadence.86 Yet when Coca-Cola so surged in 
popularity in the Trust Territory of the 1940s that Guam’s bottling plant ran short of 
containers, Americans read the drink’s popularity not in terms of their own insatiable 
appetite for sugary sodas but as a sign of an alarming declension from paradise.87  
The Navy departed the Trust Territory in 1951, briefly emptying Kolonia of its 
American presence apart from educational administrators Bill Finale and Bob Halvorsen 
and a handful of missionaries.88 But Interior rule did not ease American anxieties over 
imports. Nor did Interior substantially alter the Navy’s basic governing calculation. The 
territory continued to operate under a framework of minimal administrative funding and a 
go-slow approach to economic, cultural, and political change. It also maintained a 
relationship with the United Nations trusteeship system that offered some deniability (for 
those who desired it) that American rule in the territory was actually a form of anti-
colonialism.89 Even so, as civilian governance opened a wider range of voices within the 
American regime, mehn waii continued to fret over empire’s evils amid a Kolonia that 
was already being substantially transformed. 
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Culture of Everyday Life in the 1950s (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 274. 
87 Naval historian Dorothy Richard took the contrary position, however, arguing that Coca-Cola was at least 
an acceptable alternative to alcohol. Richard, United States Naval Administration vol. 3, 489.  
88 Margery Terpstra. Telephone interview by author. October 7, 2016. 
89 At times, this framing was quite explicit, as when Trust Territory High Commissioner Elbert Thomas 
mused in 1949 that trusteeship theory “may spell the end of colonialism and mercantilism and sound the 
death knell to the exploitation of what were termed ‘backward peoples.’” The “white man’s burden,” 
Thomas asserted, was “no longer solely the white man’s task.” See also: Kugel, Governing of Micronesia, 
16; Elbert Thomas. Objectives in the Administration of the Trust Territory (Honolulu: High Commissioner, 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1949), 12. 
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Remaking Kolonia 
 
In 1952, the Saturday Evening Post’s Robert Sherrod boarded a series of island-
hopping aircraft for a tour through the Trust Territory. The territory had come under 
Interior Department rule the previous year, and was still in the process of recruiting an 
adequate force of civilian staffers. On his flight from Guam to Pohnpei, Sherrod noticed 
an American couple on board with their young child and “imminent prospects” of 
another. “These are the true pioneers,” he reflected, “the new bearers of the white man’s 
burden.” But once the couple disembarked and caught a glimpse of their Quonset-style 
staff housing, they took the first flight back to Guam. Americans who remained 
complained of weather, isolation, electrical outages, and poor roads, but Sherrod believed 
no problem hit them harder than food. American palates were “not geared to the bland, 
almost tasteless breadfruit and taro,” he wrote, and consequently nearly everything they 
consumed was imported, canned, and overpriced.90 With Pohnpei’s living conditions 
apparently unable to meet the minimum acceptable standard for many Americans, the 
administration was forced to expend a large proportion of its limited resources on caring 
for its mehn waii staff. Even so, turnover remained high and local institutions like schools 
and hospitals struggled.  
The Trust Territory government of this era was often roiled by ideological 
disputes within its ranks. Still, nearly everyone within the regime seemed to agree on 
basic principles: low annual budgets, a slow-paced approach to economic and political 
reform, and the need to maintain foreign staff life as something of a separate sphere. 
Interior therefore sought to reproduce a no-frills version of American life amid the ruins 	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of the Navy’s vacated bases and atop the fault lines it left behind, paying foreign staff 
higher wages than their local counterparts and working to limit sexual contacts between 
the two groups. This porous division served a range of sometimes-contradictory goals: to 
facilitate staff recruitment, fulfill trusteeship obligations by modernizing island 
infrastructures, hinder the spread of cultural imperialism, or present an aspirational 
showcase of American life. But the separate spheres cut both ways. They enabled 
American families to enjoy the “fellowship of the American colony” amid the comfort of 
familiar consumer goods, but also invited unnecessary conflict.91 Both the conflict and 
the colony itself proved fleeting. What remained was a Kolonia left largely to its own 
devices and subsequently reborn as an independent, polyglot hub united by democratic 
principles and the rule of law. 
The backdrop for this rebirth was a Kolonia much diminished from its prewar 
form. After the war, the US Navy had reoriented the town around a small military base 
and granted Islanders temporary leases to occupy some of the land vacated by repatriated 
Japanese.92 Pohnpeians aspiring to business ownership or civil service took some of those 
leases. Many others went to outer Islanders relocated during the war or with ties to 
Pohnpei’s prewar communities of Kapingese, Pingelapese, Mortlockese, Mokilese, 
Nukuorans, and Ngatikese. By the end of the 1940s, the American base consisted of two 
Quonset hut barracks for enlisted men, a Quonset hut mess hall and movie theater, a 
chief’s quarters, a club, and various support structures, all of which sustained an 
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occupying force of around 50 sailors and the families of a few officers.93 The base was 
small, but its separation from the rest of the town was at least loosely enforced: local food 
was rarely if ever served in the mess hall, and Islanders were de jure barred both from the 
mess and from overnight visits in the barracks.94  
Colonizer and colonized maintained an amiable if often superficial rapport in the 
Kolonia of the 1950s, rarely tipping over into public conflict.95 But Interior did inherit 
some of the distant, oppositional relationships that had characterized colonial relations in 
the town before their arrival. Anthropologists frequently noted the Navy’s tendency to 
become abrupt and impatient when dealing with Pohnpeians and outer Islanders, and at 
times to demonstrate a seemingly willful rudeness. Officers forced even men of influence 
like Oliver Nanpei to wait hours past the time of scheduled meetings. They meted out 
arbitrary punishments, sentencing a man to six months in jail for stealing paper, for 
instance.96 Enlisted men also stirred controversy as they strolled the island shirtless or 
drunk, used obscene language, and pursued sexual liaisons with local women.97 
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Ponapeans.” Bascom, Ponape, 16. 
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Political fault lines too were already in place under Naval rule. On the one hand, 
Islanders did not appear entirely convinced by the Navy’s framing of the United States as 
a beneficent liberator. Many instead regarded Americans as conquerors, though perhaps 
conquerors less imperious or prone to corporal punishment than the Japanese had been.98 
On the other hand, Islanders had begun to pressure the military government on a range of 
internal issues. Traditional leaders and an emergent class of politicians argued for the 
settlement of war claims and a variety of incremental reforms, men declined to volunteer 
their labor for infrastructure projects that mainly benefited Americans, and Pohnpeians 
lobbied for the Navy to restore traditional titles taken from them under Japanese rule. 
Municipal governments and the Ponape Congress, both established during the 1940s, 
served as a forum to resolve some of these concerns.99 In 1952, for instance, the Ponape 
Congress Noble’s House passed an unsuccessful petition asking the Americans to return 
the luhwen wehi. The petition condemned Japan’s seizure and subsequent leasing of the 
land, arguing that it had been distributed in a manner “stingy toward us Ponapeans… and 
generous toward themselves.”100 Individuals also petitioned the High Commissioner and 
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regime to their rightful owners. The luhwen wehi remained an unresolved source of tension on the island 
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national government retained control of much of the territory the Americans designated “public lands” in 
the 1940s. Petition from Ponape Noble’s House of Congress to K.M. Carroll, May 22, 1952, HFP, reel 2 
[frame 817-818]. 
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United Nations on subjects ranging from war reparations and the restoration of prewar 
postal savings accounts to land disputes and a variety of other issues.101  
The Navy had also exposed fault lines of longer standing. When the military 
government proposed holding elections to choose a single chief for the entire island, for 
instance, Oliver Nanpei began a public campaign to fulfill an ambition his father Henry 
had long held for himself. Nanpei scrupulously worked to build goodwill among potential 
constituents, using personal funds to pay down a portion of Kitti’s municipal debt and 
sponsoring athletic games there.102 His campaign seems particularly to have targeted his 
longtime rival Max Iriarte, who probably desired the position as well but declined to 
pursue it publicly. The campaign inflamed tensions between the two men and their 
followers, partly because Navy officials encouraged Nanpei to pursue a vigorous 
American style of electioneering that was entirely at odds with the island’s political 
norms. The campaign proved so destructive that Iriarte recalled being laughed at in 
public, shamed by opponents who walked past his Kolonia office bearing gifts of sakau 
and pigs for Nanpei rather than him, and driven nearly to tears as he asked those gathered 
at community meetings “to abandon these practices which are not good for us.”103 The 
campaign provoked so much division that the Navy was forced to eliminate the position 
of all-island chief altogether, if not to repudiate its strategy of seeking to resolve conflicts 
through a public airing of grievances. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 See, for example: Island Affairs Officer to District Administrator, “Background on petitions to UN 
Visiting Mission,” March 5-6, 10, 1953, SFP, Series 3 Ponape, Box 10, Notes 1953, 4-5. 
102 John Fischer, “Informant: Peli,” August 11, 1950, D26S1, HFP, reel 2, [frame 432]. 
103 Noting the poor fit between American-style elections and behind-the-scenes Pohnpeian politicking, 
Fischer wrote that one Pohnpeian involved in this dispute told him, “You Americans can have an election 
and forget about it until the next election. We Ponapeans can not.” Another suggested that the election had 
opened up a rift so deep that in past years it could only have been settled by war, and that some of those 
involved had actually proposed turning to violence. John Fischer, “Titles, etc. Makis, copy of 10/xi/50. 
12/xi,” HFP, reel 2, 548 [frame 1090]; Political Affairs Officer to Civil Administrator, “Present and 
Potential Political Development of Ponapean Society,” HFP, reel 2, 564 [frame 1098]. 
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Interior families arrived in the Trust Territory in 1951 mostly unaware of these 
fissures. But they did appear in dramatic fashion, many of them aboard a chartered 
aircraft nicknamed the “diaper special.” The vessel hopped from island to island, 
delivering 64 wives and children of Interior employees to district centers throughout the 
territory.104 Those who came to Pohnpei inherited Kolonia’s Naval facilities in little-
modified form. They swiftly made Club Kolonia and a ring of rusting Quonsets they 
called “the circle” the focal point of their social lives. They also began setting themselves 
apart from their Micronesian neighbors. Most opted to educate their children through the 
island’s small “dependent school.” Many hired maids, ostensibly to ensure that “the 
locals benefited from our time on the island.” All demanded, or at least desired, familiar 
imported goods from the island’s commissary and private shops.105 Interior rule did 
promise to be different: accessible, responsive, and no longer subject to the accusation of 
running the islands “like a battleship.”106 But Interior’s prohibitions against staffers 
pursuing sexual relationships with Islanders and its use of unequal wage scales for 
foreign and local staff highlighted the distance that continued to define colonial relations 
under the new regime. 
If anything, the early Trust Territory administration was less tolerant of 
“fraternizing” than the Nan’yō’chō had been. Nonetheless, those liaisons recurred with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Cecilia Wahl, “Diaper Special,” Micronesia Monthly 1, no. 1 (November 1951), 4. 
105 Jean Braden, Homesick in Paradise: A Ponape Story 1965-1967 (Gresham, Oregon: Jean Braden, 2014), 
3, 36; “News from the Dependent School,” Ponape-per, December 11, 1959, 6; “New Frontier School 
Opens Sept 5,” Ponape-per, August 18, 1961, 1. 
106 Trust Territory Chief Justice Edward Furber, for instance, raised the alarm in 1950 over the tendency of 
many American personnel to disregard the territory’s Bill of Rights and to treat Islanders as occupied 
peoples rather than citizens with rights. Margery Terpstra also recalls that mehn waii at the time jokingly 
referred to Pohnpei’s Naval governor as “captain” regardless of his actual rank because “he was head of the 
ship.” Harold Ickes, “The Navy at Its Worst.” Collier’s, August 31, 1946, 67; E.P. Furber to Civil 
Administrators, “Civil Rights of Inhabitants – Importance of Recognition of in Judicial Proceedings [sic],” 
March 28, 1950, SFP, Series 3 Ponape, Box 10, Early Texts, 1; Margery Terpstra. Telephone interview by 
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considerable frequency. Some mehn waii suffered failed marriages as husbands or wives 
strayed into the arms of Islander lovers, and rumors of indiscretions were legion.107 While 
education director Robert Gibson merely advised his staff to “be indiscreet discreetly,” 
High Commissioner Delmas Nucker, his wife, and a handful of other officials took a 
direct interest in policing the territory’s morals.108 Neither staffers nor Islanders seem to 
have welcomed these intrusions into their personal lives. One American teacher, for 
instance, complained of being subjected to a two-hour lecture on the dangers of “foreign 
entanglements” during his training. He later grumbled that the High Commissioner’s staff 
was “obsessed” with the subject.109  
One of Pohnpei’s most contentious couplings had occurred under Navy rule, 
when the military government ham-handedly dismissed Island Trading Company branch 
manager V.R. Braddon-Walker over his relationship with Daisy Nanpei and then ordered 
his transfer off island. Daisy and her sisters Luise and Keity had all married Japanese 
plantation overseers prior to the war, in part to facilitate their father Oliver’s ties to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Stories of similar liaisons in the Trust Territory during this time include sailors breaking open the 
Pohnpei’s first shipment of USCC goods to exchange them for sex, a 16-year old Mokilese girl interrogated 
by police for spending the night at Kolonia’s Bachelor Officer’s Quarters, a “native female” who spent the 
night at Pohnpei’s Navy barracks, a sailor stationed on Ngatik caught pilfering USCC goods for his 
mistress, an Interior staffer who “got drunk and raped an island girl,” a homosexual encounter between an 
American teacher and male student, and a female PICS teacher caught having sex with a Palauan student 
on the steps of a hotel. Willard Muller later recalled observing American men unable to turn away from the 
bare breasted women they met on field trips to the territory’s western islands and American women 
“equally aware of superb male bodies” they saw there. “More than once,” he writes, “I saw an American 
woman on a visit to one of these islands, who normally could walk with no difficulty down island paths in 
other parts of the district with just as many uncovered tree roots across them suddenly begin to stumble 
when Puluwat men came walking in their direction.” John Fischer, “Translation, Statement of Emiel taken 
at Police Station,” September 3, 1952, Series 3 Ponape, Box 10, Notes 1952, SFP; Bascom, Ponape, 16; 
Pompey, “Micronesia,” 91; Robert Gibson, interview by Karen Peacock, February 10, 1984, folder 5, 
transcript, KPI, 7-8; Willard C Muller. Faces of the Islands: When Pacific Islander and American Ways 
Meet (Rochester, Washington: Gorham Publishing, 2002), 38; Sherrod, Robert Lee. “Want to Live on a 
Tropical Island?” Saturday Evening Post, December 20, 1952, 69; Muller, Faces of the Islands, 143-144. 
108 Nucker served as the Trust Territory’s High Commissioner from 1954 to 1961. Robert Gibson, interview 
by Karen Peacock, February 10, 1984, folder 5, transcript, KPI, 7. 
109 The teacher, Theodore Henning, implies that personnel director Nat Logan-Smith and the territory’s 
chief anthropologist delivered this lecture. Theodore Henning, Buritis in Paradise (New York: Greenwich 
Book Publishers, 1961), 38. 
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island’s foreign trade.110 With her husband deported and Oliver working to erase Japan’s 
imprint on his family, Daisy was drawn to Braddon-Walker.111 But Naval officials 
objected to the match, making the couple’s rumored premarital liaisons an issue even 
after they were wed. The couple’s mehn waii friends held the transfer to be “cruel and 
unnecessary.” Many Pohnpeians agreed, but also understood the attack on Braddon-
Walker as a potential crisis of prestige. A policeman named William, for instance, argued 
that, “if both people are equal than the marriage is good,” intimating his anxiety that 
equality with mehn waii for even the wealthiest Pohnpeians might no longer be possible. 
These protests ultimately succeeded, though not without unduly inflaming tensions. 
Braddon-Walker remained on Pohnpei until 1955.112  
The Navy’s hostility to relationships like Nanpei and Braddon-Walker’s 
resembled injunctions against fraternizing with civilians elsewhere, but Interior’s 
concerns were particular to its conflicting aspirations for the territory. These sexual 
liaisons drove wedges between married couples and exacerbated staff turnover, fostered 
an intimacy that implied a more permanent form of colonial occupation than was 
intended by the territory’s UN charter, and exposed a sinful underbelly of American 
culture that might hinder possibilities for a longer colonial presence. But in instituting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 All three men were repatriated to Japan by the US Navy, while Nanpei’s daughters and grandchildren 
remained on Pohnpei. Albert O. Momm. Ponape: Japan’s Island in the Eastern Carolines, (n.p., 1945), 28. 
111 Eager to cozy up to the American regime, Oliver even urged Daisy (unsuccessfully) to rename her eight 
children so they might sound less Japanese. Daisy’s eight children were Isako, Kioko, Iosimi, Sasang, 
Nanako or Caroline, Setsuk, Ma, and Emiko. Immediately after the war’s end, Pohnpei’s Naval Governor 
Albert Momm wrote that all of Oliver Nanpei’s grandchildren had been raised “so strictly in the Japanese 
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Daisy and Braddon-Walker had one son together in 1950, whose name is Tony. Rufino Mauricio. “Family 
Root,” 35; Embree, Field Report, 70; Momm, Ponape, 28. 
112 Similarly, a Madolenihmw judge named Soure offered his approval for Braddon-Walker’s continued 
work on Pohnpei, but only under the condition that he did not work for Pohnpeians. Such an arrangement, 
he argued, was as “unfitting” as Pohnpeians working for outer islanders. Director of Internal Affairs to 
Civil Administrator, “Local Reaction to Possible Removal of V.R. Braddon-Walker,” December 31, 1950, 
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unequal wage scales, under which Americans were paid as much as five times the amount 
Islanders received for the same work, Interior followed a well-established local 
precedent.113 In fact, Solomon Commission economist Richard Cooper later argued that 
the tensions produced by wage imbalances in the Trust Territory was a “standard 
problem” in all colonial settings. “You have the colonialists with their pay linked to their 
home country,” he observed, “as it has to be in order to get them to go out there. Then 
you have the colonial peoples who… want to know ‘why is the American getting four 
times what I am getting?’” The resulting strain, Cooper maintained, tended to push local 
salaries above levels sustainable by the local economy and to enhance the appeal of civil 
service positions, even as the imported goods necessary to sustain a comfortable urban 
lifestyle on Pohnpei were priced out of the reach of a local worker.114  
Pohnpei’s wage scales impacted the day-to-day lives of nearly everyone on the 
island. On the one hand, wage-earning Islanders and those they served objected to the 
struggles local staff faced in maintaining an acceptable standard of living. At a 1953 
territory-wide education conference in Chuuk, for instance, a Madolenihmw-based 
teacher named Samson spoke of the strain salaries as low as $17 to $35 per month put on 
families. “In Ponape,” he argued, “we all know that we have much food but we do not 
just go out and get food. We have to work hard to get food… The money that I get each 
month can never support our family.”115 Playing on mehn waii tropes of the Pacific Island 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 The figure cited here refers specifically to Pohnpeian teachers, who Education Director Robert Gibson 
later noted received only a fifth of the salary their American counterparts were paid during the 1950s. 
Robert Gibson, “Trust Territory: Cultural Education and Westernized Schooling,” Trust Territory 
Education Materials, Pacific Collection, University of Hawai’i at Manoa (hereafter TTEM), Folder 15, 15.  
114 Richard N. Cooper, interview by Bruce M. Kalk, August 3, 1993 in Oral Histories of the Northern 
Mariana Islands: Political Life and Developments (1945-1995), eds. Howard P. Willens and Deanne C. 
Siemer (Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands: CNMI Division of Historic Preservation, 2004), vol. 2, 250. 
115 The teacher in question was probably Samson Alpert. Proceedings, 2nd Education Conference. Truk, 
Micronesia, 1953, 58-59. 
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as labor-free paradise, Samson protested that the unseen difficulties teachers faced 
putting food on the table compromised the entire school system. Teacher recruitment 
lagged, and afternoon classes could not be held when teachers returned home to farm and 
students left to eat lunch.116  
On the other hand, the higher pay foreign staffers received fostered a small market 
for goods that were entirely out of reach for most Islanders, though in a variety that was 
still insufficient for some mehn waii consumers. Visitors to Interior-era Kolonia often 
commented on the “cosmopolitan racial composition” and varied origins of its foreign 
staff, but the forces that drove Middle American consumerism held sway there as well.117 
Thus when the Island Trading Company took over the Navy’s commissary in 1952, it 
was forced to increase inventories of canned and preserved foods at a substantial loss in 
order to meet the needs of American personnel.118 Refrigerators and stoves also appeared 
in district centers throughout the territory, and even the rustic (by American standards) 
Terpstra residence at the Ohwa mission was eventually fitted with a kerosene 
refrigerator.119 In later years Kolonia stores like the Kolonia Consumers Cooperative 
Company continued to carry products geared toward mehn waii shoppers, one of whom 	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118 The Island Trading Company shut down this same year, though for unrelated reasons. John S. Spivey. 
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recalled purchasing cold storage eggs, frozen meat, canned whale, powdered milk, coffee, 
“lots of canned food,” and other staples at KCCA during the mid-1960s.120  
Variety was the watchword of foreign consumer demand in Kolonia’s 1950s 
grocery scene, which was shaped in large part by inflated mehn waii wages and 
idiosyncratic American demands. Those demands often seemed to mimic the messaging 
of corporations like Campbell’s Soup, which worked for decades to convince housewives 
that they needed to personally cook a varied menu in order to demonstrate their love for 
their families.121 This preoccupation with variety led many mehn waii to dismiss local 
foods as tedious and bland, and to strain against Kolonia’s limited import selection.122 
Many therefore turned to stopgap measures: gardening, ordering food by mail, 
developing fusion dishes like breadfruit French fries, or playing a “cat and mouse game” 
with quarantine inspectors by smuggling in fresh tomatoes or bell peppers from trips to 
Hawai’i or Guam.123 Their “ingenuity” earned the repeated praise of men like Philip 
Toomin, who lamented the social distance created when “the poorest American kitchen 
was far superior to even the best Micronesian.” Though taking a self-serving comfort in 
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the notion that Islanders admired Americans enough to forestall discontent, Toomin 
almost certainly misjudged the popular demand for his family’s varied “tasting menus.124 
Acquisitiveness was a quality held in low esteem on Pohnpei and its outer islands. 
Even so, it was largely Pohnpeians and outer Islanders who built a new Kolonia at the 
intersection of this mehn waii consumerism and Islanders’ diminished buying power. 
Kolonia residents like the Pohnpeian-Okinawan businessman Inosuke Yamada dreamed 
of restoring the energy and bustle of Japanese Kolonia while turning the page on a time 
when “all business was for the Japanese.”125 Along with Yamada’s store, by the end of 
the 1950s Kolonia featured several groceries and general stores, a fish market, 
restaurants, two public movie theaters, a hotel, dental office, barbershop, and a number of 
local stores in addition to various administrative buildings and churches.126 Islanders 
owned and operated most of those businesses alongside the Etscheit family’s various 
commercial interests. Both helped generate tax revenues far out of proportion to their 
numbers. As a result, intermittent disputes over revenue sharing between Kolonia and 
rural Nett erupted repeatedly throughout the 1950s. Coupled with the cultural differences 
that increasingly distinguished multiethnic Kolonia and a resistance to the control of the 
Nett traditional leadership, these disputes slowly coalesced into a movement for an 
independent Kolonia. That movement succeeded in severing the town from Nett 
Municipality in 1965, making Kolonia the territory’s first chartered town.  
FSM President Peter Christian has suggested that Kolonia’s independence 
movement sprang from the “distinctly diversified people” who called it home.127 Indeed, 
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while Max Iriarte and his supporters strenuously defended the Nett chiefs’ traditional 
rights to Kolonia Town, they were ultimately overcome by the shrewd appeals to 
democratic governance and egalitarianism politicians like Mokil’s Bethwel Henry used to 
lobby the American regime. Those arguments overcame American critics as well, some 
of whom attacked the movement as an urbanist, outer Islander-led assault on Pohnpeian 
leadership and traditional agriculture.128 Yet as the years went on, Kolonia’s multiethnic 
remaking increasing spilled beyond the town’s boundaries. In Madolenihmw, a 
homesteading program created sizeable new communities of outer Islanders from Piis-
Losap and Pingelap. In Nett and Sokehs, economic migration brought outer Islanders 
who boosted demand for imported foods and locally grown taro, particularly after the 
Kennedy era’s funding surges.129 Meanwhile, Kolonia’s mehn waii continued to maintain 
their explicit public separateness until, finally, doing so was no longer tenable.  
 
 
Clubs in counterpoint: the Ponape Women’s Association and Club Kolonia 
 
In the fall of 1959, a trio of women’s clubs on Kosrae invited Pohnpei’s 
educational administrator Paul McNutt to observe their meetings. In Tafunsak, McNutt 
saw 43 women laboring over pillowslips on hand-cranked sewing machines and selling 
items like piece quilts, children’s clothing, tea towels, and hot pad holders. In Malem, 60 
women of all ages staged a Liberation Day “water carnival” that pitted female 	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competitors against one in another in canoe races and swimming.130 But in Lelu, amid 
Kosrae’s smattering of administrative offices, the women’s club wanted to demonstrate 
its ability to stage a formal American dinner. McNutt received a written invitation and 
returned his RSVP, and on entering the island’s municipal building found two long tables 
covered with starched white tablecloths, candles, and silverware stamped “USN.” Orange 
juice toasts were made, speeches and prayers delivered, and a choir began a soft serenade 
of “Believe Me If All Those Endearing Young Charms.” Roasted chicken, rice, fried 
bananas, mashed potatoes, fried fish, sliced pork, taro, yams, a burnt sugar two layer 
cake, a pineapple upside-down cake, and two double crust pies were served. A suitably 
impressed McNutt wrote that the eight couples present ate in the accepted American 
fashion and “acted as if it were old stuff to them.”131  
At the center of these activities was Rose Makwelung, a dynamic I-Kiribati 
woman who had spent the previous half-decade nurturing women’s clubs throughout the 
Ponape District. Operating independently of counterpart organizations in Palau or the 
Marshalls, the clubs varied in size, the composition of their membership, and the 
activities they sponsored. But each articulated a unique vision of indigenous modernity 
within a new sort of woman-centered public sphere. Those visions evolved within a loose 
Pacific-wide network of “women’s interest” activism and helped push food production 
farther into women’s spheres of influence. Pohnpei’s women’s clubs thus crystalized an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 For a brief discussion of Liberation Day’s development in the postwar Trust Territory see: Keith L. 
Camacho, Cultures of Commemoration: The Politics of War, Memory, and History in the Mariana Islands 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2011), 13-14. For another account of the three-month visit Rose 
Makwelung’s made to Kosrae to prepare its women’s clubs before McNutt visited, see: “Learning to Do - 
At Kusaie.” Micronesian Reporter VII, no. 5, (September-October 1959), 5. 
131 Educational Administrator, Pohnpei to Reports Officer, Miss Cynthia Olsen, “Kusaie Women’s Club,” 
September 11, 1959, RGP, Box 9, Folder 109, 1-2. See also Paul McNutt, “A Day With Rose,” 
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of McNutt’s encounters with one of Makwelung’s events on Pohnpei. 
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emergent indigenous modernity similar to what Christine DeLisle argues developed on 
prewar Guam. There, she suggests, Chamorro women “aided and abetted” American 
colonialism even as they “constructed new forms of Chamorro consciousness and new 
notions of Chamorro progress” in relation to practices like speaking English, adopting 
American fashions, and interacting with colonial institutions.132  
Even so, Interior’s uncertainty about its own “civilizing mission” made abetting 
American colonialism a more ambiguous prospect than it had been on Guam, and lent 
Pohnpei’s women’s clubs greater freedom to develop new “modern” subjectivities. This 
flexibility was evident whether clubs chose to host cooking workshops, teach sanitation 
or childcare techniques, market traditional crafts and cloth wealth, or provide a social 
space for their members. But this same uncertainty also caused Pohnpei’s mehn waii 
families to grapple with their own modernity, and perhaps never more revealingly than 
when they gathered to drink and socialize at the rusting former Naval officer’s club 
known as Club Kolonia. There, they drew the sharpest line between themselves and the 
Islanders around them, who were not only barred from club membership but also legally 
prohibited from alcohol consumption. By the mid-1960s, ongoing tensions between Club 
Kolonia’s exclusivity and Interior’s democratizing rhetoric culminated in the club’s 
permanent closure. The concurrent ascendancy of Makwelung’s women’s clubs and the 
decline of Club Kolonia therefore points to the formation of a powerful new set of 
solidarities on postwar Pohnpei. Even as women’s clubs emerged as multicultural spaces 
celebrated by American staffers, embraced by a substantial cohort of Pohnpeian women, 
and capable of offering outer Islander women an alternative to traditional exchange, the 
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tensions at the heart of the American colonial project also worked to break down the 
separate spheres that had so marked Kolonia’s early American-era sociability. 
 Pohnpei’s women’s clubs have always been sustained by grassroots community 
support, but they owe much of their founding vision to Rose Makwelung. Makwelung 
was born Rose Kaumai in Kiribati. In 1915, when she was four years old, Kaumai was 
adopted by ABCFM missionary Jessie Hoppin and brought to Jaluit Atoll in the Marshall 
Islands. Hoppin was a traveling missionary for Kiribati, the Marshalls, and Kosrae, and 
teacher at the Kosrae mission school where Kaumai’s birth parents were enrolled. From 
Jaluit Kaumai could make frequent visits to Kosrae, but in 1922 Hoppin sent her first to 
Claremont, California and then to Pasadena for schooling. Kaumai completed her 
secondary education in Pasadena, and returned to Jaluit to teach in 1932. Proudly bearing 
the influence of her American peers, she arrived back in the Marshalls with short hair, 
makeup, a vocabulary of American slang, and a trunk full of short dresses.  
Kaumai was put in charge of the Jaluit mission girl’s school shortly after her 
arrival. There, she introduced uniforms and a girl’s athletic program and allowed students 
to cut their hair short. “When the girls saw my hair,” she later told the Micronesian 
Reporter, “they also wanted theirs short. I said, ‘why not?’” Kaumai also caught Jaluit’s 
attention by playing tennis in gym bloomers, and responded to her students’ interest by 
ordering enough material to make them for the entire school. Other than opposition from 
missionaries like the Australian Carl Heine, she faced little community resistance in 
implementing these changes. “When I came back,” she recalled, “I noticed there already 
had been some change. But I was the first native to practice those things and they didn’t 
seem to object.” Within a few years, Kaumai was in Kosrae and firmly established at the 
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mission school at Mwot, where she married the Kosraean pastor John Makwelung. She 
remained there until 1943, spending most of the balance of the war at Lelu’s colonial 
settlement teaching Japanese to Banaban agricultural workers and their children. 
After the war, Makwelung quickly rose through the ranks at education to become 
one of the Trust Territory’s highest-ranking Islander officials. She was superintendent of 
Kosrae’s elementary schools during the Navy era, a teacher on Pohnpei by 1952, and 
assistant superintendent of Pohnpei’s schools, Ponape District’s adult education 
supervisor, and the district’s economic and political advisor by the end of the decade.133 
But her public work was most profoundly shaped by her role as delegate to the 1954 Pan-
Pacific Women’s Association meeting in Manila, where the organization’s support for 
locally based women’s clubs drew her toward encouraging women’s participation in 
public life.134 Within a year, five women’s clubs were holding regular meetings at 
Kolonia: a Kapingamarangi club, a Ngatikese club, a Pohnpeian club, and a combined 
Pingelapese-Mokilese group. These groups soon incorporated as the Ponape Women’s 
Association. As club membership grew from 120 women in five local chapters to 200 
women in thirteen chapters by 1959, Makwelung remained actively involved: turning up 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Jessie Hoppin. “Letter to the Editor.” The Friend CXVI, no. 1, January 1, 1946, 13. “Interview: Rose 
Kaumai Mackwelung,” Micronesian Reporter XIX, no. 1 (First Quarter, 1971), 2-8; Educational 
Administrator, Ponape to Assistant Director of Education, “Additional Intermediate School Teacher,” 
November 10, 1959, RGP, Box 9, Folder 111, 1; Educational Administrator, Ponape to District 
Administrator, “Annual Report,” February 15, 1960, RGP, Box 9, Folder 114, 1. 
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emotional as well as a political and intellectual response to the myriad changes being rapidly wrought by 
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at club meetings to teach English classes, helping to organize handicraft production, 
assisting with annual conventions, and arranging specialized workshops.135  
New cooking techniques were among a broad portfolio of skills the Ponape 
Women’s Association worked to convey to its members. In 1962, for instance, 
Makwelung presided over an extensive six-week leadership program at the group’s 
Kolonia clubhouse. The program featured short courses on government and the courts, 
land issues, schools, health and nutrition, cooperatives, soap making, handicraft 
techniques, cooking, sewing, and washing. It also aimed to train its members in regular 
daily habits and punctuality.136 Clubs built these curricula around the contributions of 
their volunteer Islander and mehn waii teachers, but they also reflected Makwelung’s ties 
to a broad network of mid-century “women’s interest” advocates. Makwelung 
collaborated with territorial counterparts like Mary Lanwi of the Marshalls and Palau’s 
Anastasia Ramarui on local projects, and joined them on networking, educational, and 
observational trips abroad. She returned to the Pan-Pacific and Southeast Asian Women’s 
Association meeting in Tokyo in 1958 and in 1961 traveled to a South Pacific 
Commission-hosted women’s interest seminar in Western Samoa. Three years later, 
Makwelung embarked on a United Nations-funded tour of community development 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Although the Ponape District’s women’s clubs were unique for their close ties to the American regime 
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Emaimelei Bismark told New York Times reporter Robert Trumbull that Palau’s women’s clubs “led the 
movement” to revive taro production once it became clear that rice was harder to come by under the 
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projects in the Philippines, India, and Ceylon.137 There, she demonstrated her eagerness to 
bring home knowledge produced in foreign colonial institutions, as when she enthused 
over the recipes for “delicious” tropical dishes and new techniques for coir fiber 
production she discovered on a visit to an industrial school in the Philippines.138  
Territorial staffers quickly embraced the Ponape Women’s Association and 
Makwelung’s work. Caught between the administration’s official refusal to intervene in 
“local custom” and their own distaste for the sexism they believed pervaded island 
societies, cosmopolitan Islander women like Makwelung seemed to represent an ideal 
mechanism to intervene vicariously in local gender relations.139 Mehn waii celebrated the 
Ponape Women’s Association for drawing women “out of the taro patch and into 
community activities” even as their own regime tended to confine female staffers to 
secretarial and teaching positions regardless of their qualifications.140 The association’s 
dual embrace of Western-style education and supposedly “lost native arts” like weaving 	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140 A few American women did hold positions of authority within the American regime of the 1950s, most 
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wives” to serve as classroom teachers, with predictably poor results. One staffer complained to Robert 
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Collection, University of Hawai’i at Manoa, 42; George to Dr. Gibson, n.d., RGP, Box 4, Folder 56, 1. 
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and carving also helped assuage mehn waii anxieties over their culpability for carrying a 
potentially destructive modernity to island societies.141  
These flirtations reflect the political roles women played in the territory, roles that 
often recalled the “militarized domesticity” Mire Koikari has observed in Cold War 
Okinawa. There, American women also hosted people-to-people cultural encounters, 
supported women’s clubs, and sponsored domestic science programming. As Koikari 
notes, these women fashioned their homes into “focal site[s] of imperial politics” and 
thereby helped rationalize and safeguard American Cold War expansionism.142 Yet here 
again, waters in the Trust Territory were more muddied. Less sure of their mission and 
more distant from a military presence, territorial staffers found themselves as likely to 
celebrate Pohnpei’s women’s clubs for being building blocks of political independence as 
they were to praise them for drawing the islands closer to the United States.  
Islander women understood the clubs in different terms. While club meetings 
offered outer Islanders a unique opportunity for multicultural sociability that was distinct 
from Pohnpei’s feasting and exchange system, they also joined Pohnpeians in drawing on 
club resources to help them adjust to American rule. The association’s published recipes 
reflect this adaptive approach. Making innovative use of ingredients and cooking 
methods, the recipes demonstrate a more sparing reliance on imported foods than the 
fusion dishes mehn waii developed for their own use. A 1962 recipe for pumpkin 
pudding, for instance, calls for mashed pumpkin, lime, cornstarch, and salt to be poured 
into a baking pan, baked in an oven or an uhmw, and served with thick coconut milk. 
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With Japanese-introduced pumpkin and local produce, a coconut milk glaze that evoked 
both a 1950s American casserole and Pohnpeian dishes like piahia, and its suitability for 
both perehn kuk and uhmw preparation, the pudding quietly signaled the embrace of a 
modernity markedly distinct from the mimicry of Americanness some at Interior 
envisioned.143 This sort of responsiveness ultimately enabled the clubs to outlast both 
Interior’s fleeting political needs and Makwelung’s involvement, and helps account for 
their enduring presence both on Pohnpei and within its diaspora today. 
The Ponape Women’s Association’s refusal to adhere to a more assimilationist 
agenda made it quite distinct from Club Kolonia, whose very reason for being was to 
reproduce a comforting American sociability as faithfully as was reasonably possible. 
Club Kolonia stood on a hillside between the district’s administrative offices and the ring 
of staff housing known as “the circle,” nearby the present-day causeway. Hosted within a 
Quonset the staff newsletter Ponape-per jokingly described as a “dingy cave,” the 1950s 
version of the club featured a bar and recreation room done up in tropical décor that was 
open on the northeast side to provide a view of the harbor.144 Bylaws adopted in 1951 
identified the club’s mission as providing “recreational and social activities” for district 
employees. Full membership was limited to the territory’s “family head and bachelor” 
staff, although family members were eligible for associate membership. Permanent 
nonindigenous district residents could also be granted guest privileges.145  
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Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, visitors to Club Kolonia and the territory’s 
other repurposed officer’s clubs repeatedly noted the centrality of alcohol consumption to 
club life and staff sociability more broadly. While Club Kolonia entertained visiting 
officials, hosted holiday gatherings and family-friendly events, held regular movie 
screenings, organized card games, and maintained a lending library, members made most 
frequent use of the club during its daily cocktail hour. Groups of self-described 
“Kolonials” then gathered “en masse” to drink and dine from a limited menu of items like 
hamburgers, hot dogs, and sashimi. The liquor they consumed was available at a two-
thirds discount over American rates: at prices so low, journalist Willard Price was told, 
“you can’t afford not to drink.” Price himself concluded that the territory’s staffers 
seemed to be completing “Bachelor of Alcoholism” degrees in a “School of Hard Liquor” 
after he attended a series of dinner parties at which drinks and conversation flowed freely 
into the night.146 
Club Kolonia also hosted regular monthly parties, many of which were themed. 
By the early 1960s, advertisements for these gatherings began to appear in the Ponape-
per. There was a shipwreck party where costumed guests hunted for “buried treasure” 
such as coupons for free liquor, and a beachcomber-themed event featuring a “ribald” 
play and “wahine” dancers from Saipan, New Zealand, and Hawai’i. Guests at the club’s 
corral dance were encouraged to dress in “farm duds, cowboy dress, and maybe even a 
couple friendly Indian costumes,” while attendees at a “suki-yaki” party wore yukata, 
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kimono, and happi.147 These costume parties often relied on imagery familiar from 
American Pacificism or the imperial pasts of Japan and the United States. In doing so, 
they recalled a long history of efforts to “imagine and materialize distinctive American 
identities” through costumed Indian play. But they resonated especially with the new 
allure “authentic” Indianness had found in Cold War America, where it had become a 
tool to cope with a perceived loss of personal identities and the anxieties of industrial and 
postindustrial life.148 This same pursuit of authenticity had led some of the territory’s 
more adventurous staffers to seek their positions in the first place. But as they found 
themselves pursuing an indeterminate mission in an age increasingly skeptical of the 
colonial project, staffers found in Club Kolonia a bridge between the flawed modernism 
they feared might follow them to the islands and the paradise they had hoped to find 
there. This may help to explain why the mode of sociability Club Kolonia offered seemed 
to many staffers to feel indispensable, almost urgent.  
The Trust Territory barred Islanders from alcohol consumption until the early 
1960s.149 Nonetheless, clubs had been informally issuing guest passes to a handful of 
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high-ranking Islanders as far back as the Navy era, recalling the selective enforcement of 
alcohol law under the Nan’yō’chō. Visitors to Majuro’s comparatively integrated 
Coconut Rendezvous Club could thus find men like Dwight Heine imbibing with Navy 
officers during the 1940s and with Interior staffers throughout the 1950s, and may have 
spotted a half dozen Islanders granted the same privilege in each of the territory’s other 
district centers.150 Unsanctioned drinking was even more commonplace outside of club 
settings. Pohnpeians regularly consumed a homebrewed concoction called “yeast” 
throughout the postwar era, and an associate justice for the territory’s high court 
estimated that fully 50% of Chuuk’s criminal charges and convictions during the late 
1950s stemmed from drinking violations.151 But when the Bureau of Indian affairs 
devolved authority of alcohol regulation to tribal governments in 1953, it must have 
seemed only a matter of time before the territory’s district congresses were granted the 
same authority. When that power came in 1962, Heinrich Iriarte of Nett swiftly 
introduced legislation in the Ponape Congress that further devolved alcohol policy to 
municipalities, though he exempted sakau from regulation.152  
 Even before alcohol deregulation and the Kennedy administration’s desegregation 
of federally operated recreation facilities in 1961, Club Kolonia had begun to squabble 	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over admitting sponsored Micronesians as members.153 In June of 1961, a chagrined 
staffer named Diane Sammet complained to the Ponape-per that the club’s definition of 
“private” was so vague that, “visitors from anywhere in the world excepting the islands 
of Micronesia are welcome.” “Why,” she asked, “have we chosen to restrict only the 
Micronesians—the very people we have come here to teach and learn from and with 
whom to be neighbors?” Six months of debate, polling, and editorials followed, and by 
the end of 1961 the club had adopted new bylaws that made any sponsored applicant 
eligible for membership.154 By 1962, the club boasted 16 Micronesian members, most of 
whom, the Ponape-per assured its readers, “are busy each day bending their elbows at the 
ping-pong table and billiard table and not the bar.”155 Four years later a new club charter 
expanded membership to any district resident willing to pay a small initiation fee.156 
 Club Kolonia’s gradual decline occurred amid a series of policy reversals that 
transformed the Trust Territory during the early 1960s. After receiving a critical report 
from the 1961 United Nations Visiting Mission, an embarrassed Washington swiftly 
eased visa restrictions, placed the Northern Marianas under Interior control, and doubled 
annual appropriations. The regime also embarked on an accelerated economic program 
aimed at seducing Islanders into voting themselves into permanent association with the 
United States.157 District centers like Kolonia were suddenly overrun with a new sort of 
Interior official Robert Gibson derisively called the “hurry-up boys.”158 These officials 	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presided over a broad expansion of the colonial bureaucracy, empowered territorial and 
district legislatures, expanded educational opportunities for Islanders, and deployed a 
surge of Peace Corps volunteers to the islands. As a result, Kolonia’s population doubled 
to nearly 3,000 residents between 1963 and 1970. With its dirt roads and profusion of 
bars, some of which featured swinging saloon doors and hitching posts, the town began to 
evoke Wild West Shows for its mehn waii visitors. But with its denser and increasingly 
diverse population, more diffuse social scene, and a rift in the mehn waii community 
created by large contingents of Peace Corps volunteers who avoided Interior staffers 
socially and preferred life outside of town, the town no longer seemed in need of a 
private club. Club Kolonia was shuttered in the early 1970s.159  
 The Ponape Women’s Association and Club Kolonia each bet on a unique vision 
of what it meant to be modern on 1950s Pohnpei, and club members shaped each 
institution according to their needs. But while the solidarities fostered by the island’s 
women’s clubs endure into the present day, Club Kolonia’s reliance on a model of the 
colonial enclave as retreat for the colonizer and example to the colonized proved more 
fragile than staffers imagined. Ironically, the separate spheres and alcohol-fueled 
sociability that had so defined 1950s staff life became potent lines of attack during the 
1960s. Critics took staffers’ alleged susceptibility to alcoholism as confirmation of their 
suspicions that the territory was being run by carousing guardians of desultory, impotent 
bureaucracies. Anthony Solomon, for instance, later described much of the territorial staff 	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as alcoholics and “romantic or drop-out types” unable to tolerate life in “that God 
forsaken territory” for more than a few years without resorting to heavy drinking.160 
Those critiques were often unfair, but they did have an impact. And, as Kolonia 
developed and grew more urbanized, some of the mehn waii staffers who remained 
lamented the “close-knit feeling of the smaller community” they had lost.161  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The alarm staffers like William Vitarelli raised over the magnetic power imported 
foods like spaghetti and meatballs seemed to hold over Americans, and what that power 
might portend for Islanders, changed along with the economic reforms and evolving 
mehn waii sensibilities of the 1960s and 1970s. But it never entirely disappeared. In fact, 
as the territory’s independence movement collided with a dramatic spike in imports, 
deliberations over the repercussions of imported goods broadened markedly. On the one 
hand, once the Kennedy administration stated its intention that the territory remain under 
permanent US control, a handful of Interior officials began for the first time to speak “in 
an extravagant way about how nothing but American movies and Coca-Cola and 
McDonalds hamburgers should be served to anybody in Micronesia.” Others pursued a 
range of development projects aimed at boosting exports, hoping to reduce the territory’s 
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growing trade imbalance rather than fight a losing battle against imports.162 On the other 
hand, concerns over import dependence increasingly emerged from the territory’s 
independence movement, particularly insofar as those imports might complicate an 
independent Micronesia’s political relationships with foreign powers.  
In spite of the worries mehn waii expressed throughout the 1940s and 1950s, 
imported goods did not posses the power to shatter island cultures, which adapted to new 
introductions much as they had in the past. Even so, just as the US Navy’s cultural 
security initiatives crumbled under the pressure of consumer demand, mehn waii hopes of 
averting the harms of colonial rule by circumscribing Islander access to imported goods 
ultimately proved untenable. In attempting to hold economic development down to “the 
Micronesians’ own capacity to absorb” while accommodating its civilian staff, the 
American regime reinscribed prewar colonial hierarchies rather than effacing them.163 As 
a result, imported goods retained a certain prestige value throughout the postwar era.  
That prestige was neither powerful enough to supplant feast foods like yams or 
pigs nor did it much resemble the obsessive desire for American goods mehn waii often 
assumed motivated Islander consumerism. But, along with the convenience of fast-
cooking foods like rice and the advocacy of groups like the Ponape Women’s 
Association, the prestige associated with imported goods did help maintain demand for 
imports through the 1950s. Once funding surges blew open access to the island’s cash 
economy in the 1960s, stores were free to exploit the pent-up demand of the previous two 
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decades. Balancing that demand with the imperatives of Pohnpei’s sovereignty became 
an urgent, and increasingly fraught, project over the following years. 
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CHAPTER 4: BREADFRUIT AND RICE: SOVEREIGNTY,  
SUBSISTENCE, AND THE RICE REVOLUTION 
 
 At Salapwuk, a small community located on an upland plateau of Kitti, a series of 
narrow earthen mounds and trenches have long been guarded as sacred sites. According 
to oral historians, the features mark symbolic pathways that link subsistence resources 
like breadfruit, yams, and fish to one another and bind Salapwuk to the rest of the island. 
One of these pathways is the Allap en Rahk, the Great Path of the Season of Plenty. On 
one side of that path lies Salapwuk, Pohnpei’s great hearth (rasalap), whose deep history 
as a ritual center ties it to labor-intensive root crops like yams and the season of scarcity 
(isol). On the other side lies the island of Temwen, Pohnpei’s isilap (forehead), whose 
role as political and economic hub and orientation toward the east winds link it to tree 
crops like breadfruit and the season of plenty (rahk). The deities responsible for 
regulating the isol and rahk seasons and the crops associated with them traverse the Allap 
en Rahk, forming a vascular system that sustains subsistence and prestige production and 
safeguards critical resources like breadfruit, Pohnpei’s most important staple food.1 
 Breadfruit is unique. It is so abundant that a tree may produce for 50 years, 
yielding 50 to 150 large, starchy fruits annually, with some varieties yielding as many as 
700.2 It requires so little labor that Pohnpeians speak of it as a gift from the gods, and 
recognize breadfruit feast presentations as a sign of divine abundance rather than a 	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reflection of the giver’s diligence.3 It is so versatile that it can be eaten at any stage of its 
development: steamed, boiled, fried, baked, roasted in fires or stone ovens, consumed 
raw when very ripe, preserved in pits for as long as a century, or fed to pigs.4 It is so 
adaptable that Pohnpeians identify one major and four minor breadfruit seasons and as 
many as 130 unique breadfruit cultivars.5 Anthropologist Glenn Petersen has even 
speculated that hybridization and a “quantum increase” in breadfruit stocks after 1000 
C.E. so reduced Pohnpei’s labor needs that it fostered a “breadfruit revolution,” 
facilitating the large-scale social mobilization necessary to build the monumental stone 
complexes of Nan Madol.6 But during the independence movements of the 1960s and 
1970s, breadfruit took on a new role: as the most potent symbol of Pohnpei’s food 
sovereignty, particularly when counterposed against the surging power of imported rice. 
 By 1960, rice was an established staple with a deep history on Pohnpei, but only 
the minority of families dependent on the cash economy consumed it regularly. When the 
Kennedy administration abandoned the slow-paced reforms of the 1950s for a program of 
rapid economic development, however, access to this previously finite commodity was 
democratized, making rice a true staple of Pohnpeian eating for the first time. Initially, 	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the acceleration in development and its concomitant funding surge were components of a 
calculated strategy to entice Islanders into voting for permanent association with the 
United States. But as Washington worked to address domestic civil rights concerns by 
equalizing access to public resources, federal programs increasingly seemed to find their 
way to the territory as a matter of course, bringing with them cash and food aid that 
expanded the reach of rice consumption even further. 
 Among the unintended results of these reforms was a series of impacts to local 
economies, political systems, cultures, and health so far-reaching they might be called a 
rice revolution. Pohnpei’s rice revolution roughly mirrored the breadfruit revolution of a 
thousand years prior, delivering labor reductions to the subsistence economy, offering 
peace of mind during food security crises, reshaping daily eating, and redirecting 
agricultural labor into wage work or prestige production. But unlike breadfruit, whose 
nutritional value was probably always marginal to its popularity, overreliance on rice and 
processed imports like corned beef and ramen also carried significant costs to public 
health. The full scope of those costs gradually became apparent during the 1970s, as 
reductions in exercise due to sedentary office work and automobile transportation were 
added to changes in diet. But the risk to Pohnpei’s food sovereignty was always the era’s 
primary concern, as the rice revolution’s deep entanglements with imported goods and 
U.S. aid threatened to lure voters toward Washington at the very moment the territory’s 
independence movements reached their climax.  
 The term food sovereignty was coined in 1996 by the transnational peasant 
movement La Vía Campesina. It therefore postdates all of the major turning points of this 
chapter: the 1978 formation of the Federated States of Micronesia, the end of the 
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trusteeship, and the 1986 ratification of the Compact of Free Association with the United 
States. Yet food sovereignty’s emphasis on “the right of peoples to healthy and culturally 
appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their 
right to define their own food and agricultural systems” and its opposition to global 
corporate trade and food regimes do help to illuminate the relations of power at the heart 
of Pohnpei’s struggles over its future political status and food system.7 Elsewhere in the 
Pacific, scholars have noted resonances between the independence movements of the 
1970s and 1980s and food sovereignty’s later emphasis on self-reliance, its focus on land 
issues, and its roots in agricultural practice.8 But Pohnpei also maintained a distinct food 
sovereignty formulation of its own, grounded in the island’s enduring ethic of individual, 
family, and community self-care and the breadfruit-centered agroforests that sustain it.9 
 Food security, on the other hand, was a broadly used term in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Yet here too, Pohnpei and its outer islands maintained distinct food security formulations 
that powerfully shaped attitudes on local food systems and the region’s sovereignty. The 
term food security was coined after the world food crises of 1972-73, and has come to be 
defined in terms of “individual access, rather than state-level availability” with an 
emphasis on “neoliberal discourse and ideology… free markets, and a loss of centrality 
for the nation-state.”10 In fact, with the exception of the Navy’s restrictions on “luxuries” 
during the 1940s, fidelity to free markets and consumer choice has constrained pre- and 
post-independence Micronesian governments from vigorous making interventions in 	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import markets. Risks to individual food access from poverty or natural disaster have 
shaped policymaking as well. But the region’s long legacy of ruinous natural disasters 
and Pohnpei’s rapidly changing economy also made the reliable availability of imported 
foods a matter of broad public concern, and many voters kept the potential risks to 
community food access at top of mind as they considered their political future.  
 This chapter explores Pohnpei’s food sovereignty and food security formulations, 
the emotional controversies over its school lunches and an anti-poverty feeding program 
known as Needy Family, and the increasingly visible impacts a century’s worth of 
interventions in the island’s food system were beginning to have on Pohnpeian and outer 
Islander bodies. In the run-up to independence, national and district-level legislators grew 
progressively more empowered, and a “Micronesianization” policy installed growing 
numbers of Islanders in administrative positions. The administration’s foreign character 
thus grew progressively more scrambled as independence approached, and as 
Micronesian leaders carried institutions, infrastructures, money economies, and legal 
precedents designed by an occupying government into an uncertain postcolonial era. The 
nation they made, and their contestations over breadfruit and rice, food security and food 
sovereignty, has deeply shaped Pohnpei’s food system up to the present moment. 
 
 
Securing food, securing sovereignty: breadfruit, natural disasters, and Pohnpei rice 
 
 As U.S. funding surged, development programs proliferated, and possibilities for 
political independence in Micronesia crystalized through the 1960s and 1970s, 
enthusiasm for potential export crops like pepper, cacao, and rice increasingly gripped 
Pohnpei’s agriculturalists. In 1960, the agriculture station planted a one-acre test plot of 
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Sarawak pepper imported from Fiji. Three years later, when the pepper began to bear, 
Pohnpei’s district administrator called for major investments in pepper production, noting 
that potential income per acre of pepper not only surpassed copra but was “not exceeded 
by any major tropical crop.” A small group of Islander and mehn waii stakeholders then 
worked to identify export markets and mounted a foreign advertising effort, their 
marketing materials promoting Pohnpei pepper as the “freshest and most wholesome” 
gourmet pepper in the world. By 1972, Pohnpei’s farmers were cultivating as many as 
40,000 pepper vines on roughly 50 acres across the island. Over the next two decades the 
industry ebbed and flowed before finally reaching its peak, and then crashing.11 
 When pepper was riding high, hundreds of Pohnpei’s farmers were drawn to the 
crop. Among them was a man in Wapar, at Madolenihmw’s southwestern edge. 
Esteemed around Pohnpei for the beauty and quality of his breadfruit, he resolved instead 
to become Madolenihmw’s largest pepper producer, trading on his reputation as a farmer 
for prestige as a businessman. He cleared a three-acre field and two additional acres of 
land, felled his breadfruit trees, and replaced them with pepper vines growing in full sun, 
just as the bottom fell out of the pepper industry. In the end, only a vast field of paddle 
grass remained. Again, word of the farmer spread, but this time as a cautionary tale, a 
warning against forsaking the dependability of breadfruit for the uncertainty of 
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Francisco: Agland Investment Services, 1979), 11. See: Glenn Petersen. “Ponapean Agriculture and 
Economy: Politics, Prestige and Problems of Commercialization in the Eastern Caroline Islands.” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Columbia University, 1976), 245-250.  
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commercial enterprise.12 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Pohnpei rang with cautionary 
tales of leveled breadfruit trees, uprooted yams, and farmers whose flattened agroforests 
were left to bake in the sun. These stories framed a potent counterargument against the 
export-centered food security vision of many of the island’s agriculturalists, grounded in 
a food sovereignty formulation that held self-reliance and breadfruit at its core. 
Negotiations over balancing the imperative to keep Pohnpei food secure with the 
opportunity to recover its sovereignty represented perhaps the most fundamental political 
tension on the island during the post-Eisenhower era. Yet the Kennedy administration’s 
reforms in the Trust Territory were primarily aimed neither at strengthening food security 
nor at eroding food sovereignty. Instead, Washington hoped to draw the territory 
permanently into its orbit, maintaining the U.S. military’s strategic position there while 
placating international, domestic, and local critics of its 1950s-era governance. As 
Assistant Interior Secretary Harlan Cleveland later put it, the administration hoped “to 
prevent a complete independence, but also to prevent a dependent status that would be so 
frankly colonial that it would be vulnerable to criticism from elsewhere.”13  
Though widely seen as a response to a damning report from the 1961 United 
Nations Visiting Mission, Assistant Interior Secretary John Carver instead attributed the 
policy reversal to the administration’s broader efforts to equalize access to public 
resources and facilities: “the Kennedy spirit of [U.S. territories] being part of the US of A 
and we’ve got to have standards out there of education and other things which were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Bill Raynor. Interview by author. Kolonia, Pohnpei, 19 November 2014. 
13 Harlan Cleveland, interview by Howard P. Willens, August 9, 1993 in Oral Histories of the Northern 
Mariana Islands: Political Life and Developments (1945-1995), eds. Howard P. Willens and Deanne C. 
Siemer (Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands: CNMI Division of Historic Preservation, 2004), vol. 2, 244. 
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consistent with it being part of the United States.”14 But Washington’s clearest 
articulation of its intentions appeared in a secret 1962 executive order, which proposed a 
“greatly accelerated program of political, economic, and social development” that might 
eventually persuade Islanders to exercise the “informed… realistic” choice of voting 
themselves into a permanent territorial relationship with the United States.15  
This persuasion was aimed at a plebiscite to be held at an indeterminate future 
date, and was often carried out by American officials who believed they were actually 
preparing the territory for independence.16 It took the form of initiatives that cut across 
island life, from investments in education and infrastructure to economic development, 
the formation of the territory-wide Congress of Micronesia, and the deployment of the 
Peace Corps. On the one hand, nearly all of these reforms impinged on Pohnpei’s 
agroforests in some way, from public education that seemed to devalue traditional 
agricultural knowledge and labor to jobs that drew Pohnpeians from their farms and 
boosted demand for imported foods. On the other hand, the American regime’s 
heightened presence and resources revealed longstanding Pohnpeian anxieties over the 
ability of agroforest and fisheries resources to maintain food security in times of crisis. 
Thus Pohnpei’s agroforests, outwardly divorced from Cold War geopolitics and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 John A. Carver, interview by Howard P. Willens, July 29, 1994 in Oral Histories, eds. Willens and 
Siemer, vol. 2, 166. See: United Nations Trusteeship Council. Report of the United Nations Visiting 
Mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Twenty-seventh session. 1 June-19 July 1961. (New 
York: United Nations, 1961). 
15 John F. Kennedy, “National Security Action Memorandum No. 145,” 18 April, 1962 in Howard P. 
Willens and Deanne C. Siemer. From the White House: documents on the Northern Mariana Islands and 
Micronesia collected from the presidential libraries, 1945-1995. (Washington: Wilsie Co., 2005.) CD-
ROM. 
16 See: Anthony Solomon, A Report by the U.S. Government Survey Mission to the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands. (Washington, 1963), vol. 1, S-7. 
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diplomatic deliberations, increasingly seemed to operate as silent battlegrounds over the 
island’s food security and future sovereignty. 
In fact, threats to Micronesia’s short and medium-term food security were real 
and often quite urgent, most of them resulting from typhoons, tsunami, and droughts. 
Among other disasters, the post-Eisenhower era saw Typhoon Jean, whose 190-mile per 
hour winds wreaked “indescribable devastation” on Saipan in 1968, and Typhoon Lola, 
which in 1972 swamped Pingelap with three giant 30-foot waves and ruined up to 80% of 
the crops on Mokil.17 There was a severe drought that left Kapingamarangi desperately 
short of food and water in 1973, and Typhoon Pamela, which struck the Mortlocks with 
such force in 1976 that 1,500 Mortlockese requested resettlement to Pohnpei.18 In 1983, a 
drought brought Madolenihmw less than four inches of rainfall in eight months. At the 
Jesuit-run Ponape Agriculture & Trade School, water shortages produced a “long and 
seemingly never-ending crisis,” requiring drinking and cooking water to be trucked in, 
killing most of the school’s crops in the ground, and changing the lush greenery of its 
campus to a sickly shade of brown.19 
 Natural disasters of this sort had been a fixture of island life since Pohnpei’s 
earliest settlement, and as a result Pohnpeians and the region’s outer Islanders maintained 
a range of strategies to mitigate their impacts. Pohnpei’s intricately multicropped 
agroforests intentionally incorporated as many unique cultivars of major crops as possible, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ruth Van Cleve, Director of the Office of Territories in Washington, happened to be on Saipan during 
Typhoon Jean, and cabled this message back to her office. “District Digest.” Micronesian Reporter XVI, 
no. 2 (1968), 42; “Ponape Hit by Lola’s High Wind and Waves.” Highlights (June 15, 1972), 1. 
18 “Briefly.” Highlights (October 15, 1973), 7; “Relocation to Ponape Planned.” Highlights (June 1, 1977), 
5. 
19 “Rev. Jim Stehr in His Second Year as Director.” News of PATS 1, no. 1 (Winter, 1983/84), 4; FSM 
Government Pohnpei to High Commissioner, “Drought,” 8 April 1983 in “Correspondence re Ponape’s 
governmental operations, drought & political affairs,” TTA reel 5007, 1-2. 
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providing skilled practitioners a staggered harvest schedule even through the difficult isol 
growing season. The resulting biological diversity promoted stability, making agroforests 
more resistant to pests and disease and more able to stage a quick recovery after major 
disruptions.20 During the most severe disasters, stores of pit-fermented breadfruit (mahr) 
sustained households and communities until agroforests began to bear again.21 Outer 
atolls maintained inter-island ties for trade and mutual assistance, and kept such close 
watch over their agricultural resources that dying patriarchs commonly divided the 
branches of household breadfruit trees among their offspring.22 Yet disaster recovery 
could still be perilous. A typhoon that struck Mokil around 1770 killed numerous 
Mokilese outright, sparked a deadly famine, and then led to several intentional killings. 
The same storm probably caused the near-complete depopulation of Pingelap, leaving as 
few as nine people remaining on the atoll.23    
Added to these risks were more novel threats to food security. In 1957, 
researchers noted an epidemic decline of breadfruit at Pingelap resulting from a 
mysterious disease that killed mature trees down to the roots. Two years later, with most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Bill Raynor. Agroforestry Systems in Pohnpei - Practices and Strategies for Development. (Kolonia, 
Pohnpei: College of Micronesia Land Grant Programs, 1991), 28, 34. 
21 Mahr could be fermented in smaller household pits or in larger community pits. Some of these communal 
pits held as many as 10,000 fruits at a time. The archaeological presence of breadfruit pits on Pohnpei dates 
back 1,600 years. Kitti oral historian Pensile Lawrence has suggested that there was a sharp decline in mahr 
production during Pohnpei’s Japanese occupation. Maureece J. Levin. “Breadfruit Fermentation in 
Pohnpei, Micronesia: Site Formation, Archaeological Visibility, and Interpretive Strategies.” Journal of 
Island and Coastal Archaeology 12, no. 4 (2017), 2-3; See also: Diane Ragone and Bill Raynor, 
“Breadfruit and Its Traditional Cultivation,” in Ethnobotany of Pohnpei, ed. Michael Balick. (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 2009), 80-83; Jennifer Atchley and Paul Alan Cox. “Breadfruit Fermentation 
in Micronesia.” Economic Botany 3, no. 3 (1985), 333. 
22 Damian Sohl describes this method of leaving portions of live breadfruit trees to descendants as “a 
traditional method of food security.” Shimizu, “Chiefdom and the Spatial Classification,” 153; Damian 
Sohl. Interview by author. Kolonia, Pohnpei, 21 October, 2014. 
23 David Damas. Bountiful Island: A Study of Land Tenure on a Micronesian Atoll. (Waterloo, Ontario: 
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1994), 21; Dirk H.R. Spenneman. Typhoons in Micronesia. (Saipan: 
Division of Historic Preservation, 2004), 77; Joseph E. Weckler. Land and Livelihood on Mokil: An Atoll in 
the Eastern Carolines, Part I. (Washington: Pacific Science Board, 1949), 52-53. 
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of the atoll’s mature breadfruit trees bare and blackened, breadfruit had become so rare 
that families were reserving it for their children and some Pingelapese wondered aloud 
whether God knew that “we cannot live without breadfruit.” After burning through the 
atoll, the “Pingelap disease” dissipated, leaving younger trees mercifully unharmed. But 
between 1960 and 1966, the disease jumped to the Marshalls, then to the Marianas, then 
to American Samoa, and then to Kiribati.24 By 1968, High Commissioner William 
Norwood was warning of “grave threats” posed by the loss of some 250,000 trees across 
the affected area, and “virtually complete losses” of breadfruit on some Marshallese 
atolls and on Guam, whose large stands of dying breadfruit researchers said resembled a 
fire-ravaged forest from the air. The scale of the crisis seemed to demand a proportionate 
administrative response, which in turn seemed to vindicate the presence of some colonial 
or other strong federal authority: costly agricultural research, strictly enforced quarantine 
regulations, and formal entreaties to the South Pacific Commission and U.N. 
Development Programme for technical assistance.25 
But even as they welcomed outside technical assistance and improvements in 
disaster relief, many Pohnpeians continued to view agroforests as guarantors of their 
island’s long-term food security, pillars of their subsistence and prestige economies, and 
a foundation of their collective identities and political autonomy. Throughout the post-
Eisenhower era, this underlying conservatism repeatedly clashed with the regime’s 
economic development planning, and particularly with the sweeping development reports 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 D. Zaiger and G.A. Zentmyer. “Epidemic Decline of Breadfruit in the Pacific Islands.” FAO Plant 
Protection Bulletin 15, no. 2 (April 1967), 25; D. Zaiger, “The Tree of Life is Dying.” Micronesian 
Reporter XV, no. 1 (March-April 1967): 31. 
25 William Norwood to Ruth Van Cleve. January 16, 1968. “General correspondence regarding Pingelap 
breadfruit diseases project,” TTA, reel 501, 1; Zaiger and Zentmyer, “Epidemic Decline of Breadfruit,” 25; 
D. Zaiger, “The Tree of Life is Dying.” Micronesian Reporter XV, no. 1 (March-April 1967), 34. 
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it solicited from outside consultants. Few of these development experts were as forthright 
as the agriculturalist who insisted in 1969 that “we may not have true farming on Ponape 
until the people are starving or there is an overpopulation of the land,” evoking the 
radical development schemes and hostility to agroforestry of Japanese and German rule.26  
Yet the era’s development proposals were sweeping, and many promised complete 
overhauls of the island, from the bottom up.   
In 1966, for instance, Robert R. Nathan Associates comprehensively targeted the 
territory’s “underdevelopment” in a proposal likely informed by the firm’s work in places 
like South Korea. There, its distillation of the consensus view on economic planning in 
the 1950s had become the “touchstone for all development activities.”27 In the Trust 
Territory, however, that institutional knowledge repeatedly led Nathan Associates to 
development schemes that targeted local subsistence economies with impressive 
precision, and perhaps to a failure to consider the cascading impacts “maximizing 
development” might have on island cultures, political systems, health, and human 
relationships as well. This maximalist approach found its adherents among Americans 
and Islanders alike. But opponents, like the American official who declared the Nathan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 At times, Pohnpeians have expressed this same sentiment, as a joke. Glenn Petersen recalls being told by 
a state legislator, tongue-in-cheek, that “the only way to foster economic development on Ponape would be 
to chop down all the breadfruit trees, thus forcing people to work for a living.” Nat J. Colletta. “Economic 
Survey: Ponape Island, Eastern Caroline Is.” n.p., 1969. Pacific Collection, University of Hawai’i at 
Manoa, 7. Petersen, “Cultural Analysis of the Ponapean Independence Vote,” 20. 
27 As in Korea, Nathan Associates’ recommendations for the Trust Territory focused on economic 
modernization and encouraging more widespread participation in capitalist consumption and production. 
The firm proposed to offer Micronesians “expanded opportunities to participate more fully in modern 
economic life – as employees and employers, as farmers and consumers, as investors and owners, and 
contributors and beneficiaries.” David Ekbladh. The Great American Mission: Modernization and the 
Construction of an American World Order. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 139; Robert R. 
Nathan Associates, Inc. Economic Development Plan for Micronesia: A Proposed Long-Range Plan for 
Developing the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Part I. (Washington: Robert R. Nathan Associates, 
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plan a recipe for “comprehensive, manipulated revolution,” helped ensure that no 
consulting firm ever saw its development proposals fully implemented as policy.28 
Agriculturalists’ persistent efforts to revive Pohnpei’s prewar rice paddies 
revealed the radical consequences that could result from these seemingly anodyne 
development proposals. No longer intended to support a settler population or Japanize the 
landscape, the postwar iteration of Pohnpei rice promised to provide cash to farmers, 
reduce the flow of one of the island’s largest imports and, by supplying other districts, 
boost the food self-sufficiency of the entire territory.29 In fact, American officials had 
envisioned replanting Pohnpei’s paddies even before the first U.S. troops crossed its reef, 
with the Navy’s initial plan of occupation warning that excessive imports might someday 
produce an “unbalanced economy” there.30 But Pohnpei rice did not resurface until 1963, 
with an initial pilot project at Sapwalap. The next few years then saw a flurry of activity: 
new yield and test trials at the Kolonia agriculture station, rice specialists arriving from 
Okinawa and the Philippines, and Pohnpeians enrolling in intensive agriculture training 
in Taiwan. By 1966, there were 12 acres of rice in production across the island.31 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Peter Hill. Comments on Nathan Report. Truk Education Department, 1966, Pacific Collection, 
University of Hawai’i at Manoa, A2: 2.  
29 Japan’s paddy cultivation had, of course, relied heavily on forced labor. Yet a barely concealed 
enthusiasm for this style of rice production ran through American planning materials. A preliminary 1962 
feasibility study recommended reclaiming abandoned prewar paddies, planting them with seed, fertilizer, 
and equipment imported from Japan, and “implementing the Japanese intensive form of culture and 
processing” there. Manuel Sproat. “Rice Production Program for Ponape District.” November 5, 1962, in 
“Correspondence, study proposal on rice and its development in Ponape,” TTA, reel 236, 1, 10-16. 
30 U.S. Navy Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area, “Sub-Area IV – Eastern Carolines: Agriculture” in Plan 
for the Occupation and Naval Government of Pacific Island Areas, 1945. Pacific Collection, University of 
Hawai’i at Manoa, 7. 
31 M.W. Goding to District Administrator, Ponape, May 9, 1962 in “Correspondence, study proposal on rice 
and its development in Ponape,” TTA, reel 236; Manuel Sproat, “State of the District Message,” April 28, 
1966 in “Correspondences, Laws & Resolutions Passed by Ponape District Legislature, 2nd thru 10th 
session,” TTA reel 11 [frame 276], 4; Malcolm G. Cook to Y. Baron Goto, February 17, 1967 in 
“Correspondence, study proposal on rice and its development in Ponape,” TTA, reel 236. 
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In 1968, the Trust Territory brought Hawai’i-based American Factors Associates 
to Pohnpei to draft a comprehensive rice feasibility study. The firm declared up to 1,000 
acres suitable for cultivation, but warned that production costs would be prohibitively 
high without mechanized farming. Among its specific proposals was a plan to quickly 
clear large areas using aircraft or tractor sprayers loaded with 2-4-5T, a now-banned 
herbicide that was also a main ingredient of Agent Orange. When sprayed over rice-
producing areas in Nett, the study promised, 2-4-5T “could kill almost everything and the 
mass of organic matter would burn.” The consequences for public health and agroforestry 
can only be imagined, but the firm’s other prescriptions would have had widespread 
impacts as well, from road construction and irrigation projects to the extensive use of 
commercial fertilizers and pesticides.32   
The American Factors proposal was never fully implemented, but by 1975 a 
series of false starts, setbacks, blunders, and partial victories had brought agriculturalists 
to two large government paddy sites in Lukop and Nett. Brimming with optimism that 
their 228 acres would yield 300 tons of rice annually within two years, they deployed 
wide-track bulldozers for grading and watched as ditching dynamite sent earth and stone 
flying 400 feet skyward, gouging out drainage canals below.33 But even here, results fell 
short. By 1983, the now-independent Pohnpei State government was condemning this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 American Factors Associates, Limited. Proposal for a Survey to Determine the Feasibility of 
Commercial Rice Production on Ponape, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in “Correspondence, study 
proposal on rice and its development in Ponape,” TTA, reel 236. June 1968, 1-7. 
33 James Hiyane. “Ponape Rice Project Nears Completion.” Micronesian Reporter XXIII, no. 4. (1975, 
Fourth Quarter), 24. 
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project too as an “expensive failure,” and then in the next breath musing over how to 
revive Pohnpei rice properly, perhaps by bringing in Southeast Asian laborers.34  
Postwar Pohnpei rice was no clear-cut colonial scheme. Its seductive power was 
broad, and its promise to reduce the need for external resources found adherents within 
the independence movement and Trust Territory administration alike.35 Ultimately, 
however, even Pohnpei’s political leaders may not have fully grasped the scale of the 
demands rice placed on farmers, its long-term environmental and political impacts, or the 
challenges it faced on the local market. District agriculturalist James Hiyane finally 
concluded that Pohnpei rice should never have been revived in the first place. The 
constant attention rice demands, he concluded, isolates farmers, “interferes with local 
culture” and, if production is to be maximized, diverts cash away from family and 
community and toward commercial fertilizers and pesticides.36 Bermin Weilbacher 
recalls that when he served as Pohnpei’s district administrator “the problem was getting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Ponape State Government. Ponape State Development Plan (1985-1989). (Kolonia, Pohnpei: Ponape 
State Government, 1983), 165. 
35 Prominent politicians like Bethwel Henry and Olter Paul frequently spoke in favor of commercial rice 
production, and both the Ponape District Legislature and Congress of Micronesia appropriated funds to 
support it throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In 1968, Bethwel Henry told the Rotary Club of Saipan that 
Pohnpei held 4,000 acres of potential rice-producing land, and noted that replacing Pohnpei’s rice imports 
would bring the island’s farmers over $200,000 annually. The following year, Olter Paul wrote territorial 
agriculture director Manuel Sproat to advocate for enhanced rice training, noting that rice had “the potential 
of being a major contributor to the economy of Ponape, perhaps… the whole territory through the 
elimination of imported rice.” Legislative appropriations included a $59,000 bill introduced into the 
Congress of Micronesia by Heinrich Iriarte in 1969, a 1970 allocation by the Ponape District Legislature 
for $4,800, and a large portion of the $300,000 designated for commercial crops in the early 1970s as part 
of the Ponape Capital Improvement Project. Bethwel Henry to Rotary Club of Saipan, Royal Taga Hotel, 
1968 July 23 in Public Speeches: The Congress of Micronesia, July-August 1968. (Saipan: Office of the 
Legislative Counsel, 1968), 39; Olter Paul to Manuel Sproat. 20 August, 1969 in “Correspondence, study 
proposal on rice and its development in Ponape,” TTA, reel 236; “Rice Bill,” Senyavin Times III, no. 17. 
Kolonia, Pohnpei. (1969 July 28), 10; “An Act establishing an appropriation to supplement the General 
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1970.” Second Ponape District Legislature, Fifth Regular Session, 1970. 
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and 9 and Act #68,” reel 2049, TTA; “Ponape Rice and Commercial Crop Project,” 1971 September 30, in 
“Ponape Rice Project,” TTA reel 201, 1. 
36 James Hiyane. Interview by author. Kolonia, Pohnpei, 14 March 2015. 
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[farmers] to live on an acre” adjacent to the paddy, and marketing a local rice whose taste, 
texture, and color consumers judged inferior to California rice.37 As a result, few farmers 
adopted rice as a permanent crop, or volunteered to settle on government paddies.38 
The appeal monocrops like rice, cacao, or pepper held for politicians, American 
officials, and independence advocates never fully resonated with Pohnpei’s farmers, for 
whom the benefits of full-time cash income rarely outweighed the risks of abandoning 
time-tested, breadfruit-anchored agroforestry. In fact, only cash crops adaptable to 
agroforestry, like copra or sakau, have ever maintained a lasting presence on the island. 
But even as Pohnpei rejected rice cultivation, it embraced imported rice. By the end of 
the 1970s, the growth of wage labor and federal programs arguably made rice a truly 
widespread staple on the island for the first time.39 Increasingly, imported rice and canned 
foods appeared reliable enough to weather natural disasters, convenient enough to 
overtake local food like breadfruit in ease of preparation, and palatable enough to fuel the 
body for prestige production or office work. But it was a series of USDA feeding 
initiatives aimed at schoolchildren, the elderly, disaster victims, and the needy that most 	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rice marketed in stores with special instructions on how to prepare it “so it didn’t turn to mush.” Damian 
Sohl recalled that Miracle Rice “doesn’t match the taste that Pohnpeian are used to,” continuing, “I hope 
we’re not brainwashed, but my father was a teacher during the Japanese time, and he speaks favorably 
about Japanese rice. He told me Japan produced the best rice in the world, and I believe that, because I 
think the country spent a lot of resources doing research and they’ve been planting rice for centuries.” 
Bermin Weilbacher. Interview by author. Kolonia, Pohnpei, 14 December 2014; Robinson Frederick. 
Interview by author. Honolulu, Hawai’i, July 7, 2014; Ken Rehg. Interview by author. Honolulu, Hawai’i, 
July 14, 2014; Damian Sohl. Interview by author. Kolonia, Pohnpei, 21 October, 2014. 
38 Adelino Lorens. Interview by author. Kolonia, Pohnpei, 5 March, 2015. 
39 Lois Englberger, Geoffrey C. Marks, and Maureen H. Fitzgerald. “Insights on Food and Nutrition in the 
Federated States of Micronesia: A Review of the Literature.” Public Health Nutrition 6, no. 1 (2003), 6. 
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urgently evoked anxieties over food security, tensions over food sovereignty, and fears of 
“dependency” as Pohnpei hurtled toward political independence.  
 
 
Indispensible hazards: school lunches and disaster relief 
 
 As a child in the 1950s, Damian Sohl made the long walk home from his Kolonia 
school every afternoon, hungry. Passing through the Panuelo land opposite Sokehs Island, 
he and his classmates scavenged amid the coconut groves, cracking open young coconuts 
and poaching fallen mangoes. “My parents were not educated to understand that we need 
to have our stomachs filled so that we can learn,” he recalls. “So they would send us to 
school and hope we survived walking home after.” Gesturing toward the Panuelo 
property, he continued, “we survived on this land.”40 In the past, most of Pohnpei’s 
children had the freedom to forage for snacks when hungry and eat what they chose. But 
in the pre-Kennedy Trust Territory, public schools could neither allow children to roam 
free nor provide them with lunch. As a result, schools dismissed in the early afternoon, 
putting aside whatever community-donated produce or C-rations they happened to have 
to feed the rural and outer Islander students in their dormitories. 
 By 1975, things had changed. That year, as a classroom teacher in Sokehs Powe, 
Sohl saw the U.S. National School Lunch Program enter his own school, and witnessed 
its overwhelming popularity with both students and parents. But then, just a decade later, 
Sohl himself was tasked with terminating the program in his role as Director of Education 
for Pohnpei State. He then saw that popularity turn to wrath. “I couldn’t walk at night 
here,” he recalls. “People hated me... we had meetings around the island, and people used 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Damian Sohl. Interview by author. Kolonia, Pohnpei, 21 October, 2014. 
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nasty language. To me. They said, ‘why can’t you be a responsible director and do 
something about keeping the school lunch program?’” Sohl had explained that any 
administrator would want to keep the USDA lunches, but the resources were no longer 
there. In a post-independence state, he argued, “It is better that we continue to cut the 
umbilical cord right now, because the longer we stay on… when they stop it many of us 
are going to die from starvation.”41 But even without funding to restore it, the shuttered 
school lunch program has remained a simmering political issue on the island ever since.42 
The politics of the Trust Territory’s school lunches were explosive, their ties to 
children and food rendering them just as persistently popular and “fraught with powerful 
cultural and symbolic significance” as they were in the United States.43 But the territory’s 
other federal feeding programs could be political minefields as well, from disaster relief 
aimed at the desperate to anti-poverty initiatives that promised to feed anyone who met 
U.S. income guidelines, indefinitely. Participation in these programs peaked as the 
territory’s independence movement reached its climax. USDA food therefore became 
invested with enormous meaning in the islands, appearing at turns compassionate and 
menacing, indispensible and corrosive. On Pohnpei, the feeding programs also unmasked 
abiding food security anxieties at a moment of rapid economic and political change, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Damian Sohl. Interview by author. Kolonia, Pohnpei, 21 October, 2014. 
42 In Pohnpei’s 2007 gubernatorial election, for instance, John Ehsa campaigned on the reestablishment of 
the school lunch program as a cornerstone of his economic development strategy. According to the 
Kaselehlie Press, Ehsa suggested that “local farmers and fishermen would have no problem selling their 
produce with a school lunch program for 8,000 students. If Pohnpei State, every Tuesday, put one banana 
on a plate for each student, farmers will sell 8,000 bananas. This will, if Pohnpei can afford it, redistribute 
the wealth down to the grass roots.” Lacking the substantial resources necessary to revive the program, 
however, Pohnpei State never fully reintroduced it during Ehsa’s terms in office. Instead, public school 
lunches on the island since the early 1990s have been more limited, usually consisting of rice and some 
type of soup. Bill Jaynes, “Candidates Answer Questions and State Their Views.” Kaselehlie Press 7, no. 
24, October 31, 2007, 9; Bill Jaynes, “Pohnpei Legislature investigates Governor’s School Lunch program 
spending.” Kaselelhlie Press 10, no. 9, March 31, 2010, 1, 5.  
43 Susan Levine, School Lunch Politics: The Surprising History of America’s Favorite Welfare Program 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 3. 
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played a critical role in democratizing access to a previously exclusive import-based diet: 
one that promised to dislodge breadfruit as the foundation of Pohnpei’s food security 
strategy and replace it with ubiquitous, 50-pound sacks of imported rice.  
The food that flooded into the Trust Territory during the 1970s was rooted in 
longstanding U.S. government efforts to find an outlet for America’s surplus agricultural 
commodities. Depression-era efforts to aid struggling farmers through commodity 
supports and technical assistance had first diverted surplus food into American school 
lunchrooms, and by the 1950s the USDA was also sending large quantities of food 
abroad as foreign aid. As historian Susan Levine suggests, by the Kennedy era food was a 
“staple in Cold War diplomatic strategy” with “shipments of wheat, corn, and other 
commodities [serving] as symbols of American democracy and prosperity, shoring up 
regimes threatened by internal revolutionary movements and external Soviet support.”44 
But USDA food was also finding new uses at home, as Washington diverted the nation’s 
growing agricultural surplus into their domestic welfare programs. By the early 1970s, 
USDA food could be found everywhere from school lunchrooms and foreign aid 
shipments to summer camps, day cares, hospitals, charities, disaster relief agencies, 
Meals on Wheels, homes for the aged, elderly group dining programs, and supplemental 
food programs for women and children.45  
In the Trust Territory, these foods made their first intermittent appearances in 
institutional meals during the 1950s. In the 1958-59 academic year, for instance, Palau’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Levine, School Lunch Politics, 46, 107. 
45 Edward J. Hekman, “Statement by Edward J. Hekman, Administrator, Food and Nutrition Service United 
States Department of Agriculture before the General Subcommittee on Education House Education and 
Labor Committee, April 22, 1974” in “Correspondence and related documents regarding all the federal 
categorical assistance programs such as Hill-Burton, Economic Opportunity and USDA food programs.” 
TTA reel 1456, 1-3. 
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schools received 13,900 pounds of rice, 8,800 pounds of flour, 1,196 pounds of dried 
skim milk, 1,664 pounds of butter, and 170 pounds of cheese through the Donated 
Commodities Program. Along with community-donated local foods and the 4,000 pounds 
of produce harvested from school farms, Palau thereby reduced its costs to between three 
and eight cents per meal, a savings that one administrator marveled “seems 
unbelievable.”46 Pohnpei participated in the program as well, and by the early 1960s its 
schools and hospitals were receiving staples like rice, flour, milk, butter, cheese, and eggs 
and, occasionally, items like peanut butter, poultry, and meat.47 
Pohnpei’s education officials and administrators had been calling for healthy, 
locally sourced institutional meals throughout the 1950s, advocating for local foods in 
school lunches, reductions in rice imports, and “an improved dietary program among the 
indigenous people.”48 But the cost reductions donated foods offered were hard to resist, 
especially given the enthusiasm with which the Kennedy and Johnson administrations 
were pushing American food into “underdeveloped” areas. In 1963, for instance, the 
Ponape-per carried a Thanksgiving message from U.S. Agriculture Secretary Orville 
Freeman that praised the Food for Peace program for showing the world “what free men 
in a free society can achieve to secure the blessings of abundance.” Freeman then 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Heinz E. Meyer to Robert Gibson. September 10, 1959. Robert E. Gibson Papers, Box 10, Folder 109, 2; 
See: Art Wolfe to Robert Gibson. September 16, 1959. Robert E. Gibson Papers, Box 10, Folder 109, 1. 
47 “Freeman Cites President’s Goal of Redoubled Food Drive to Aid Needy.” Ponape-per 5, no. 51. 
December 20, 1963, 6; George Bussell to Hq. Hospital Administrator. “USDA Food Distribution to TT 
Hospitals.” November 29, 1978 in “Corres. Meetings, Report and Other Information Regarding TT Wide 
Food Service Program, 1977-1979” TTA, reel 208.  
48 “District Administrator’s Speech to Ponape District Congress, Delivered March 16, 1960” in 
“Correspondence, Laws, & Resolutions Passed by Ponape & District Legislature 2nd Thru 10th Session,” 
TTA, reel 11, 5-6; Ponape District Congress, Doadoahk: Kelimau en Ponape District Congress, October 
17 to November 4, 1960, (Ponape District: Education Department, 1960), 3; “Education Conference, March 
12-21, 1961, Saipan, Mariana Islands. Recommendations and Appendices,” Trust Territory Education 
Materials, Pacific Collection, University of Hawai’i at Manoa, Folder 12, 17-18. 
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enjoined Americans to be grateful for the agricultural productivity “which has made this 
Nation the best fed at the lowest real cost in all history.”49 An “acute” rice shortage on 
Pohnpei the following year, and administrators’ unsuccessful attempts to alleviate it by 
illegally rationing USDA rice to government workers, suggests how easily abstract 
administrative commitments to food self-sufficiency and nutrition fell away in this 
political environment, even in the face of limited, temporary incidences of hunger.50 
The Trust Territory’s growing tendency to overwhelm hunger with government 
aid, particularly after natural disasters, linked Freeman’s framing of a free America 
standing against global hunger and Communism directly to Islanders’ food security 
anxieties. Whereas the territory’s Japanese and German regimes had deployed emergency 
food rations conservatively, in the post-Eisenhower era those provisions began to seem 
inexhaustible.51 Those affected mostly received the food gratefully, as gifts of a wealthy 
power generously given. But for others, disaster relief provoked a range of objections, 
from the duration of their use to their deployment where damage seemed minimal. 
Anthropologist Vern Carroll, living on Nukuoro after a 1963 tidal wave that inundated 
the atoll’s taro patch, protested that emergency rations were doing more harm than the 
disaster itself. He told journalist E.J. Kahn that Nukuoroans were “open[ing] cans of 
peanut butter” rather than rebuilding the taro patch, and later puzzled over the seeming 
contradiction between Nukuoro’s abundant resources and his impression that “in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 “Freeman Cites President’s Goal of Redoubled Food Drive to Aid Needy.” Ponape-per 5, no. 51. 
December 20, 1963, 6. 
50 “Sohte Rais.” Ponape-per 6, no 10. March 6, 1964, 6. 
51 After a 1927 storm in Palau, for instance, the Nan’yō’chō disbursed funds for immediate food and shelter 
needs, but then encouraged Islanders to make special plantings of sweet potatoes, yams, tapioca, papaya, 
bananas, and other crops on ¼ acre of their land. According to the regime, within four months the potatoes 
and tapioca were ready for harvest and government food relief was no longer necessary. South Seas 
Government. Annual Report to the League of Nations on the Administration of the South Sea Islands Under 
Japanese Mandate. (Tōkyō: Japanese Government, 1927), 131. 
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minds of the natives… a shortage of food is always imminent.”52 In later years, 
anthropologists like Mac Marshall recognized that “totally self-sufficient” island societies 
were a “well nurtured myth,” but did object to the territory’s “indiscriminate” distribution 
of relief supplies and their potential to deepen economic and political dependency.53  
Increasingly, it was local politicians who grappled with these issues, as the 
territory’s “Micronesianization” policy began elevating Islanders to positions of 
executive authority.54 Leaders like Bermin Weilbacher, who held various roles at the top 
of Pohnpei’s executive branch through the 1970s and 1980s, therefore found themselves 
standing between food security and food sovereignty concerns on the one hand and the 
tense politics of U.S. welfare policy on the other. After one typhoon, Weilbacher 
accompanied an American agriculturalist on an island-wide survey to determine relief 
needs. “We went to a funeral,” Weilbacher recalls, “and we see all the rice packed in 
aluminum foil… all over. And he looked and said, ‘no way you’re going to get USDA 
food.’” With America’s own racialized debates over who “deserved” government food 
aid playing in the background, Weilbacher viewed this conspicuous feasting as “almost 
like an insult,” and was embarrassed by frequent territory-wide reports of Islanders 
selling disaster provisions as well. But he was also a fierce advocate for Pohnpei’s food 
sovereignty, a defender of disaster relief when needs were high, and mindful that “it was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 E.J. Kahn, Jr. A Reporter in Micronesia. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1966), 166, 183; Vern 
Carroll. “Nukuoro Kinship.” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1966), 16. 
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Organization 35, no. 3 (1979), 267. 
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Micronesian Assistant District Administrator in 1964. Francis X. Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land: A 
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very rude to reject” disaster aid, suggesting he understood the entangled politics of food 
gifts in a way many American officials did not.55 
Disaster relief and school feeding programs ultimately penetrated into the 
territory’s food systems just as deeply as wage work, which in the post-Eisenhower era 
shifted labor from farm and fishery into offices at an increasingly rapid rate. As a student 
at Sokehs Powe Elementary in the 1970s, for instance, Alice Ehmes chose the status-
leveling sociability of free school lunches rather than eating at her own home just two 
doors down. The USDA lunches combined familiar rice and meats with exotic foods like 
powdered milk, peanut butter, and canned peaches.56 “That’s where I developed a taste 
for corn,” Ehmes recalls, “I still eat corn, like I prefer corn to anything else, and I guess it 
was just from that time.” The lunches left fond memories, but she stresses that the stakes 
were higher for some of her classmates, for whom a school lunch may have been their 
only “full meal” of the day.57 In later years, leaders like Damian Sohl came to believe 
these USDA lunches were “taking the responsibility away from parents to feed their kids.” 
Anthropologist Martha Ward went even farther, declaring the program “haunting” and 
accusing it of creating a generation of children who preferred white bread and rice to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Bermin Weilbacher. Interview by author. Kolonia, Pohnpei, 14 December, 2014. 
56 In theory, these USDA lunches met the standards of “Pacific Type A” meals, a region-specific adaptation 
of the Type A lunches served in domestic U.S. classrooms during the 1970s. In practice, a range of 
procurement, transportation, and spoilage issues created more variation in the content of USDA meals from 
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57 Alice Ehmes currently lives on Pohnpei, but has also lived in Oregon and on Oahu. She has taught at the 
College of Micronesia, worked for Pohnpei State’s Department of Economic Affairs, and worked with the 
Children’s Health Project at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa. Alice Ehmes. Interview by author. 
Honolulu, Hawai’i. 18 June, 2014. 
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breadfruit and yams, as healthy local foods “rotted on the ground.”58 But its appeal amid 
the rapid changes to Pohnpei’s economy and broader food system is hardly surprising. 
In fact, as Ehmes shared USDA lunches with her classmates, the eating habits of 
her Pingelapese parents and grandparents were diverging as well. Her grandparents 
supported themselves by farming crops like taro, bananas, coconuts, and Polynesian 
chestnuts (mworopw) in the forest and uplands, and by relying on her grandfather’s early 
morning canoe fishing. Meanwhile, her father found a job in Kolonia and her mother 
began to shop at Ambrose, Pohnpei’s first American-style grocery store. The imported 
foods available from Ambrose were, Ehmes believes, “just a matter of convenience” for 
her mother, though they offered the added security of “having the food right there” as 
well. Similar divergences were taking place all over the island, as younger and wealthier 
Islanders made rice the foundation of their daily eating, then often retained it indefinitely.  
Musing over the “really bad” eating decisions of her adulthood, Ehmes admits she 
prefers breadfruit, but more often chooses rice.59 But, particularly for those who have 
circulated within the cash economy as Ehmes has, rice offers a number of clear benefits 
over breadfruit. It is a seemingly inexhaustible, non-seasonal commodity that is 
inexpensive in terms of both cash and labor and, in addition, offers a baseline access to 
the prestige associated with cash wealth on an island where prestige is critical. Those 
benefits took center stage in one of the Trust Territory’s most heated public debates, 
staged over an aid initiative that never actually reached Pohnpei: the Needy Family 
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59 Alice Ehmes. Interview by author. Honolulu, Hawai’i. 18 June, 2014. 
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Feeding Program. A particularly awkward fit between U.S. welfare policy and island 
food systems, Needy Family struck a nerve both in the islands and the United States. 
 
 
Rice politics: the Needy Family Feeding Program  
 
Aimed at adults as well as children, at the comfortable as well as the hungry, and 
appearing when the chance to recover Pohnpei’s sovereignty was most at hand, Needy 
Family was the Trust Territory’s most controversial, and most political, feeding program. 
Adopting U.S. poverty guidelines, the program classified nearly everyone in the territory 
as poor, and therefore potentially eligible for indefinite supplies of USDA food. Needy 
Family caused alarm among food sovereignty advocates and administration officials alike. 
But it also found fervent supporters, both in the two districts where it was implemented, 
and on islands like Pohnpei where it was not. As the territory moved steadily from the 
1969 convening of the Congress of Micronesia’s Future Political Status Commission to 
the formation of the Federated States of Micronesia in 1978, Needy Family became 
Pohnpei’s most urgent, most revealing site of encounter between the island’s food 
sovereignty roots, elected political system, and the deepening reach of its rice revolution. 
Throughout the independence process, Pohnpeians joined a traditional ethic of 
autonomy and self-care to American advocacy for self-sufficiency, maintaining a food 
sovereignty formulation that guided them through the complex negotiations and 
plebiscites of the 1970s and 1980s. Yet, anthropologist Glenn Petersen’s assertion that 
these food sovereignty principles also led Pohnpeians to “refuse to accept the free food” 
from the USDA is misleading.60 Not only was there an impressive groundswell of support 	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for bringing Needy Family to Pohnpei, most of the officials at territorial headquarters 
were much less enthusiastic over the program than the man who became its public face, 
the bombastic Food Services Officer George Bussell. In fact, Bussell’s attacks on 
Micronesian leaders and assertions that Islanders “can’t survive by themselves” set up a 
binary opposition between American officials and independence advocates that never 
accurately reflected Needy Family’s reception on the ground.61  
 The Needy Family Feeding Program was deeply rooted in domestic U.S. politics, 
and never intended for export. For years, anti-poverty and civil rights activists had sought 
to equalize access to federal welfare programs, which had often been administered 
capriciously by state and local officials, and in 1965 successful secured the creation of a 
federal poverty line. When the Nixon administration embarked on an “unprecedented 
expansion” of federal food and nutrition programs, those national poverty standards then 
helped limit the exclusion of minorities like African Americans from federal food 
assistance. USDA commodities increasingly reached low-income households and the 
institutions that served them in the United States, but began to appear with growing 
frequency in the Trust Territory as well. There, the poverty line was neither equipped to 
assess local food needs nor could it be reconfigured to account for the abundance of food 
produced through farming and fishing, still the lifeblood of the territory.62  
Needy Family first appeared in the Trust Territory in 1971 at Kili, the small, 
inhospitable island in the Marshalls that served as the temporary home of Bikini Atoll’s 
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nuclear exiles. After two decades of deprivations and relocations, the Bikinians were 
undergoing another period of “extreme food shortage,” and territorial headquarters 
submitted a federal application for Needy Family to alleviate it. Procedures required the 
territory apply as a whole, and thus when Kili was approved every other district became 
eligible as well, subject to review by headquarters.63 Just one year later, citing typhoon-
related crops damage and nutritional deficiencies among children, officials in the 
Northern Marianas secured Needy Family for their entire district, where it reached 80% 
participation by the end of the decade. In 1977, typhoon damage brought Needy Family 
to Chuuk’s outer islands as well, and then to Chuuk Lagoon the following year.64  
The scale of these Needy Family distributions quickly raised eyebrows. On Chuuk, 
Xavier High School students and their American teacher produced a short film aimed at 
documenting its impact. They interviewed businesspeople who worried over “dramatic” 
declines in food sales and noted increases in sales of building materials, boats, and cars. 
They also conducted a short survey that indicated slight declines in farming and fishing. 
The end of the film features two Chuukese men eating from cans of corned beef. One 
tells the camera, “What are we to say about this USDA Needy Family food program? If 
we didn’t have this food we would not be alive today. This food is very delicious. If it 
were not for this USDA Needy Family Food Program I don’t think any of us would be 
alive today.” Continuing their effusive praise for several more minutes, the men explain 
that USDA foods are convenient to prepare, needed because “we are jobless and we don’t 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 “Feeding Program in Truk Islands,” in “Feeding Program in Truk Islands,” TTA reel 71, 1-2; “Non-TT 
Funded U.S. Federal Programs Administered by the Procurement and Supply Division,” 14 October 1971 
in “Correspondence and Comments on the Needy Household Commodities,” TTA reel 421. 
64 Elizabeth Udui, “Feeding the Multitude,” Micronesian Reporter 27, no. 1, 8-9; John C. Deleon, Henchy 
C. Bualuay, Albon J. Jelkan and Anthony N. Oiterong, “Report on the Needy Family Program on Moen,” 
Micronesian Reporter 27, no. 1 (First quarter, 1979), 14. 
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have enough to eat,” enable them to farm and gather firewood, and allow the elderly to 
avoid “picking out the bones from our local fish.” They then ask the filmmakers to “tell 
the U.S. government to extend this program until we die,” neatly framing Needy Family 
as both a long-term food security solution and a remedy to the failures of U.S.-led 
economic development.65  
As the magnitude of Needy Family’s potential economic, social, and political 
repercussions became clear, widely circulated accounts of Islanders feeding USDA food 
to pigs and Chuuk apparently approving more than 41,000 applications to feed 36,000 
people were fueling a broad political backlash.66 Over the next several years, that 
backlash grew. On the floor of the Congress of Micronesia, legislators protested that 
USDA commodities would swing votes away from independence, or hinder the transition 
to self-rule.67 Members of Hawaii’s congressional delegation investigated Needy 
Family’s economic impact on the territory and their own constituents.68 Importers and 
local merchants grew distressed over USDA foods monopolizing cargo space and 
displacing their products.69 The American media attacked the unrestrained growth of 
domestic feeding programs, even to islands that appeared to have no need of them.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Eric Metzgar. The USDA Needy Family Food Program in Truk, 1978-1979. Triton Films, 1979; 
Micronesian Seminar, US Federal Programs in Micronesia: A Report on a Conference Sponsored by 
Micronesian Seminar, Kolonia, Ponape March 12-14, 1979, 18. 
66 John C. Deleon, Henchy C. Bualuay, Albon J. Jelkan and Anthony N. Oiterong, “Report on the Needy 
Family Program on Moen,” Micronesian Reporter 27, no. 1 (First quarter, 1979), 14. 
67 William D. Jackson to All Federal Program Managers, 1978 March 23 in “State Plan of Nutrition 
Operations Under the Provisions of the National School Lunch Act and the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 as 
Amended Dealing with TTPI and CNMI for Fiscal Year 1979” TTA, reel 512, 2.  
68 Daniel K. Inouye to Ruth Van Cleve, March 26, 1979 in “Feeding Program in Truk Islands,” TTA, reel 
71. 
69 Micro Congress Ponape Islands to High Commissioner. 14 November 1978 in “Corres. Meetings, Report 
and Other Information” TTA, reel 208.  
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While Micronesian critics of Needy Family often invoked the longstanding 
administrative priority of self-sufficiency, American critiques of the program were also 
tinged with fantasies of Pacific abundance and the incommensurability of those fantasies 
with racialized stereotypes of welfare users in the United States. A California-based 
exporter complained that Needy Family was not only dampening his hiring but also 
“discouraging” Islanders from work, “as if your wife were trying to keep a tight budget 
while your neighbor stole your money and invited your children to have steak and lobster 
every night.”70 60 Minutes spun a tale of “malignant generosity” in the territory, where a 
“Micronesian who is not employed and has no intention of ever being employed is 
feeding his favorite pig prime U.S. beef,” with his “unique, traditional, scattered island 
society” being treated like “Inner City, U.S.A.”71 As racial anxieties fueled the perception 
that feeding programs disproportionately favored people of color in the U.S., blowback 
against the “racial profile of public assistance” began to reach the islands as well.72  
In October of 1978, in the midst of this brewing storm and just seven months 
before the FSM inaugurated its first president, Food Services Officer George Bussell 
departed for Washington. There, he shopped a plan to expand Needy Family to the 
territory’s remaining districts. Had it been enacted, Bussell’s proposal would have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Dan R. Neblett (Albatross Trading Co.) to Cecil Andrus, 5 May 1979 in “Feeding Program in Truk 
Islands.” TTA, reel 71, 3. 
71 This 60 Minutes report circulated widely through the islands. Tourist officer Adeline Reyes, for instance, 
attacked the American media’s sensationalism in a conversation with a reporter, telling her “Did you see 
‘Sixty Minutes?’ Showed us feeding USDA food to the pigs. It’s disgusting. I’m not sure we wouldn’t be 
better off without the tourists. What do we need tourists for anyway?” The program was also said to have a 
“big impact” in Washington, where officials briefly considered stationing USDA agents in the islands to 
either purchase and distribute local food or work to increase local production. “Correspondence and the 
Transcription on Micronesia (‘Who Gives a Damn’) by the CBS’s ‘60 Minutes,’” 1980. FSM Microfilmed 
Archives, FSM National Archives, Palikir, Pohnpei [hereafter FMA], reel 29, 1-4; Ann Nakano. Broken 
Canoe: Conversations and Observations in Micronesia. (New York: University of Queensland Press, 1983), 
285-286; Linda L. Parkinson to Resio Moses. February 25, 1980 in “Corres, Reports & Other Info. T.T 
Wide Food Services.” TTA, reel 192. 
72 Levine, School Lunch Politics, 156. 
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brought feeding program spending from $8.8 to nearly $40 million annually, and enrolled 
19,800 people in Ponape District alone. Participants would have received 20 pounds of 
rice and 10 cans of evaporated milk every month, with enough flour, peanut butter, 
corned beef, margarine, butter, shortening, macaroni, and canned fruits and vegetables for 
three meals per day. On Pohnpei and its outer islands, those shipments would have 
amounted to more than 14 million pounds of food per year.73 
The plan spurred a flurry of responses. There was an “alarmed” call from the 
Department of Agriculture to the Office of Territorial Affairs over the spending increase, 
and a letter from that office to the territory’s High Commissioner calling for Needy 
Family to be “thoroughly re-evaluated” if U.S. poverty standards were delivering food to 
80% of the territory’s households.74 U.S. Ambassador Peter Rosenblatt offered his 
“dismay” over the program’s expansion and his opposition to federal programs that failed 
to contribute to Micronesian self-sufficiency.75 Leo Falcam, months away from becoming 
Pohnpei State’s first elected governor, warned that the administration was “literally going 
all out to put these programs into effect… despite repeated objections by the Congress of 
Micronesia,” and that Bussell aimed to extend Needy Family indefinitely after 
independence in the form of foreign aid.76 Yap Senator John Mangefel, referencing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Bussell’s estimates for the Ponape District excluded Kosrae, which became a separate district in 1977. 
Ruth G. Van Cleve to Adrian Winkel. October 25, 1978 in “Attorney General File – Food Services – 
General Correspondence.” TTA, reel 3820; “Related Correspondence on USDA, The Needy Family 
Feeding Program (FY 1977) and Charts Showing the Estimated Numbers of Recipients and Dollar Value of 
Commodities,” 1978. TTA, reel 429, 3. 
74 Bussell’s estimates for the Ponape District excluded Kosrae, which became a separate district in 1977. 
Ruth G. Van Cleve to Adrian Winkel, October 25, 1978 in Attorney General File – Food Services – 
General Correspondence.” TTA, reel 3820. 
75 Peter Rosenblatt to Nancy Snyder, 13 November 1978. “Attorney General File – Food Services – 
General Correspondence.” TTA, reel 3820, 3. 
76 Leo Falcam to Tosiwo Nakayama, 20 October, 1978. “Attorney General File – Food Services – General 
Correspondence.” TTA, reel 3820, 1-2. 
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Food for Peace Program, joked that “instead of only giving [USDA food] to their 
enemies like Russia and China, [the United States] is trying to give it to us,” and 
reworked the familiar warning for the Trojan Horse: “don’t look a gift horse in the mouth, 
and the stomach, too.”77 An article in the Honolulu Advertiser counterpointed Acting 
Pohnpei Governor Bermin Weilbacher’s argument that Needy Family was unwanted and 
unneeded with Bussell’s claim that ending it meant “allowing these people to die,” and 
his insistence that any local political opposition stemmed from “the old tribal system – if 
you keep them dumb, you can control the people.”78 
Bussell’s fondness for such broadsides raised Needy Family’s profile, but also 
numbered his days in the Trust Territory. In late October of 1978, the Congress of 
Micronesia’s House Committee on Education and Social Matters held public hearings on 
Pohnpei concerning the district’s feeding programs. There, Representative Kikuo Apis 
offered a sarcastic resolution proposing that Bussell be promoted to a higher position 
outside of Micronesia, while District Agriculturalist James Hiyane insisted that Pohnpei 
neither suffered from starvation, acute malnutrition, nor a shortage of arable land. But 
Resio Moses, acting as administrator for the district’s Department of Community 
Services, defended Bussell and the program, noting that Needy Family could help 
“grassroots” people divert their limited income toward necessities like school expenses or 
building materials. Further, Moses suggested, “whether the feeding program comes or not 
the people (of Ponape) will still eat rice.”79 By the end of the year, Congress of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 “Mangefel’s Last Warning,” Marianas Variety News & Views, November 10, 1978 in “Feeding Program 
in Truk Islands.” TTA, reel 71. 
78 Frederick H. Marks, “US Food for Micronesia Debatable,” Honolulu Advertiser, October 22, 1978, H-3. 
79 “Food Program Stirs Controversy.” Micronesian News Service, October 27, 1978 in “Feeding Program in 
Truk Islands.” TTA, reel 71. 
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Micronesia leadership had issued a formal protest over the “disturbing reports” of 
Bussell’s behavior, the High Commissioner promised disciplinary action, and Bussell 
submitted his resignation.80  
Bussell had compounded tensions over the territory’s feeding programs, but those 
tensions preceded and exceeded his tenure. In fact, shortly before Bussell arrived in 
Washington, the Ponape Legislature had held its own “extensive” hearings with 
community members in Kolonia and rural Pohnpei, and then passed a resolution formally 
requesting Needy Family for the district. That resolution cited “rapidly increasing costs 
of living,” “extreme scarcity of available jobs and meager wages,” “the skyrocketing rate 
of inflation far in excess of inflationary trends in the continental United States,” and the 
nutritional benefits USDA foods might offer to children.81 The nutritional arguments may 
have been specious, but the inflation and soaring food prices were real. The price of 
imported rice on Pohnpei had more than doubled in the early 1970s, and institutional 
purchasing was so expensive by 1975 that the island’s jail was forced to create a new 
“prisoners’ farm” to feed its inmates.82 Community concern over Micronesia’s post-
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to Ponape District,” L.R. No. 288. 4th Ponape District Legislature, 7th Regular Session. (1978) in “Corres. 
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independence economic development was mounting as well. Nonetheless, the High 
Commissioner’s office denied the legislature’s request. 
The most impassioned debates over how to address these escalating costs of living 
took place at the district level. At the Congress of Micronesia, where members acted as 
the territory’s primary catalysts for independence and the de facto “opposition party to 
the Trust Territory administration,” programs like Needy Family received a lower priority 
than avoiding long-term dependence on the U.S.83 Thus, when Interior pledged in 
November 1978 not to expand the territory’s existing federal programs or seek new ones, 
and to eliminate programs of “marginal or of low priority,” the Congress was 
supportive.84 But in the districts, legislators and administrators faced more pressure to 
respond to immediate community demands. On Pohnpei, demand for USDA food was 
robust enough to coax national politicians previously hostile to certain feeding programs 
to defend those same programs after taking new positions in district administration. Resio 
Moses frequently spoke out against USDA foods in the Congress of Micronesia, but took 
a different tack as Director of Community Services, where he viewed his role as 
“supporting the government’s efforts to heal, to educate, and when necessary to feed the 
hungry.”85 Other opponents of USDA foods, like Congress of Micronesia Representative 
Kikuo Apis, maintained their resistance and were voted out of office.86 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 John Haglelgam. Interview by author. Kolonia, Pohnpei, 9 December 2014. 
84 Adrian Winkel to All Distads/Governors, et al., “Policy Statement on Federal Programs,” November 17, 
1978 in “Feeding Program in Truk Islands.” TTA, reel 71. 
85 John Haglelgam. Interview by author. Kolonia, Pohnpei, 9 December 2014; Micronesian Seminar, U.S. 
Federal Programs, 15. 
86 David Hanlon. Remaking Micronesia: Discourses Over Development in a Pacific Territory, 1944-1982. 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1998), 177. 
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Its first request for Needy Family denied, the Ponape Legislature continued to 
agitate for the program.87 In December of 1978, legislators passed a second resolution 
accusing the administration of ignoring the merits of their initial request, violating its 
“solemn obligation to promote the social advancement” of the territory, and denying 
equal protection to its citizens by implementing Needy Family in some districts and not 
others. The resolution also argued that cost of living increases had enforced reliance on 
“budget, low-nutrition food commodities” by Islanders “without adequate training or 
knowledge in food values,” and resulted in the people of the district “acquiring habits of 
food consumption increasingly more detrimental to their health.”88 Grassroots support for 
Needy Family was becoming more apparent as well. In January of 1979, Pohnpei 
assembled a petition that ultimately reached nearly 2,800 signatures, requesting that 
Needy Family be extended to the district for the remainder of the trusteeship. Hand-
carried to Saipan by District Legislature member Peter Christian, the petition’s size was 
unprecedented, and included signatures from nearly 16% of the island’s population.89  
 These signatures, many of them grouped by surname, revealed both the kin 
networks through which Pohnpei’s grassroots politics operated and the participation of 
women within those networks. Women still exerted influence through prestige production 
and clubs, but they engaged in new forms of activism as well. In 1971, for instance, more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Adrian Winkel to District Administrator, Ponape. 20 November, 1978 in “Feeding Program in Truk 
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88 “A Resolution Relative to the Denial of the Administration to Extend the Needy Family Feeding Program 
to Ponape District,” L.R. No. 288. 4th Ponape District Legislature, 7th Regular Session. (1978) in “Corres. 
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89 On the first page of this petition stood the signatures of Nett Nahnken Salvador Iriarte and Interim FSM 
Congress Speaker Bethwel Henry. Their support may have resulted from the proximity of Iriarte’s 
municipality to Kolonia and the heavy concentration of outer Islanders in Henry’s district, which 
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than 150 women protested the sale of liquor by the drink to Islanders, bringing their 
demands to the District Administrator and then picketing a meeting of the Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Board.90 Two months later, citing the protests as evidence that “women 
are starting to take some action,” Madolenihmw’s Antalihse Shoniber launched a 
campaign for the Ponape Legislature.91 But women’s participation in the cash economy 
was deepening as well, facilitated by special trainings like those offered by Oahu’s East-
West Center in areas like nursing, beauty management, and dietetics. As Teresia Teaiwa 
suggests, these programs were both “an insidious colonial reinforcement of women’s 
supposed traditional assignment to the private sphere” and unequipped to counter 
women’s exclusion from political office or underrepresentation in higher education. Yet 
the increased buying power did boost women’s influence in a meaningful way, both in 
the home and in the island’s consumer markets.92  
Headquarters remained unmoved by Pohnpei’s repeated requests for Needy 
Family, but Christian decided to lob one further volley in the program’s defense. In a 
lengthy letter to the Office of Territories, he accused American officials of a “protective 
and paternalistic attitude” that revealed a “lack of faith” in the growth and development 
of the Micronesian people over the course of the trusteeship. Asserting the prerogative of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 According to the Senyavin Times, the women urged the DistAd to “prohibit Ponapeans from consuming 
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any more for it takes away the lives of our people.” The protests may have been a veiled form of resistance 
against alcohol-related domestic violence, in addition to an objection to the fighting associated with 
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indigenous leadership to decide whether to implement and how to manage federal feeding 
programs, Christian countered each of the arguments leveled against Needy Family in 
turn. USDA foods did not hinder economic development, he argued, but boosted it. Good 
agricultural land on Pohnpei and its atolls was not abundant, but scarce. Community 
health was not robust but in decline, and termination of the Women, Infants, and Children 
feeding program in the face of an “alarming death rate among infant children” revealed 
the administration’s “appalling lack of sensitivity.”93 Pohnpei’s sovereignty was its own 
concern, and Christian urged Interior not to “become blinded by a preoccupation with 
thoughts concerning the future status of our islands.” But his letter also characterized the 
territory as a “small isolated community of developing islands, limited in skilled 
manpower and resources and basically in need of outside help,” with indigenous 
leadership best equipped to direct those outside resources to local needs.94  
On the one hand, pro-USDA leaders like Christian made savvy use of Pohnpei’s 
newly empowered legislature during this time, advocating for feeding programs that 
stood to offer significant, meaningful short-term benefits to their constituents. As David 
Hanlon suggests, the outer Islander communities Christian represented may have been 
especially supportive of programs like Needy Family, wagering that “reliance on the 
wealth of distant colonizers was preferable to dependence on their more physically 
proximate, considerably less wealthy, and oftentimes less hospitable Pohnpeian hosts.”95 
Outer Islanders were also more likely to be landless, to live in or near Kolonia, and to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 In fact, the decision to terminate WIC had originated in Resio Moses’ Department of Community 
Development. “Food Program Stirs Controversy,” Micronesian News Service, October 27, 1978 in 
“Feeding Program in Truk Islands.” TTA, reel 71. 
94 Peter Christian to Ruth Van Cleve, 5 January 1979 in “Corres. Meetings, Report and Other Information.” 
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rely on store foods for their survival, and therefore more likely to benefit from easier 
access to an imported food diet that many had adopted already.  
But access to USDA foods offered considerable advantages to Christian’s landed 
Pohnpeian constituents as well, both for their ability to assuage food security anxieties 
and to divert agricultural labor away from subsistence production and toward the prestige 
economy. While cash had intruded into traditional feasting as early as the 1930s, when 
some traditional leaders began selling the yams gifted to them at feasts, the ballooning 
bureaucracy of the 1970s was expanding participation in the cash economy at an 
unprecedented rate.96 As a result, a growing number of Pohnpeians were conserving labor 
for prestige production by consuming imported foods like rice or ramen rather than 
subsistence crops like breadfruit or taro, or purchasing high-value yams, pigs, and sakau 
from others. By the 1980s, a kind of inflation was reshaping the island’s feasts. Cash 
fueled contributions of larger and larger yams and pigs, and imported household goods 
became an increasingly common feature of women’s feast contributions. Whereas 
traditional feast contributions enabled any landed Pohnpeian farmer to compete for titles 
on an equal footing, access to the cash economy was uneven. Just as the island’s 
burgeoning economic inequalities were starting to transform feasting, therefore, USDA 
foods offered cash-poor Pohnpeians a chance to level the playing field.97 
On the other hand, elected leaders’ advocacy for programs like Needy Family 
may have reflected a perverse incentive toward short-term planning inherent in the 
democratic system itself. Adelino Lorens, Pohnpei’s chief of agriculture since 1986, has 
proposed an analogy between breadfruit and traditional leadership on the one hand, and 	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rice and elected leadership on the other. “Elected officials are in their official capacity for 
limited terms,” he suggests, “But when we really look at the real development of a 
country, it should be longer-term. And rice is really short-term. Breadfruit is long-term… 
They say if you plant one breadfruit in your lifetime, that’s enough.”98 This capacity for 
farsightedness may have contributed to traditional leaders’ particular wariness toward 
dependence on U.S. funding. At a 1974 traditional leaders conference, for instance, a 
Pohnpeian delegate worried that the territory lacked the capacity for meaningful self-
governance without ongoing U.S. support, and that “if we cannot stand it means that the 
United States is not fulfilling their obligations.”99 For many Pohnpeian traditional leaders, 
the prospect of a future state neither developed enough to support its own government nor 
capable of self-support with traditional local resources was a matter of deep concern, and 
they did not hesitate to use their considerable influence to make their feelings known. 
Politicians like Bethwel Henry and traditional leaders like Johnny Hadley did 
work to bridge these two systems. Henry recalls attending a feast in Sokehs in the late 
1970s where traditional leaders argued over whether USDA foods meant “things would 
be very easy” or whether it was better to grow food locally to avoid dependence on the 
U.S. and to “guarantee that it will be there.” Sympathetic to these food sovereignty 
concerns and his constituents’ food security anxieties, Henry was a vocal advocate for 
self-sufficiency, diversification of exports, and economic growth, at times advocating for 
Needy Family and at times yielding to the Sokehs traditional leadership on food 
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sovereignty issues.100 Henry was deferential to traditional leadership throughout his 
career, and maintained a reputation as a leader uniquely emblematic of Pohnpeian virtues 
like respect, humility, cooperation, and even-temperedness. Yet, in his efforts to negotiate 
a tangle of competing local, national, and international interests, he ultimately faced the 
same political pressures as any other elected official.101 
Hadley, son of the late Madolenihmw nahnmwarki Samuel Hadley, served as the 
first official liaison between the FSM’s newly elected government and its traditional 
leadership. Concerned for the new nation’s food sovereignty, Hadley worked to model it 
in his personal life, farming and fishing and refusing luxuries like washing machines. In 
1981, he told a reporter, “our appetites are standing in the way of progress… As long as 
we pass the taro patches on our way to buy bread at the supermarket we are going to have 
to import foreign food within a money economy. If we can remain self-sufficient then we 
can govern ourselves. I explain this to the people but their stomachs don’t want to 
listen.”102 While Pohnpei’s chiefs traditionally held jurisdiction over the island’s foreign 
trade, Pohnpeians had been subverting that prerogative since the early 19th century, when 
commoners used sexual commerce and petty theft to gain illicit access to trade goods 
from foreign vessels.103 After independence, traditional leaders maintained social and 
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cultural leverage, but community demand for imports rising from stomachs that “don’t 
want to listen” largely overwhelmed their power to persuade.  
In the 1950s and 1960s, it had been commonplace for Pohnpei’s traditional 
leaders to hold elected office, or to quietly direct voters toward their chosen candidates. 
But by the 1970s, voters increasingly recognized that the skills needed for traditional and 
elected leadership did not always overlap, and worried that electoral politics threatened to 
degrade the traditional leaders who participated in it. As a result, the roles of traditional 
and elected leaders diverged, and neither system was left with all the tools to reverse 
Pohnpei’s rice revolution, nor to guide the global economic forces that increasingly 
pushed commercial foods around the world. The irony of a postcolonial government that 
disempowered traditional leadership and reproduced features once aimed at comforting 
U.S. administrators was not lost on leaders like Senator Pedro Harris, who complained in 
1983 that Micronesia had inherited a “three-legged” government it could not afford to 
fund.104 But neither was it likely that the people of Pohnpei would have welcomed a 
heavy-handed effort to enforce food sovereignty on their island, or to reduce their access 
to a foreign trade their ancestors had participated in for centuries.  
As the FSM entered into negotiations over its political future in the gap between 
its 1978 independence and the 1986 ratification of the Compact of Free Association, 
Pohnpei’s food sovereignty and food security tensions only gained in urgency. 
Meanwhile, the potential health impacts of the island’s changing food system were 
beginning to receive more attention. Stakes were high, and Pohnpei’s voters were poised 
to render what might be a final verdict on their future relationship with the United States. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 “Ponape Delegation Votes for Self-Determination.” The National Union 4, no. 17. September 15, 1983, 
4.  
 204 
Voting for breadfruit 
 
 In the summer of 1981, Bermin Weilbacher found himself aboard a flight bound 
from Honolulu to Pohnpei, struggling to describe breadfruit to a stranger. A Kosraean by 
birth, Weilbacher had been Chief of Agriculture for the Trust Territory, Ponape District 
Administrator, Acting Pohnpei State Governor, and was then serving as Chief of 
Agriculture for the FSM at the new national capital in Kolonia. As he recounted 
breadfruit’s remarkable versatility, Weilbacher hit on an idea for the next edition of his 
“Go Local Club” column in the FSM government’s official newspaper, The National 
Union. “Our breadfruit need not rot on the tree or [get] fed to the flies or pigs,” he wrote. 
“If you [have], at any time, made excuses to your friends for eating breadfruit, you should 
be ashamed of yourself.” Americans, he explained, didn’t apologize for eating 
hamburgers or hotdogs, nor were Japanese ashamed of sashimi, Filipinos of balut, or 
Chamorros of fruit bat. Not only should Micronesians be proud of their breadfruit, and by 
extension of their national identity, traditional crops presented a golden opportunity for 
export to land-poor regions like the Marshalls or Nauru. “GO LOCAL,” Weilbacher 
concluded, “expand your farm production.”105  
 The era between the FSM’s independence and ratification of the Compact of Free 
Association found the new nation in a remarkable state of creative flux, with future 
access to U.S. funding still unclear and schemes to bolster Pohnpei’s sovereignty 
springing up everywhere. Weilbacher’s “Go Local Club” was itself a sign of this 
creativity. As Weilbacher explains, “there was no club per se, no place where the club 
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met. I tried to build it in the mind.”106 The club’s fictive “chapters” were spread across 
Oceania, and Weilbacher’s columns a device to relay the innovative sovereignty-building 
initiatives he encountered in his travels to a Micronesian readership. Columns most often 
promoted local produce and goods, but also called for energy conservation, river bathing, 
limiting use of telephones, recycling auto parts, hiring local workers, driving safely, 
taking pride in historic sites, supporting local music, improving agricultural production 
and animal husbandry, healthy eating, and exercise.107 The range of these proposals 
suggests how profoundly the islands had been transformed under a century of colonial 
rule. Yet they also reveal the range of decolonized futures that seemed possible as 
Pohnpei prepared for its final political status vote: a 1983 plebiscite to reject or endorse 
free association that many Pohnpeians framed as a decision between breadfruit and rice. 
 Free association was an idiosyncratic political arrangement partly modeled after 
the Cook Islands’ postcolonial relationship with New Zealand. Falling into a hazy third 
space between colonization and independence, its potential ramifications were not always 
apparent. Much of the territory saw free association as a tolerable compromise, offering 
an acceptable degree of self-government without an abrupt end to U.S. funding. But most 
of Pohnpei’s traditional leaders were opposed from the start, warning of a corrosive 
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deepening of acculturation to foreign values and dependence on the United States.108 
Heinrich Iriarte, an influential traditional leader in Nett and mainstay of the island’s 
elected leadership, argued in 1970 that the only true alternative to full independence was 
a “permanent, unbreakable union with the United States.” Both free association and 
commonwealth status, he suggested, would render Islanders “half-American and half-
Micronesian,” leaving them as captive to the U.S. as Hawai’i, Puerto Rico, or Guam. 
While free association was ostensibly terminable, Iriarte argued, Micronesians would 
inevitably become “too comfortable with the large American budget and the American 
standard of living” to fully break with the U.S. in the future.109  
 Such arguments, particularly when delivered by traditional leaders, were 
influential. But Ponape District’s non-binding 1975 referendum on future status revealed 
a more complex political landscape. The referendum offered five status options, among 
which independence captured a convincing plurality of 40.9%. But each of the other four 
options involved some continuing relationship with the United States, muddling the 
mandate for independence. The vote also laid bare the district’s ethnic divisions, with 
Pohnpeians far more supportive of independence than outer Islanders. Still, sovereignty 
advocates took heart from the vote, even as the prospect of leaping into the unknown 
provoked worry among their neighbors. Some mothers, for instance, began warning of an 
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imminent return to the production of breadfruit barkcloth, leaving children to wonder 
whether Americans were “going to come and take our clothes away.”110 The question, 
guileless though it may have been, was revealing. It evoked both precolonial Pohnpeian 
autonomy and the still-recent deprivations of the Pacific War, and suggested the 
unnerving range of possibility for daily life in a post-independence state. 
By the end of the 1970s, the Trust Territory had broken into four pieces: the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, 
Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Republic of Palau. The latter three eventually 
ratified Compacts of Free Association with the United States, intricate legal documents 
that bridged the U.S. military’s longstanding demand to maintain control of the region’s 
defense with the funding imperatives of the three independent Micronesian governments. 
The FSM’s Compact offered 15 years of grants, access to certain federal programs, and 
visa-free travel to the United States for Micronesian citizens. Official FSM government 
representatives were publicly supportive and, outside of Pohnpei, resistance to the 
agreement was limited.  
A final agreement on the draft FSM Compact was reached in October of 1982, 
with a plebiscite to be held in June of the following year. That plebiscite offered Pohnpei 
a final opportunity to pore over free association’s implications for everything from 
sovereignty, funding imperatives, state-national relations, food security, and identity to 
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the legitimacy of the negotiations themselves.111 But those early years of independence 
also presented an opportunity to experiment with ways to reclaim Pohnpei’s autonomy 
through economic development, and to bear out decades of accusations against distant, 
unresponsive Trust Territory bureaucrats in the bargain. The resulting enthusiasm for 
local manufacturing was galvanizing, but stimulating production over such a short period 
proved challenging. One project aimed to manufacture flip-flops using soles and 
machinery imported from Taiwan, but poor market research resulted in an untested 
product consumers believed was inferior.112 Copra remained the federation’s bedrock 
export, and Madolenihmw’s Ponape Coconut Products was busily producing soaps and 
shampoos, boasting it could supply “all the needs of Ponape.”113 But global copra prices 
were so volatile that a crash after 1979’s peak more than halved the total value of the 
nation’s exports within four years.114 Fisheries appeared promising, particularly given the 
1977 establishment of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone around the islands, but also 
seemed unlikely to generate the imminent surge in tax revenue needed to change 
Pohnpei’s short-term funding equation prior to the plebiscite.115 
 In spite of this uncertainty, in 1983 Pohnpei became the only state to reject the 
Compact, with 51.1% voting no. Because the federation’s other three states approved the 	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agreement with more than 75% support, it was ultimately ratified. But while President 
Tosiwo Nakayama celebrated the vote as a “landslide,” reaction on the ground was more 
mixed. Pohnpei Governor Resio Moses was conciliatory, arguing that voters had not 
necessarily rejected the Compact or the unity of the federation, but lodged a protest 
against the plebiscite process itself and “asked for more time” to consider their options.116 
The Pohnpei Legislature issued a report objecting to the Compact on three grounds: 
language that seemed to permit a unilateral U.S. military presence in the islands, fiscal 
provisions that encroached on sovereignty and the federation’s balance of powers with a 
system of U.S. government audits, and deficiencies in the negotiations and plebiscite 
processes.117 Some Pohnpeians complained that an inadequate voter education campaign 
had rushed them ill-prepared into a high states vote, and worried that the Compact would 
deliver localized economic benefits to Kolonia while “casting a foreboding military threat” 
across the rest of the island.118  
Outside political observers weighed in as well. The Catholic Mission’s Henry 
Schwalenberg called the plebiscite a “successful exercise in nation-building.” But he also 
pointed to the Pohnpei vote, and to a partial boycott of the plebiscite in Chuuk, as 
evidence of the federation’s “fragile unity,” resentments over pressure to trade 
sovereignty for foreign aid, and “the extent certain factions would go in pursuit of self-
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aggrandizement.”119 Glenn Petersen noted rural Pohnpei’s overwhelming “no” vote and 
the broad support for free association in Kolonia and the outer islands, a disparity some 
warned signaled a future worsening of ethnic, class, or rural-urban tensions. But Petersen 
championed the result as a Pohnpeian defense of self-reliance and manaman, a term 
roughly analogous to power or sovereignty, echoing a man who juxtaposed the Compact 
vote with the Needy Family controversy: “we Ponapeans voted for manaman. The rest of 
Micronesia voted for USDA.”120  
Of course, Pohnpei’s district and state legislators’ fervent advocacy for Needy 
Family, and their equally enthusiastic opposition to the Compact a few years later, 
suggests that the distance between manaman and free association may not have been as 
irreconcilable as plebiscite-era sloganeering implied. The legislature’s 1978 Needy 
Family resolutions, for instance, could be read as strategies to secure a quick surge of 
development funding, remedy decades of inept colonial economic policy, and set Pohnpei 
on a path toward long-term self-reliance, as well as a scheme to meet short-term 
constituent demands. In fact, while the Pohnpei State Legislature did lodge a final show 
of resistance against the agreement, the Compact’s ratification brought a détente over free 
association that enabled leaders to turn to other issues.121 In the meantime, hopes for 
clawing back autonomy turned to the Compact itself, whose initial funding boost 
supporters hoped would accelerate economic growth, expanding the local tax base as U.S. 
funding was stepped down.122 
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Foods like breadfruit and rice had become fixtures in Pohnpei’s visions of its 
postcolonial future, as vivid tropes underpinning food sovereignty or material assurances 
of future food security. The public health impacts of dietary change, however, rarely 
seemed to break through, despite warnings from sovereignty advocates like Bermin 
Weilbacher.123 But cautions from nutritionists and community advocates across the region, 
many of them women, had been building. In 1971, for instance, Carmen M. Tun warned 
that “undernutrition” in Yap was increasing susceptibility to infectious disease, causing 
digestive and respiratory problems, and leading to pregnancy complications. Tun, a co-
founder of the Yap Women’s Association, criticized nutrition workshops that promoted 
unaffordable imports like beef and foreign vegetables, implied that local foods were 
“unfit for consumption or for maintaining good health,” and left participants feeling 
“hopeless, helpless, and frustrated.” “Merely educating the people on what to eat,” Tun 
had argued, was not enough. Restoring Yap’s food system demanded village-level 
community development linked to collaborative, interdepartmental policymaking. Only 
then could “food production, distribution, storage, preservation,” and shifting social 
patterns be comprehensively addressed.124 
Tun’s approach to restoring Yap’s public health was radical, even in the context 
of the independence movement, given its potential to cut against the region’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
postcolonial future. That reimagining concluded with a second Compact agreement, ratified in 2004, whose 
provisions were mostly familiar but which included a number of changes critics argued circumscribed FSM 
sovereignty even further. See: John Haglelgam, “Sovereignty Undermined: The Devil Is In the Fine Print.” 
Pacific Magazine (April 2004); David Hanlon. “The ‘Sea of Little Lands’: Examining Micronesia’s Place 
in ‘Our Sea of Islands.’” The Contemporary Pacific 21, no. 1 (2009), 101. 
123 See, for instance: Bermin Weilbacher. “The Go Local Club.” The National Union 3, no. 9, May 15, 
1982, 7. 
124 In addition to her work with the Yap Women’s Association, Tun later served as Second Lady of the 
FSM and Yap State’s Postmaster General. Carmen M. Tun. Nutritional Problems and the Role of 
Community Development in Remedial Measures. (Utrecht-Zeist: International Course in Food Science and 
Nutrition, 1971), 1, 3-4. 
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longstanding elevation of free markets and consumer choice over the social impacts those 
systems produced. But most of Micronesia’s dieticians played it safe, hewing closely to 
administrative preferences for promoting local agricultural production and consumption 
of healthy foods, and working to change individual behaviors through education and diet 
counseling. Nancy Rody, for instance, argued in 1981 that malnutrition resulted from 
parents unaware of “how to correctly use the new foods now being eaten in the Pacific,” 
and therefore advocated a “balanced diet” using nutrition data culled from U.S. and 
Pacific-based researchers.125 Anthropologist Barbara Demory echoed a perennial mehn 
waii critique of feasting as she worried over how Pohnpei had managed to produce such 
productive agroforests and so many “underfed and poorly nourished” children at the same 
time. Responsibility, she argued, lay with “values inherent in the traditional political 
prestige system” that had produced a “deleterious” effect on home eating, as families 
cultivated healthy crops for feast presentations while eating rice and ramen at home.126  
But Demory’s formulation was backwards. It was the rice revolution, spurred 
along by the funding increases of the post-Eisenhower era and then by the Compact, that 
had collided with Pohnpei’s subsistence economy while its prestige economy remained as 
healthy and vibrant as ever. That rice revolution has become the most visible dietary 
legacy of Pohnpei’s colonial rule, as many on the island now consider rice an 
indispensible component of any meal.127 Yet the FSM’s second Compact of Free 
Association, revised in 2004, is set to expire in 2024, and Pohnpei remains heavily reliant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Nancy Rody. New Pacific Nutrition. (Saipan, Marianas Islands: Marianas Dept. of Education, 1981), 2 
126 Barbara Gail Horing Demory. “An Illusion of Surplus  : The Effect of Status Rivalry upon Family Food 
Consumption.” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1976), 1, 12-13. 
127 Allison Corsi. “An Exploratory Study of Food and Nutritional Beliefs and Practices in Pohnpei, FSM.” 
(M.P.H. thesis, Emory University, 2004), 47. 
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on the funding it provides to operate critical institutions like schools and hospitals. As 
2024 draws near, many dormant questions over food security and food sovereignty may 
well become urgent once again. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The transformations in Pohnpei’s food system and politics in the post-Eisenhower 
era were so dramatic as to appear almost disconnected from its earlier colonial past. 
Certainly, Washington’s use of outside funding and social programs to make policy 
represented a departure from prior colonial governance, and the endurance of so much of 
that policy speaks to the period’s ongoing influence. Yet many of the building blocks of 
that change were in place long before. Copra had expanded access to the cash economy, 
and Pohnpeians had accepted a land reform that broadened its influence. Cash wealth had 
become a new form of prestige, one that mostly lay outside the traditional prestige system 
but that held value nonetheless. Rice was never quite as pregnant with meaning for 
Pohnpeians as Japanese settlers, but its use among those with access to Japanese currency 
did foreshadow a larger rice revolution four decades later. Even the ostensibly uneventful 
1950s had built Kolonia into a powerful center of multicultural influence. 
Yet the food sovereignty and food security tensions that so shaped Pohnpei’s 
independence movement were more than a response to American policymaking. Their 
roots lay in centuries of calamitous natural disasters and in the food politics of the 
nahnmwarki system, perhaps even of the Saudeleur era. Those tensions therefore stand to 
reemerge as 2024 draws closer, though perhaps in a much different form, as Pohnpei 
grapples with its relationships within the FSM, with the United States and, increasingly, 
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with China. The long-term impact of the island’s rice revolution may then come into 
sharp focus once again. 
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CONCLUSION: GOING LOCAL 
 
 The three decades since the Compact of Free Association have seen predictably 
uneven forward lurches in Pohnpei’s economic development, and a corresponding 
expansion in the influence of its cash economy. Less predictable has been a dramatic 
surge in the number of Pohnpeians and outer Islanders living abroad, especially in the 
United States. With a resident population hovering around 35,000, Pohnpei may have 
sent as many as 15,000 additional people to the U.S., to more established destinations like 
Guam, Hawai’i, and Oregon and to large cities and small towns across the U.S. 
mainland.1 FSM citizens have also joined the U.S. military at high rates, and deployed to 
bases and conflict zones across the world.2 The airport at Dekehtik now facilitates a 
vibrant informal trade, as those leaving the island pack coolers with local fish and those 
returning bring t-shirts and smartphones, or the occasional specialty food.  
 Pohnpei’s boundaries have grown, but its colonial legacy remains tightly woven 
into the fabric of the island. At Our Lady of Mercy High School in the fall of 2014, my 
Micronesian Civics class sometimes used the panorama outside our window as a way to 
consider that legacy. Our school sits in a place once called Mesenieng, named for its 
association with resurrection and new life.3 Claimed by Congregationalist missionaries in 
1865 and rechristened Canaan, two decades later it was the seat of Spanish government. 
                                                            
1 The FSM government does not maintain official figures on its residents abroad. In a 2014 conversation 
with me, however, FSM Consulate Kandhi Eliesiar estimated that 10,000-15,000 citizens of Pohnpei State 
currently reside in the United States. On other Micronesian migrations to the U.S., see: Donald H. 
Rubinstein. Micronesian Migrants to Guam and Saipan Post-Compact (1987). (New South Wales, 
Australia: The Centre for South Pacific Studies, University of New South Wales, 1990); Mac Marshall. 
Namoluk Beyond the Reef: The Transformation of a Micronesian Atoll. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 2004); Lola Quan Bautista. Steadfast Movement Around Micronesia: Satowan Enlargements beyond 
Migration. (New York: Lexington Books, 2010); Hezel, Francis X. Micronesians on the Move: Eastward 
and Upward Bound. Pacific Islands Policy 9. Honolulu: East-West Center, 2013. 
2 See: Island Soldier. Directed by Nathan Fitch. (Durham, North Carolina: Atoll Pictures, 2017). 
3 David Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar: A History of the Island of Pohnpei to 1890. (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i Press, 1988), 152. 
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There, Capuchin priests and colonial officials mingled within thick fortress walls that still 
stand just beyond the school’s gates. In a promise of collaboration and mutual respect, 
German officials opened the doors of that fort, and then slammed them shut in the chaos 
of the rebellion. To our west, German priests erected an imposing church, which towered 
over a Shinto shrine enclosed by an orderly park well into Japanese rule. There, 
Pohnpeians and settlers bowed toward Tokyo, seeking Hirohito’s divine favor as war 
approached. Only the bell tower now remains, standing watch over a baseball diamond 
whose outfield wall incorporates the Spanish ruins. A visitor might read the games played 
there as a transparent signifier of U.S. influence, unless they happen to overhear the 
Pohnpeian term for baseball, iakiu, and note its similarity to the Japanese yakyū. 
 But in seeking clarity on Pohnpei’s position within circuits of imperial rule, we 
might just as well have looked at ourselves. Our principal was a nun from Saipan, serving 
with the Mercedarian Missionaries of Berriz, Spain. Our class president’s American 
father practiced law in Kolonia, and with her German mother was a fixture of the expat 
community. My own path to Pohnpei began a decade ago, through a teaching non-profit 
whose director forged ties in the region during her years on Kwajalein. My wife came 
through the Japan International Cooperation Agency, and our courtship took place almost 
entirely within the colonial town both our nations once occupied. Our class was from 
Pohnpei and Chuuk, Yap and Kosrae, from outer islands in between, and from Kiribati 
and Korea. Some had already spent childhood years in the U.S., others were on their way 
to American colleges, and nearly all maintained family ties abroad. Even in Pohnpei’s 
public schools, where students may be less well-heeled, family names reveal complex 
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lineages, with foreign ancestors joining Islander forebears drawn in by labor, natural 
disaster, or the tireless mobility that has characterized Oceania for millennia. 
Amid this complexity, which is now embedded in Pohnpei’s flora as surely as its 
bodies and built environment, Island Food Community has been staging a vigorous “go 
local” campaign. Since its founding in 2004, Island Food’s workshops, classroom 
presentations, television and radio programs, posters, billboards, political lobbying, and 
scientific research have made the “go local” message nearly ubiquitous on the island.4 A 
colorful billboard placed near Pohnpei’s hospital in 2006, for instance, pictures a man 
teaching his son how to plant a yam. In the foreground, the boy’s mother acts as a 
“supporting figure,” perhaps preparing a piece of taro for cooking. Surrounding the 
family is an assortment of foods, from pandanus fruits and karat bananas to coconuts, 
breadfruit, and papaya.5 Absent are the cucumbers now growing abundantly in the 
Pohnpei countryside, or any sign that “local” crops like the utin pihsi (Fiji banana) or 
kehpin sapahn (Japanese yam) may have originated elsewhere.  
So what, and who, is local on Pohnpei? If Island Food believes utin pihsi can 
become local, can cucumbers? Can rice? In 2015, I posed these questions to Island 
Food’s Executive Director Rainer Jimmy. He responded: 
…what we grew up with, anything that comes in that has a similar taste or texture 
is local. For example, bananas. There were bananas way, way back. And then 
other bananas came in. They are categorized as local. Cucumbers, green leafy 
vegetables, they were not, so they’re not local. Although they were grown locally, 
they are not categorized as local because they do not meet our meaning of local 
                                                            
4 A 2008 survey, for instance, found that an Island Food billboard placed on the circumferential road near 
the state hospital two years earlier had been seen by 98% of participants. Laura Allison Iler Kaufer. 
“Evaluation of a Traditional Food for Health Intervention in Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia.” 
(School of Dietetics and Human Nutrition, McGill University, 2008), 55. 
5 Lois Englberger, A. Lorens, M. Pretrick, B. Raynor, J. Currie, A. Corsie, L. Kaufer, R.I. Naik, R. Spegal, 
and H.V. Kuhnlein. “Approaches and Lessons Learned for Promoting Dietary Improvement in Pohnpei, 
Micronesia” in Combating Micronutrient Deficiencies: Food-Based Approaches. (Cambridge: Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2011), 235-236. 
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food. And I think the locals need to clearly define what they mean by local. But 
my understanding is that local is what Pohnpeians have, what is still there, and 
what will be there…. people know that rice was never part of Pohnpei. It was 
something imported… there are varieties of banana that came from Fiji, Taiwan, 
Manila. But they’re bananas. They’re not rice. They’re bananas. Pohnpei can 
relate to bananas. So those varieties become local because Pohnpei can relate to 
them and they understand them. And I think they’ve seen these around for a long 
time, and it is part of the knowledge passed down from generation to generation.6 
 
Jimmy’s slippage between local foods and local people suggests a broad definition of 
locality, and even of Pohnpeian indigeneity, one expansive and distinct enough to 
encompass the complexity of the postcolonial island and its people. In Jimmy’s reading, 
locality is a taste and a texture, that which precedes and exceeds the colonial encounter. It 
is an ongoing relationship between the people and their land, one that remains fluid 
enough to carry to the island into an uncertain future.  
 Yet Pohnpei’s public health crisis remains urgent. Its food system cuts lives short, 
fosters illness, and strains healthcare infrastructure. Imports erode subsistence agriculture 
and litter the landscape with packaging waste, while school systems and wage labor draw 
young and old away from farm and fishery. The damage to the food system is systemic, 
and its flaws are increasingly ingrained into young bodies as each new generation of 
eaters comes of age. Invasive species impact the island’s ecology, and climate change 
now disrupts the seasonality of crops like breadfruit, causing them to ripen at unexpected 
times. Young Pohnpeians raised in the U.S. face their own struggles, as American food 
systems consistently deliver rosier health outcomes to wealthier eaters. The island’s 
activist organizations, like Island Food or the Conservation Society of Pohnpei, can have 
real impacts, especially on the individual level. But activists and NGOs lack the power to 
set the food system right on their own. 
                                                            
6 Rainer Jimmy. Interview with author. Kolonia, Pohnpei. January 13, 2015. 
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 Reclaiming a healthy food system for Pohnpei often feels just within reach, 
especially with the outbreak of its public health crisis still within living memory. The 
island’s agroforests endure, and retain much of their power to sustain the island. But 
much has changed over a century of colonial encounter, and much of that change is 
irreversible. Perhaps Pohnpei may mount a coordinated action, prioritizing long-term 
public health and the health of the food system, with agroforests at the heart of the 
solution. Perhaps local food can be brought to local people, helping to layer new and 
healthier histories on Pohnpei’s colonial pasts. But the pain that now rests in Pohnpei’s 
land and in its bodies runs deep, and appears unlikely to be easily or swiftly resolved. 
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GLOSSARY7 
 
And atoll 8 eight miles southwest of Pohnpei. 
 
Dauen Neu river that currently marks the southern boundary of Kolonia Town. 
 
Dekehtik small island in the Pohnpei lagoon directly north of Kolonia, site of the 
Pohnpei airport since 1970.  
 
Enipein region in Kitti now made up of two kousapw: Enipein Pah and Enipein Powe.  
 
Fefan third largest inhabited island in Chuuk Lagoon. 
 
Haruki-mura Japanese agricultural settlement established in Palikir in 1931, whose 
name means “Coming of Spring” village. 
 
Herbertshöhe (Kokopo) capital of German New Guinea, located in East New Britain,” 
from which Germany governed its “Island Territory” in the Carolines and Northern 
Marianas.  
 
Isol Pohnpei’s season of scarcity, yam season. 
 
Jaluit Gesellschaft German copra trading firm founded in 1887 from the merger of the 
Deutsche Handels und Plantagen-Gesellschaft and Robertson & Hernsheim. The firm 
purchased the San Francisco-based A. Crawford & Co. five years later.  
 
Kaigan Dōri Kolonia Town’s waterfront road under Japanese rule, and center of 
commercial activity at that time.  
 
Kamadipw traditional Pohnpeian ceremonial feast. 
 
Kapingamarangi atoll 465 miles north-northeast of Pohnpei. 
 
Kinakapw kousapw in northeast Madolenimw. 
 
Kōgakkō Japanese-era schools established to teach Islanders Japanese and train them for 
colonial labor. 
 
Kousapw section or local chiefdom. 
 
Ledau kousapw in eastern Madolenihmw. 
 
Lehn Diepei river in Rohnkitti that flows into the Dauen nan Kepinpil. 
                                                            
7 Many entries adapted from Thomas Panholzer and Rufino Mauricio, Place Names of Pohnpei Island, 
Including And (Ant) and Pakin Atolls (Honolulu: Bess Press, 2003) and Damian Sohl, Kenneth Rehg, and 
Robert Andreas, “Pohnpeian-English Online Dictionary,” accessed 12 July 2018, www.trussel2.com/pnp. 
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Lelu one of Kosrae’s five municipalities, located on the island’s northeastern side, and 
site of the Kosrae State capital at Tofol. 
 
Lenger small island and kousapw just northeast of Dekehtik, in the Pohnpei lagoon. Site 
of Japanese seaplane base and American airport until 1969. 
 
Luhwen wehi “remainder of the wehi,” the land remaining in each wehi after the 1912 
German land allotments. 
 
Lukop kousapw in Madolenihmw. 
 
Mahr preserved breadfruit. 
 
Malem one of Kosrae’s five municipalities, located on the island’s southeastern side. 
 
Mehn waii foreigner. 
 
Mokil atoll 109 miles east of Pohnpei. 
 
Mortlock Islands group of large atolls 150 miles southeast of Chuuk. 
 
Mpwoampw area directly to the southeast of Kolonia Town, just past the Dauen Neu 
river. Mpwoampw was purchased by Johann Kubary, then by the Etscheit Family. Nett 
traditional leaders have contested ownership of the area for decades.    
 
Mwalok a community in Sokehs Powe known for its sizable Pingelapese population. 
 
Nahlaimw second ranking title in the Nahnken title line. 
 
Nahnken title of the highest chief in the “B” title line of Pohnpei’s nahnmwarki system. 
 
Nahnmkwari title of the highest chief in the “A” title line of Pohnpei’s nahnmwarki 
system. 
 
Nahs Pohnpeian feasthouse and community meeting house, formerly used for religious 
purposes. 
 
Naichi (??) Japanese term for domestic, or inland. Used to measure the distance of 
people, colonies, nations, and objects from “domestic” Japanese space. 
 
Naichi hakumai domestically grown Japanese white rice. 
 
Namiki Dōri road that led from the Spanish wall park, past the Kolonia kogakko, 
hospital, and government offices, and led to the town’s agriculture/weather station under 
Japanese rule. Presently Kaselehlie Street. 
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Nankinmai an undesirable rice imported to Japan widely associated with Nanjing, 
although by the 1920s it was mostly produced in Southeast Asia. 
 
Nanpohnmal Nett kousapw just south of Kolonia Town. Prior to the rebellion of 1910-
1911, Nanpohnmal was part of Sokehs. Site of a sizable airport under Japanese rule. 
 
Nanshin Japanese political doctrine of “southward advance” toward Oceania and 
Southeast Asia, pursued especially by Japan’s Navy between the 1920s and the Second 
World War.  
 
Nan’yō Bōeki kaisha (NBK) South Seas Trading Company. 
 
Nan’yō Dendō Dan South Seas Mission. 
 
Nan’yō Guntō South Sea Islands. 
 
Nan’yō Kōhatsu Kabushiki kaisha (NKK) South Seas Development Company. 
 
Nansapw cultivated, settled, arable land, the sphere of most human activity on Pohnpei. 
 
Nanwel forest, jungle, overgrown or uncultivated land. 
 
Nan’yō’chō South Seas Government. 
 
Ngatik atoll 88 miles southwest of Pohnpei. 
 
Nukuoro atoll 245 miles south of Pohnpei. 
 
Ohwa village located in Northern Madolenihmw, site of Protestant mission station and 
considerable conflict between Protestant and Catholic forces under Spanish rule.  
 
Oroluk atoll 202 miles west-northwest of Pohnpei. 
 
Pakin atoll 21 miles west of Pohnpei. 
 
Palikir large area in southwest Sokehs, currently the site of the FSM national capital. 
 
Parempei lagoon island located northeast of Kolonia, and kousapw of Nett. 
 
Pehleng kousapw in northwest Kitti. 
 
Perehn kuk Cookhouse. 
 
Piis-Losap atoll in the Upper Mortlock Islands, 50 miles southeast of Chuuk Lagoon. 
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Pingelap atoll 188 miles southeast of Pohnpei. 
 
Puluwat atoll 170 miles west of Chuuk Lagoon. 
 
Rahk season of plenty, Pohnpei’s main breadfruit season. 
 
Rohnkitti kousapw in Kitti, site of Pohnpei’s first Protestant church, major shipping port 
and seat of several influential nahnkens during the 19th century, and center of the Nanpei 
family’s power. 
 
Ryōtei upscale Japanese restaurant, which traditionally featured entertainment by geisha 
and offered a venue for business and political leaders to hold meetings discreetly.  
 
Uhmw Pohnpeian oven built from loose stones, which are heated and placed on the 
ground around the food being baked. 
 
Sakau kava. 
 
Sapwalap large region in central Madolenihmw. 
 
Sapwtik small island just north of Dekehtik, in Pohnpei’s lagoon. 
 
Seinendan youth groups established under Japanese rule, which sponsored various 
athletic contests and community events, many of which were easily lent to nationalistic 
purposes.  
 
Shōgakkō Japanese-era schools established to educate settler children, using a 
curriculum similar to those used on the Japanese mainland. Islander schools were also 
known as shōgakkō between 1915 and 1918. 
 
Sokehs Pah the east side of Sokehs Island. 
 
Sokehs Powe the west side of Sokehs Island. 
 
Tafunsak one of Kosrae’s five municipalities, located on the island’s northern side. 
 
Tarawa atoll in Kiribati, seized by U.S. Marines from Japan in November of 1943. 
 
Tiahk custom, manner, behavior, culture. 
 
Wahu respect, honor. 
 
Wakamoto Company pharmaceutical company founded in 1929, originally known for 
an over the counter supplement based on beer yeast that was meant to alleviate 
malnutrition in Japan.  
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Wapar kousapw in southern Madolenihmw.  
 
Wehi autonomous paramount chiefdom, or turtle. 
 
Wonuhmw a cookhouse containing an uhmw.  
